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Editor’s Note
This has been an eventful year for the journal. As noted in the last edition, Dr. Laina FarhatHolzman resigned as Senior Editor after many years of highly productive work; she was a
central figure in advancing the publication. She wrote many valuable articles in these pages;
if you go to our publishing website, https://ojs.lib.byu.edu/spc/ index.php/CCR, you will
find fully 47 articles under her name (some major essays, others book reviews, one “front
matter”), since 2008. She resigned last summer in order to attend to her bi-weekly article
series published in Northern California newspapers. But, California’s gain meant the
journal’s loss. How have we attempted to recoup?
First, at the Monmouth University annual meeting of our sponsoring organization, the
International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations, the Editorial Board elected
two new Executive Editors. They are Dr. J. Randall Groves of Michigan and Dr. Tseggai
Isaac of Missouri.
Both are long-time authors and members of the ISCSC. Dr. Groves, Professor of
Humanities and Comparative Civilization at Ferris State University, published the lead
article in last spring’s edition; it was entitled “Southeast Asian Identities: The Case of
Cambodia.” Dr. Isaac, Associate Professor of History and Political Science at the Missouri
University of Science and Technology, published the second lead article in the same issue:
“Civilizations: Which Constitutes Africa’s Most Effective Choice?”
Further, both have proved of central significance to the journal this year. Especially
important is that Dr. Groves selected the lead author for a “focus” argument in this current
issue. The central article is by Prof. Steve Farmer; it represents an innovative approach to
the study of religious and philosophical systems, using the computer to find commonalities
across civilizations. Prof. Groves guided Dr. Farmer through the editorial process, taking
an earlier work and expanding and updating it for the journal. It’s a controversial argument,
and we are carrying some responses in this issue, plus an introduction by Dr. Groves.
Because of an extensive publishing commitment later this year, Dr. Groves had to decline
to serve as Executive Editor for more than the current year, but he will continue to be
associated with the journal.
Similarly, Prof. Isaac is taking the lead in the fall number. What he has taken on will touch
the hearts of all interested in comparative civilizations. He is supervising the creation of a
festschrift to a great expert in this field, and a friend of many of us: Dr. Matthew Melko.
Such a festschrift has happened in the past, once before, with an edition in honor of Dr.
Benjamin Nelson, first president of the ISCSC in its American incarnation. Thank you very
much, Dr. Isaac, for this leadership.
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Next, the role of Managing Editor has been taken up ably by Peter Hecht of Washington,
D.C. Mr. Hecht is great at administering organizations; his talent in this regard was honed
by the years he spent first directing the growth and expansion of Coca Cola as National Sales
and Marketing Manager in Uzbekistan, achieving worldwide #1 status for sales growth in
1996, and then directing the efforts of R. J. Reynolds / Nabisco to establish a regional sales
force in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and the other Central Asian republics now
known generally as the “stans.”
Several years ago, Mr. Hecht returned to the United States as his wife, Kimberly Heimert,
now Vice President and General Counsel of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation,
became a top official of the Obama administration. So, he entered the graduate program in
Social Foundations of Education at the University of Virginia. His comprehensive exam
was adjudged the highest honors pass of the year. As a reader, and as his professor, I can
attest to his exceptional abilities. He is putting the journal on an efficient and effective
footing.
Copy-editing is also led by two superlative experts. Carolyn Carpentieri Potter, a graduate
of Harvard College and Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, was for many
years an editor and publisher in New York, as well as a college faculty member in
Connecticut. Her specialty has been editing publications in the apparel and retail industry.
She also created, wrote, and developed an important health and wellness curriculum for
American junior high schools; she now lives in Florida. Many of our colleagues met her for
the first time at the Monmouth University conference this past summer, where she was
elected Senior Editor.
She is joined by the German-born and bred, now Washingtonian, Dr. Stefan Gunther, as
Editor. He began his university studies at the University of Wurzburg and the University of
Kent at Canterbury, and holds a master’s in English from SUNY Oneonta and from
Brandeis, where he earned his doctorate, as well. His dissertation, on the hermeneutics of
memory and representations of the Holocaust in contemporary fiction, shows that individual
memory of the Holocaust is being supplanted by cultural memory. Dr. Gunther has been a
top university academic administrator in the Washington area, serving at the George
Washington University, the USDA Graduate School, Johns Hopkins University, and DeVry
University, which sponsored our meeting several years ago.
Our new Corresponding Editor is Dr. Nejat Dogan. He is a full professor of international
relations at the Anadolu University of Turkey, where he chairs the Department of
International Relations. This is another brilliant person. The proof? Upon graduation from
the school of political science at Ankara University, he took a national test and emerged
with the very highest performance in the entire country. As a result, he was sent for graduate
studies in the United States on complete scholarship, earning a master’s degree in
international politics from The American University and a doctorate in foreign affairs from
the University of Virginia.
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His writings -- he is fluent in both English and Turkish -- deal with cooperation among
nations, democracy and peace, and international terrorism; he has long been active with the
Association to Unite the Democracies and the Ashburn Institute.
Currently, he is a visiting scholar at Portland State University in Oregon, with support from
the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey; he is studying twenty-first
century Turkish foreign policy and coordinated successfully an international graduate
student conference on challenges to democracies and East-West reconciliation this spring.
These newcomers join with our existing leaders on the Editorial Board: Connie Lamb holds
the title of Editor but she actually does everything.
It is Prof. Lamb, the Social Sciences Librarian at Brigham Young University with subject
responsibility for Anthropology, African Studies, Middle East Studies, and Women’s
Studies, who is responsible, more than any other human being, for our journal being online
and searchable (and at virtually no cost to the journal or the association). She provides
liaison to those library staff members of Brigham Young who handle the electronic
production of the journal and she helps to lead the Editorial Board’s initial review of all
submissions for acceptability.
All of this is while she has just added to her resume a Masters of Philosophy in Anthropology
from the University of Utah on top of the Master’s of Library Science degree, which she
earned earlier from Brigham Young University. Congratulations, Connie.
Dr. David Wilkinson is the Book Review Editor. In my opinion he is more knowledgeable
about comparative civilizations than the rest of us put together. His presentations at the
annual meetings of the ISCSC are always incisive, brilliant, and funny.
A distinguished scholar (if you go to the BYU website for this journal and type in his name,
you will find 18 articles by him listed in recent years), he has reoriented scholarship on the
nature of civilization, specializing in fluctuations of power systems, hegemony, and the
emergence of a Central Civilization or a Central World System.
Dr. Wilkinson is a Professor of Political Science at the University of California at Los
Angeles, is yet another Harvard and Columbia grad (he received his PhD from Columbia in
1965) and he was a founding member and officer of the International Society for the
Comparative Study of Civilizations upon its commencement as a U.S.-based organization,
serving through to the present.
Finally, Dr. Thomas Rienzo of Michigan holds the title of Technical Editor of this journal,
but that grossly understates his centrality to the production of the issue. Were it not for his
ability to format, set, and edit all our pieces, it would be impossible to produce the journal.
He has enormous intellectual capability and knowledge of the field, can edit anything – no
matter how poorly put together -- and has the patience of Job. The holder of a PhD from
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol72/iss72/19
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Western Michigan University, he is that institution’s faculty specialist in computer
information systems and teaches business computing and information technology
management courses at the undergraduate and graduate level.
All in all, the association and the journal can be proud of such a distinguished Editorial
Board, I think. Of course, I’m biased; each member I consider a personal friend and highly
achieved colleague. But I think that all readers will see the fruits of the labors of these men
and women in an excellent final product – a journal that has set, and continues to set, the
pace for studies of contemporary civilization.
Joseph Drew
Washington, D.C.
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The Commentarial Engine
J. Randall Groves, PhD
Professor of Philosophy and Comparative Civilization Ferris State University
jrandallgroves@ferris.edu
I am happy to get the opportunity to bring the work of Steve Farmer, John B. Henderson
and Peter Robinson to the attention of the readers of Comparative Civilizations Review.
The attempt to use developments in scientific thought is a common one in the pages of this
journal, but I have yet to see any study make such rigorous and fruitful use as this article.
Our featured paper, “Commentary Traditions and the Evolution of Premodern Religious
and Philosophical Systems: A Cross-Cultural Approach,” argues that there is a discernible
pattern to the succession of changes in religious and philosophical thinking across cultures
and that this pattern has a specific cause, namely the reiterated application of exegetical
principles, which produces the similarities we see across cultures. This is an important
contribution by itself to our understanding of intellectual evolution.
But this article is part of a group of articles by these authors and others, such as Michael
Witzel, to more closely link the study of culture and cultural change with the sciences,
neurobiology, linguistics, genetics and evolutionary psychology. These articles, put
together, represent a new approach to the study of culture and civilization and the prospect
of real progress in our thinking about the nature of culture.
There is more nature in culture, and more culture in nature than we have previously
imagined.
To make the importance of this academic phenomenon clear I will look at the article
presented in this issue in the context of two others, “The Neurobiological origins of
primitive religion: Implications for comparative mythology,” by Steve Farmer, and
“Neurobiology, Layered Texts and Correlative Cosmologies: A Cross-Cultural Framework
for Premodern History,”1 by Steve Farmer, John B. Henderson and Michael Witzel. These
three articles together give us a view of a future with an understanding of the development
of religious and philosophical thinking across cultures.
As the author’s introduction notes, when the article was originally written, the academic
world was not yet ready for such a set of bold claims, particularly ones that suggest that the
humanities can learn anything from the hard sciences. However, while there is still
significant hostility to these sorts of arguments, there are many who are ready to look at the
new claims.

1

Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities 72, 2000 {2002} 48-90.
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For one thing, until the developments of the last twenty to thirty years, there was little from
the sciences that could inform how we think about changes in intellectual thought. Since
that time a number of studies have come out and forged something of a consensus on the
social basis of the evolution of higher brain functions.2
Farmer, Henderson and Robinson are not interdisciplinary interlopers, trying to impose a
structure on intellectual history from the natural sciences with no training in or knowledge
of the subject matter they are attempting to explain. Farmer and Henderson are both
scholars from the Humanities who have noticed their findings cohere with some recent
scientific developments. This led to the publication of another very important article by
Farmer and Henderson, this time with Michael Witzel, an Indologist at Harvard University,
who has written a thought-provoking book applying the same scientifically oriented
approach the study of world mythology.3
In that article, “Neurobiology, Layered Texts and Correlative Cosmologies: A CrossCultural Framework for Premodern History,” Farmer, Henderson and Witzel presented a
neurological model of the brain that linked the stratified structure of neocortical columns
with the formation of systems of thought that resolve conflict through the dispersal of the
contradictions to different levels so that contradictions can then be accommodated in an
overall consistent system. The results of that paper explain the neurological basis for the
development of the exegetical techniques that play the key role in this paper.
The other paper we look at concerns the origins of myth and religion. In “The
neurobiological origins of primitive religion: Implication for comparative mythology,”
Farmer writes, “The idea that the anthropomorphism underlying primitive religion and myth
is in fact a side-effect of brain development is supported by a great deal of testable
evidence…” This puts Farmer in line with the scholarly consensus concerning the social
brain as the basis for much of our higher intelligence as well as our tendency toward
anthropomorphism. But Farmer diverges from the social model in suggesting that a
neurobiological explanation is also required, specifically topographic brain maps which
utilize a mirroring structure to transfer information from one level to another. If the face in
the cloud is to become a god, then the brain must transfer information at one level to another
level, and this is accomplished via the construction and integration of topographic brain
maps in which “default state anthropomorphic models are routinely over-extended into the
non-human world.” (32)
If we combine these with other articles written by Farmer and the rest of the group of
scholars involved in these investigations, we see the development of a new bold vision for
the humanities. We see a scientifically informed approach to textuality that gives a
convincing explanation of the similar forms of intellectual change that we see across
cultures.
2
3

See, for example, Guthrie, Faces in the Clouds: A New Theory of Religion. Oxford UP (1995).
Michael Witzel, The Origins of World Mythology. Oxford UP (2013).
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When we consider the three articles together, then, what we see is a set of arguments that
explain the development of intellectual thought at five different levels, the level of brain
organization, the level of correlative thought, the level of myth, the level of religion and the
level of philosophy. This is an extraordinary accomplishment. It gives us a good start on
understanding human thought from its earliest beginnings in basic correlations to the first
myths, to the development of these myths into religions and finally, from religion into
philosophy. This is work of breathtaking scope and importance. Those who view the
sciences and humanities as forever distinct magisteria should rethink their positions in the
light of these articles that show that there can be lots of fruitful overlap.
Now to the article of this issue.
Farmer et al. make two sets of arguments in our featured article. One set is to show that
parallels in premodern intellectual developments across cultures are due to similarities in
the form of exegesis across cultures, which take the form of repeated applications of a small
number of intellectual moves. These patterns are what create the parallels in intellectual
evolution across cultures.
The other set of arguments aims to show that there is a mathematical and neurological basis
for the patterns and evolution. It is thus a bold reductionism that claims to explain the form
of the intellectual content of at least some ideas and even the progression of ideas in
intellectual history as ultimately caused by the structure of the brain, which, in turn, reflects
a structure that can be described as fractal-like. This means that intellectual history can be
analyzed in the same way as all other complex systems, via the development of self-similar
structures. I will focus on the first set of arguments in this introduction to the featured
article.
Farmer et al. argue that “Because the reconciliative methods of religious and philosophical
commentators were similar worldwide,”— a result of our common neurobiological
heritage, “when rates of textual information flow were roughly comparable, structural
growth in those traditions tended to evolve in similar ways as well.” The particular contents
may be quite different, but the governing structures are the same across traditions. Since
the governing structures are the same, we see the development of cross-cultural parallels in
intellectual development.
Scholars of comparative religion, philosophy and mythology will immediately recognize
the patterns Farmer et al. are discussing. The existence of cultural parallels has long been
known, but up to now there has been no adequate explanation for the parallels. Scholars
have also been aware of similarities in exegetical traditions. Barbara Holdrege’s Veda and
Torah4, pointed to similar exegetical practices by the Rabbis and interpreters of the Vedas.
But the argument of the authors is that these patterns of exegesis have tended to lead to
convergent systems of argument across traditions. They are not convergent by being
4

Barbara Holdrege, Veda and Torah: Transcending the Textuality of Scripture, SUNY Press (1995).
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exactly the same in content, but by displaying the form of fractal self-similarities that are
likely to result from the reiterated use of certain exegetical strategies.
We see this most clearly in the reconciliation of contradictions by removing one side of a
contradiction to a different level and thus removing the contradiction. This convergence is
fueled by two contrary processes, a repetitive commentarial or scholastic process of
exegesis that brings information into a tradition in certain forms, and entropic processes
which drain information out of traditions. These two processes in conjunction with periodic
classicist revivals produce the convergences in cosmologies and correlative systems the
authors are attempting to explain.
This is the commentarial engine, the engine that fuels the fire of intellectual change and
development. The commentarial engine is what leads all premodern traditions of religious
and philosophical thought to develop structural forms such as nested hierarchies, complex
systems of correspondence, and the idea that parts of the system mirror the system as a
whole, which reflects a fractal structure.
The Parallels: Farmer et al. point to five parallels explained by the theory. The first parallel
is the emergence of textual canons between 700-500 BCE. In Greece we have Homer and
Hesiod, in China the Analects and the Five Classics, in India the Vedas, and so on. The
external push that gave rise to this convergence was the development of lightweight writing
materials.
The second parallel is the simultaneous development in abstract thought. Classical
philosophy and theology break out in Greece, China, India and Israel. The idea is that
philosophy and theology arise out of the exegesis of the canons that were established. The
authors follow Havelock in seeing Greek philosophy as the result of exegetical practices
applied to Homer and Hesiod.5 The same is true elsewhere, as in India where Indian abstract
philosophy is said to arise out of Vedic interpretation and critique.
The third parallel is the syncretic system-building of the Imperial age, 300 BCE to 550 CE.
At this time across the world we see classical sources turned into encyclopedic syntheses
and higher-level systems. State Confucianism, Mahayana Buddhism and Neo-Platonism
emerge as synthetic tendencies produce systems of correspondence and hierarchies of
beings.

The fourth parallel is the development of high-correlative systems in the late Middle Ages
and the Early Modern era, such as we see in the work of Pico della Mirandola and in NeoConfucianism.

5

E. Havelock, Preface to Plato (History of the Greek Mind) Harvard UP (1963).
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The final parallel is the collapse of high-correlative systems with the advent of modernity.
The argument of the authors is that correlativity had reached a breaking point of complexity
that could not be maintained and thus collapsed like a sand hill that has reached its
maximum height. This is marked by a destratification of correlatives, humorously
displayed in Voltaire’s skewering of the scholastics like Pangloss of Candide.
The authors claim that this theory is testable. The authors offer a computer simulation as
evidence that reiterated exegetical practices will produce the general shape of intellectual
history, or at least the general shape of the history of cosmological thought. I will not
attempt to assess this aspect of the project, but it does constitute a powerful argument in its
favor if successful.
In the end, the authors are ultimately presenting another interpretation of intellectual
history. It is a vision of intellectual history informed by developments in the sciences, and
in this way can be linked to a body of work by numerous scholars rethinking the human
story.
In this conception of intellectual history, we begin with common neurobiological heritage,
a brain that is wired to detect predators, but as a by-product, creates spiritual entities. The
“social brain,” as scholars now refer to the body of research concerning the influence of
social life on neurological development, is responsible for not only making humans smarter,
it led to an anthropomorphism that persists to this day and permeates our thinking.
These anthropomorphic spiritual entities are narrativised into myth, which is eventually
rationalized into religions. The brain has certain structural features that configure the
development of intelligence at least partially in terms of correlatives—a point made by our
authors, and this correlative impulse leads to the development of the exegetical engine,
which takes over the shaping of the outline of intellectual history—another point made by
our authors.
This is a powerful conception of intellectual history. It is sensitive to the new research on
the brain and evolutionary psychology, and it is the sort of history that lends itself to
scientific confirmation and disconfirmation.
There are two sorts of alternative approaches for the explanation of cultural parallels.
One is the Jungian approach that understands parallels as the result of a common stock of
ideas arising from a collective unconscious. The other is a more mundane approach that
looks for cultural influences, either common origins or cultural contacts through trade or
other sorts of cultural interaction. The Jungian approach, as popular as it is among
civilizationists, nevertheless founders on its implausible metaphysic of a collective
unconscious. The approach to explaining the parallels from cultural contacts does not fare
well either. Cultural contacts can’t explain similarities between cultures without cultural
contacts. Any similarity between North and South American intellectual frameworks and
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol72/iss72/19
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those of the rest of the world present a particular quandary for those who explain the
similarities through common origin or cultural contact.
This theory, however, makes sense of these parallels in terms of universal processes. The
authors’ approach is also inimical to those who follow Dilthey in arguing for the irreducible
uniqueness of all historical phenomena. The authors show that at least in some ways,
historical phenomena are not unique but subject to systematic explanation. Comparativists
understand there are convergent intellectual developments across the world’s cultures; the
task is how to explain them.
There are limits to the explanatory power of the exegetical techniques, of course. While
the authors are able to show--and even predict, the parameters of change in human religious
and philosophical thought, the specifics of any given intellectual innovation are separate
matters.




The authors could not predict the development of the concept of the Dao, but they
could predict that something like that concept, displaying the synthetic tendency of
reiterated exegesis, would develop. Maybe it would be more like the Logos of
Greece than the Dao of China. But it would be something along the lines of the
Dao, Logos or Brahman that would develop.
The authors could not predict the syntheses of Neo-Confucianism, but they can
predict that some high-correlative systems would develop in response to the
Confucian canon.

And, of course, the theory is limited in the way Dilthey would suggest; it cannot explain
individuality—the character of a person or the creativity involved in artistic endeavor.
The theory also stops short of assessing the real contributions of a given intellectual
development to the progress of human understanding. The theory cannot tell us which
systems will be efficacious or produce truth. It can only indicate their form. The authors’
arguments thus stop far short of replacing all other sorts of explanations of premodern
thought that academics might be interested in.
These limits, of course, are a good thing.
It is the theory that promises too much that founders. The theory that promises too much
also creates more enemies than need be.
The academic resistance to this approach should therefore be tempered by an understanding
of both the promise and the limits of the argument. So we reintroduce this article to the
academic audience. It is time for civilizational studies to take note of this provocative thesis
as well as the general approach, and to explore the implications of the theory.
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One implication is that the progress of human thought is not the result of pure rational
cogitation on issues of concern; rather, there are factors which govern the kinds of paths
thinking will take, and that a full account of premodern thought must consider.
The way is now open for further explorations of the conditions and history of thought that
draw on these foundations. This study shows that there is much to be gained by grounding
our theories of civilization in our scientific understanding of the brain, mathematics,
evolutionary psychology and the authors’ unique contribution, exegetical theory.
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Commentary Traditions and the Evolution of Premodern Religious and
Philosophical Systems: A Cross-Cultural Model
Steve Farmer, John B. Henderson, and Peter Robinson
saf@safarmer.com
Update (2014) Steve Farmer

The first draft of the paper published below was written for a conference in Germany on
premodern commentary traditions held over seventeen years ago, in 1997. My coauthors
were John B. Henderson, the well-known specialist on Chinese cosmologies, and Peter
Robinson, a talented computer modelist at NASA-Ames Research Center who translated my
flow chart into the algorithm found near the end of the paper.
The paper has always been a favorite of mine, since it was the first ever to attempt to identify
and model key mathematical patterns in the evolution of thought. While the model's initial
impact on historians was virtually nil — years later its cross-cultural sides did influence
Chinese studies1 — the model was well received by mathematicians studying complex
systems, which encouraged me to continue the directions established in the paper in later
years. Our initial paper limited itself to analyzing fractal-like growths in premodern
systems, but we anticipated early on that its findings might be generalized to modeling
broader segments of culture — a direction in which I have increasingly turned my attention
in recent years (see infra).
I lightly updated the draft in 2002, mainly to include references to studies my collaborators
and I had published in the five intervening years. But no major changes have been made
since to the paper, which was available on Internet but was never formally published. Over
the past seventeen years it has nevertheless slowly gained readers, being downloaded several
thousand times a year ever since.
Some topics in the paper were expanded in a long book I published in 1998 on an obscure
Latin text from the early printing age, the 900 theses of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. The
text was drawn up in 1486 for a planned debate at Rome de omni re scibili ("on everything
knowable") before the Pope and Cardinals and heads of the period's "warring schools." The
aim of the debate was to review and partly reconcile all known traditions, prelude as Pico
suggested to the Second Coming, in which Christ would still forever all intellectual debates.
As is well-known, Pope Innocent VIII forbade the debate, and Pico's 900 theses became the
first printed book banned universally by the Church. My interests in this old text lay in
Pico's extreme methods and exaggerated fractal-like views of the world, which provided a
window to study the growth of similar systems elsewhere, which can be identified in nearly
every mature manuscript tradition known.
1

Dirk Meyer, Philosophy on Bamboo: Text and the Production of Meaning in Early China (Studies in the
History of Chinese Texts, Brill, 2011.
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Other parts of the paper were included in articles that began as talks at Harvard University,
Peking University, and other academic centers in Germany, France, Italy, Holland, Japan,
and the US in the first decade of the 2000s. Most importantly, an expanded look at the
neurobiological roots of the model appeared in 2002 in a special edition of the Bulletin of
the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities devoted to the study of "correlative cosmologies,"
as fractal-like systems are known to Sinologists.
In that article, written again with John Henderson and the influential Indologist, Michael
Witzel, Wales Professor of Sanskrit at Harvard, we emphasized the model as a framework
for studying literate religious and philosophical traditions globally, in new- as well as oldworld civilizations.
In that paper we also drew up our first list of predictions that could be used to support or
falsify our model — a routine procedure elsewhere in the sciences, but previously nearly
unknown in historical studies. The best-known of these predictions pushed the dates of the
first writing in India forward over 2000 years — from the time of the Indus Valley
civilization (flourished ca. 2600 - 1900 BCE) to the last half of the first millennium BCE.
Two years later the computational linguist Richard Sproat (then at the University of Illinois,
and now at Google), joined me and Michael in testing that prediction in a paper that
challenged over 130 years of Indological research. The article reviewed masses of
archaeological, linguistic, and computational evidence that suggested that the so-called
Indus script was incapable of encoding any language, and consisted instead of nonlinguistic
symbols of a type found throughout the premodern world. Richard has since expanded our
work in a series of brilliant papers adding further statistical and computational evidence in
support of our prediction, examining along the way other poorly studied nonlinguistic
symbol systems around the world.
One further extension of our results involved what Michael first referred to as a gigantic
"No Text Zone" extending throughout the Indian subcontent, all of Central Asia,
southeastern Iran, and southern parts of the Persian Gulf from the start of the 3rd millennium
BCE (when proto-Elamite disappeared in Iran) down to last half of the first millennium
BCE. At that time the introduction by the Persians throughout their territories of Aramaic
triggered massive literate revolutions that radically impacted Indian culture and much wider
areas of Eurasia.
A brief annotated bibliography of these and a few other papers related to our model, with
links to copies available online, is given at the end of this update.
Given this background, I was happy to accept the invitation from the editors of this journal
to publish the old paper that lay at the origins of so much of my later work. Updating an
article drafted so long ago had little appeal, so we agreed to publish the article largely in its
original form, in part for its historical value, adding this note to provide background on how
the model evolved and how it has been expanded to deal with future as well as past events.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol72/iss72/19
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The period of the 1980s through late 90s, during which the model evolved, was marked by
a long series of remarkable breakthroughs in neurobiology, nonlinear dynamics, fractal
geometry, and related fields — for the first time methodologically linking research in areas
as outwardly unrelated as astrophysics, meteorology, geology, evolutionary biology,
genetics, and the new field of cultural neurobiology I was then exploring. Other major
discoveries were being made in philology, especially involving Chinese tomb text finds, that
would eventually overturn two thousand years of readings of classical texts long assumed
to reflect the genuine thought of figures like "Confucius," "Laozi," and "Zhuangzi," etc., all
of whom are now viewed as half-fictional at best. These philological discoveries had a deep
impact on the views of textual layering underlying our model, as I have discussed at length
elsewhere (Farmer, 2009).
When this research explosion began in the 1980s, I was in the middle of two extended postdocs financed by the National Endowment for the Humanities and Harvard University, the
latter spent at the Villa I Tatti, Bernard Berenson's stunning old estate in Florence. During
those wonderful leisurely years, I spent as much of my time studying theoretical
neurobiology, chaos theory, fractal geometry, and related fields of complex systems as I did
working through thousands of forgotten old scholastic texts, looking for clues as to the
origins of the elaborate fractal-like structures I kept finding in Pico and his counterparts
outside the West.
In neurobiology, Edelman and Mountcastle heavily influenced me in this period, in part due
to their elegant models of hierarchically organized brain "maps" critical to all brain
functions. Mandelbrot and Bak most impacted my views of the evolution of such fractal or
self-similar (or more technically, "self-affine") structures in general. I also gained much a
bit later from contacts with one of the pioneers in chaos theory, the mathematician Ralph
Abraham of the University of California at Santa Cruz, whose intuitive visual models
convinced me that it should be possible to model historical traditions in similar ways.
Cosma Shalizi, then at the Santa Fe Institute, provided further support for my modeling ideas
in the years right after the paper below appeared.
My early discussions with traditional historical researchers, with a few notable exceptions
(the great Ernst Gombrich was one), were less encouraging. Paul Oskar Kristeller, who had
dominated Renaissance studies for the past half century, confronted me directly at I Tatti
and in later letters. My philological work on Pico was admirable, but I was jeopardizing my
career by bringing China and brain studies into the picture. Comparisons of premodern
Chinese and Western traditions were spurious, and mixing up discussions of history with
brain science were worse. Kristeller aimed a rhetorical question at me that I'll never forget:
"What does the brain have to do with the history?!"
In Western studies in those days comparative studies were heretical, and Dilthey's views
were still common: the Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenshaften belonged to totally
different spheres of discourse, and would never meet.
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What in fact intrigued me most about Pico was that I knew from long discussions with John
Henderson, whose classic study of Chinese cosmologies appeared in 1984, that similar
fractal-like growths evolved in China roughly in sync with those in the West. My excitement
grew when digging through Berenson's old library at I Tatti, which (reflecting older
comparative interests) contained a surprising number of non-Western sources, I ran into my
first evidence that fractal (or correlative) structures arose in similar step-like fashions in
manuscript traditions not just in Europe and China, but in literate pre-Columbian
Mesoamerica as well, in ways that ruled out any possibility of direct transmissions.
Leaving aside the kinds of mystical synchronicities imagined by a Jung or Jaspers, which
were totally alien to my ways of thinking, trying to think of scientific ways of explaining
those parallels kept me awake for many months.
The answer eventually arose from a joint discovery that John Henderson and I had made
involving striking similarities in the exegetical (and especially reconciliative) methods used
by premodern scribes, reciters, commentators and exegetes in every part of the world. Due
to the precipitous decline of comparative studies after World War II, this topic had never
been systematically studied before our work.
My neurobiological studies quickly suggested reasons for those similarities, involving the
sharply limited methods that brains have available to integrate conflicting data. This led in
turn to the central idea in our paper — that the repetitive or iterative application of those
methods to successive layers of stratified traditions provided a cross-cultural "engine," so to
speak, that over long periods transformed the structures of any systems emerging out of
those traditions in convergent fractal directions.
Moreover, as I argued in my Pico book, in their most elaborate form these structures began
over long periods to reflect ever more perfectly the structure of hierarchical-mirroring (or
topographic) brain "maps" critical to all brain processing. The latter issue was being
explored theoretically and experimentally by groundbreaking neurobiologists I was then
reading, including Mountcastle, Edelman, Merzenich, Fuster, and Goldman-Rakic. The best
known result of this odd solipsistic process was the generation of a broad class of abstract
"man the microcosm" motifs, whose step-like emergence I have argued can be studied in all
literate civilizations (cf. Farmer 1998: 91-6; Farmer et al. 2002; Farmer 2009).

Ways of translating these ideas into computational terms also suggested themselves quickly:
the idea that iterative transformations give rise to self-similar (or self-affine) structures is
central to all studies of complex systems.
That idea is nowhere expressed more beautifully than in Mandelbrot's classic The Fractal
Geometry of Nature (1982). If any system transformed through iterative processes includes
significant entropic or dissipative elements — that is, if those systems lose or "leak" part of
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their data during their growth — their structures will become increasingly self-similar and
complex over time. This is what precisely what we found in the historical systems we were
studying, which reached their most extreme developments shortly before the start of their
collapse in the later printing and scientific revolutions.
Adumbrations of Dante-like or Pico-like systems were common in late ancient thought,
associated most popularly in the West with so-called Neo-Platonic traditions. But nowhere
did they attain the purity of form seen in late medieval and early-modern systems like Pico's,
which in a sense "summed up" and amplified all the fractal structures they were aware of
generated in earlier layers of thought.
The entropic processes required to build simulations of these processes can be readily
identified in reciters' memory failures, losses of texts, scribal errors, scholiasts'
interpolations, and dozens of other corruptions that philologists face in dealing with heavily
layered textual sources.
In the famous historical sketches in his classic mathematical text (Mandelbrot 1982: 405 ff.,
419), the founder of fractal geometry revealed his fascination with the same kinds of fractallike systems that John and I were studying in the historical sphere. Mandelbrot had special
interests in Leibniz's monadology and the so-called great chain of being. But misled by his
sources (especially Lovejoy), Mandelbrot mistook those structures as oddities of Western
thought, overlooking their ubiquity in other premodern cultures and hence not searching for
the iterative mechanisms that his own models suggested should underlie them (on this and
below, cf. Farmer 1998: 94-5, n. 91).
Once those mechanisms are identified in repetitive exegetical processes, the structural
evolution of those systems can be modeled using Mandelbrot's own models of fractal
growth. Obvious "tuning" parameters in building such models are provided by changes in
rates of information flows, which as other historical researchers (Innis, Havelock, Goody,
Ong, etc.) stressed long ago, can be linked to innovations in communication technologies
and closely related demographic, social, and institutional factors. If those rates remain
similar in two or more traditions, mathematical models predict that the complexities and
levels of self-similarity in those traditions (e.g., measured by their "fractal dimensions") will
stay more or less in sync in every later period — which is roughly the case we found when
we compared the pan-Eurasian growth of religious, philosophical, and cosmological systems
in each era after the middle of the first millennium BCE.
As first noted in our paper, that period overlaps with a massive Eurasian expansion of the
use of lightweight writing materials, the first synchronizing event in the parallel growth of
the abstract philosophical and philosophical systems that evolved in later centuries
throughout Eurasia. This period also overlaps with the so-called axial age, as emphasized
by Dirk Meyer (citing our work) in his seminal studies of Chinese tomb texts (footnote 1,
supra), eliminating the need in explaining axial-age parallels for far-fetched transmissions
of the idea of "abstract thought" or the mystical synchronicities of a Jung or Jaspers.
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The fact that Mandelbrot missed the links between his models and self-similar structures in
history is unfortunate, since his brilliant historical notes demonstrate that historical
awareness of those structures helped trigger the first analyses of self-similarities by late
nineteenth and twentieth century mathematicians from Cantor and Poincaré to Richardson
and Mandelbrot himself.
Mandelbrot hence missed arguably the most remarkable feedback loop in the history of
thought, and one moreover that is deeply dependent on his work: Thousands of years of
attempts by premodern exegetes to reconcile traditions, methodologically limited by the
brain's own fractal structures, led over long periods to the emergence of self-similar
cosmological systems whose contemplation by nineteenth century mathematicians helped
trigger the birth of fractal geometry — which can be used in turn to model the growth of the
systems that led to that birth.
One can take this even deeper, looking at the molecular origins of the fractal structures in
the brain, which have recently been proposed as the key to understanding all neural networks
—and by extension we would argue the massively scaled brain-culture networks underlying
the evolution of thought.2
This self-referential hall of mirrors would have delighted Mandelbrot, whose mathematical
work all depending on recursive thinking. From self-similar brain structures to premodern
cosmologies that increasingly mirrored those structures, to the contemplation of those
cosmologies by 19th century mathematicians, which helped trigger the birth of fractal
geometry, which finally suggested ways to model the evolution of those cosmologies and
the brain itself: It is fractals all the way.
***
Details on the rise and fall of premodern systems mirroring these ideas are sketched in the
paper that follows, and I won't discuss them further. In the remainder of this update I'd like
to suggest quickly ways that our model can be extended in broader directions, modeling the
future as well as the past.
In our initial article, we limited ourselves to discussing emergent mathematical patterns in
premodern thought. But as we've tried to show more recently, it is possible to generalize
our findings using intelligent-agent software to simulate how beliefs in general evolve as
rates and quality of information flows change. Among much else, this approach allows
probabilistic modeling of future developments in human thought as well as those in the past,

2
See the recent presentation of these ideas, beyond our extension of them into the cultural domain, in Di Leva, et al.
"Fractals in the neurosciences, Part I. General principles and basic neurosciences." Neuroscientist 2013 Dec
20;20(4):403-417. Preprint download: http://www.junkdna.com/di_Ieva_pellionisz_losa_neuroscientist_2013.pdf.
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using the same basic methods used to model climate change or future geological or
oceanographic developments (cf. Farmer et al., 2009, 2011-14).
Pursuing this line of reasoning, from 2008-10, Bill Zaumen, an MIT PhD with many decades
of experience developing network systems, expanding on my design input, wrote intelligent
agent network software to help extend our modeling ideas in new directions. Other
responsibilities that have arisen in the last four years have prevented us from taking this part
of our work as far as we would like, but we plan to return to it in broadened collaborations
soon, adding a graphic-user interface to make our network software (written in Java)
accessible to non-programming researchers in comparative history, linguistics, political
science, economics, and other fields of the cultural sciences.
A brief paper and a long abstract that describe this part of our work are available via links
in the last two items in the short bibliography below.
I want to end by recalling briefly the odd reception that our original paper received when it
was drafted so long ago. The organizers of the German conference who invited us to give
the paper were so upset by our attempts to introduce into premodern studies unfamiliar
recent findings in brain research, nonlinear dynamics, and computer simulations, that at the
last minute they suddenly changed the conference format. The papers would not be
delivered by their authors, but would be summarized instead in five minutes by an outside
interlocutor. The scholar they assigned to our paper didn't summarize it, and showed no
signs of having read it, but used her five minutes instead to issue sharp warnings against the
use of models in history. She cited as her authority Max Weber, who on this point at least
absorbed his lessons from Dilthey well.
The invitation from the editors of this journal to publish our paper seventeen years later
reminds us how rapidly the world is changing, due above all to the most massive revolution
ever in communication technologies, which was still in its infancy when our original paper
was written. As we predicted when we wrote that paper, in the coming decades we can
expect far more sophisticated models of the type described in our paper to become standard
tools in studies of the evolution of thought. That claim seemed outrageous in 1997 but
borders on the obvious today.
If there is one lesson that the cultural neurosciences have taught us, it is that no intellectual
production in a deep sense is the creation of one individual. We are all "nodes in the net,"
so to speak, reflecting in our creations and beliefs the summed outputs of all brains linked
to us directly or indirectly via whatever external traditions are available in brain-culture
networks orders of magnitude larger than those available to premodern intellectuals.
There are reasons to believe that all cultural systems evolving within such networks obey
the same probabilistic laws as all other complex systems. As we argue in this paper, far
from being too complex to simulate, as is often claimed, human belief systems are far less
complex than countless other systems in other biological sciences, including genetics and
neurosciences, in which simulations are critical to most scientific advances.
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Given the unprecedented speed with which cultural information and misinformation flows
are altering our political, economic, and ideological worlds, we suspect that our ability not
only to model the past but to make probabilistic predictions about the future as well may be
a requirement to insure the long-term survival of "higher" civilization. As earlier noted, we
address these issues in a paper and long abstract available at the end of the bibliography
below. Both suggest ways in which our model can be generalized to build probabilistic
models of future beliefs as well as those in the past.
We are entering a dangerous period in human civilization, coupled with apparent global
upheavals in every aspect of human life. One of the few recent developments that may help
us survive lies in our ability to replace narrow parochial with global views of history, backed
by sophisticated and testable scientific models, which can hopefully help us weather some
of those upheavals in reasonable and humane fashions.
Steve Farmer, PhD
Palo Alto, CA, September 2014
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Generalizes modeling ideas first conceived in the paper published below to wider historical
domains and the future. The same topic is taken up in a book long in progress under the
current working title Brains and history: The evolution of thought.
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Literary utopias, a seemingly modest form of fiction intended for amusement and
contemplation, have had a surprising history. They have been a source of conscious
civilizational design that has been taken seriously by some very powerful leaders, more often
than not with dire consequences.
Abstract
Parallels in the rise and fall of religious and philosophical traditions are highlighted when
those traditions are studied cross-culturally. In literate old-world societies, those
parallels included near simultaneities in the initial emergence of abstract theology and
philosophy in the mid-first millennium BCE and striking similarities in the patterns of
growth and decline in cosmological traditions from late-classical to early-modern times.
This paper introduces a general model to explain these parallels, integrating crosscultural data with abstract representations of nonlinear dissipative systems.
One novel feature of our model is its ability to be implemented in a series of simple
computer simulations. In brief, we argue that parallels in the growth of premodern
religious and philosophical systems were byproducts of cultural invariances in
commentary traditions.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2015

27

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 72 [2015], No. 72, Art. 19

Comparative Civilizations Review

23

The most important of these invariances involved the methods used by premodern
commentators to reconcile highly stratified textual canons. In our model, biologically
innate modes of analogical thought, embodied in the earliest canonical texts, are
transformed by the repeated application to later traditions of a small set of exegetical
techniques. The iterative application of the same techniques in successive layers of
tradition, combined with a variety of dissipative forces involved in textual transmission,
resulted in the growth of religious and philosophical systems exhibiting emergent selfsimilar properties.
Classical examples show up in the complex mirroring systems of so-called NeoConfucian and Neo-Platonic traditions and in closely related Daoist, Buddhist, Hindu,
Islamic, Jewish, and Christian scholastic thought. The fact that similar emergent
structures can be identified in the literate remains of pre-Columbian Mesoamerican
traditions suggests the universal applicability of our model.
Rates and reliability of textual information flows serve as tuning parameters in our
model; changes in such variables are used to model the impact of changing technological
and historical conditions on the growth of correlative religious and philosophical
systems.
We argue that the rapid development of abstract thought that occurred in the
Mediterranean, India, and China in the mid-first millennium BCE was linked to expanded
use in that period of lightweight writing materials (supplemented, in the case of India,
by the development of elaborate oral mnemonics that emerged in part in reaction to
that growth). We argue that the rapid decline of high-correlative systems in later stages
of the Eastern and Western printing revolutions can be modeled using the theory of
self-organized criticality (SOC), which envisions the collapse of self-similar systems
as they approach maximal levels of complexity and systematic integrity. We conclude
by discussing protocols for our computer simulations and our model’s teaching and
research applications.
This working paper was originally given at the Kolloquium zu historischen und
methodologischen Aspekten der Kommentierung von Text, held at the
University of Heidelberg on 4-6 July 1997. Minor revisions were added in 2002.
The suggestion that computer models can simulate the growth and decline of
premodern religious and philosophical systems may be the ultimate heresy in an
historical field in which theory of any sort is viewed with distrust. We want to
emphasize that the model developed in this paper is heuristic in nature; its object
is to encourage new approaches to premodern thought, not to replace traditional
textual research. Whatever the value of our initial simulations, we are confident
that models of the general class discussed below will become standard tools in
premodern studies in the coming decades. Please address comments on this
paper to saf@safarmer.com.
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0.1 Theoretical Framework
This paper describes a general model of the rise and fall of premodern religious and
philosophical systems—or, more precisely, those parts of a general model pertinent to
literate traditions.1 One of its novel features is its ability to be implemented in a series
of simple but potentially powerful computer simulations. The model originally arose out
of textual studies of European and Chinese cosmological traditions, but its ideas are
supported as well by data from premodern India, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and
pre- and early-colonial Mesoamerica. 2 The Mesoamerican evidence is especially
critical, since it suggests that the parallels treated in the model are not artifacts of
direct cross-influences in Eurasian thought.
The model depends on a critical feature of manuscript traditions: processes of
transmitting and commenting on those traditions, repeated over long periods, tended to
transform their structures in predictable ways.
The parallels discussed in this paper can be pictured as byproducts of two such
mechanisms: dissipative or entropic processes (the result of linguistic drift, textual losses,
scribal errors, and similar forces) that drained unique information out of those traditions, and
repetitive commentarial or scholasticizing processes that simultaneously pumped
stereotypical information into them. These two processes, modified by periodic classical
revivals or textual “purist” movements, which tended to oppose both of them, provide the
abstract engine that drives our model.
Despite its simple dynamics, the model is capable of simulating the growth and collapse
of a number of key features of mature premodern traditions—including the emergent
growth of nested hierarchies, complex systems of correspondence, and the general property
that all parts of reality mirror all others (for one graphic example, see Figure 1 below).
Adopting terms first used in Chinese studies, we refer to these mirroring structures as
“correlative systems” or “correlative cosmologies.” The development of these systems
can be traced through hundreds of years of so-called Neo-Platonic and Neo-Confucian
traditions and in a broad range of Jewish, Buddhist, Christian, Islamic, and Hindu
scholastic sources. Elaborate correlative systems can also be identified in the literate
1

Neurobiological and preliterate grounds of the model are discussed in a book in progress. For preliminary
discussion, see S. A. Farmer, Syncretism in the West: Pico’s 900 Theses (1486): The Evolution of Traditional
Religious and Philosophical Systems (Tempe, Arizona, 1998 [1999]), esp. pp. 91–96. See
http://www.safarmer.com/pico/. See also now Steve Farmer, John Henderson, and Michael Witzel,
“Neurobiology, Layered Texts, and Correlative Cosmologies: A Cross-Cultural Framework for Premodern
history,” Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities (2002). A reprint can be downloaded from
http://www.safarmer.com/neuro-correlative.pdf.
2
For some of the textual evidence on which the model is based, see Farmer, Syncretism in the West; John B.
Henderson, The Development and Decline of Chinese Cosmology (New York, 1984); Henderson, Scripture,
Canon, and Commentary: A Comparison of Confucian and Western Exegesis (Princeton, 1991); Henderson,
The Construction of Orthodoxy and Heresy: Neo-Confucian, Islamic, Jewish, and Early Christian Patterns
(Albany, 1998).
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remains of pre-Columbian Mesoamerica, in which hints survive of the long-range operation
of commentarial processes.
Interest in parallel growths in Eurasian thought has increased in recent decades, but to date
most studies have stopped at the descriptive level.3 Our original studies of commentarial
processes arose from attempts to understand the dynamic processes driving those
parallels. Much of our research has focused on the methods commentators used to
reconcile or “syncretize” traditions, since the most elaborate correlative systems arose in
epochs in which information flows were accelerating and pressures to harmonize traditions
were intense.
Our earliest cross-cultural model was exclusively verbal in nature. The model focused
on how the syncretic methods of premodern commentators promoted the growth of
correlative systems throughout Eurasia. (A table of such methods and their systematic
effects is found in Appendix A, bel ow .) Our attempts to translate our model into
computational terms began recently, after we discovered similarities in the dynamics of
our model and those involved in evolutionary processes in other fields. (For one algorithm
used in our simulations, accompanied by a flow chart, see Appendices B and C, below.)
Mirroring or reflecting properties of the sort found in correlative systems are known to
mathematicians as self-similar structures, or “fractals.” The emergence of self-similarities
in any evolving system often suggests that the growth of that system can be modeled using
the tools of nonlinear dynamics—a collection of closely related fields including fractal
geometry, chaos theory, and the theory of complex or self- organizing systems. The
use of these tools is most clearly indicated when fractal or self-similar growths arise from
the joint action of dissipative and recursive processes—precisely the conditions that we
discovered on the historical plane.
In the last twenty years, the models of nonlinear dynamics have allowed researchers to
simulate a wide range of phenomena that were previously impervious to mathematical
analysis, including developments in the social and cultural sciences.
For reasons discussed at the end of our paper, one class of nonlinear models, involving selforganized criticality or SOC, allows the simulation of not only the growth but the collapse
as well of correlative systems—a key feature in the shift from premodern to modern
thought.4

Early interest in these parallels showed up in George Sarton’s seminal studies in the 1920s of premodern
scientific traditions in Eurasia. For more recent examples, see, e.g., Hajime Nakamura, (A Comparative
History of Ideas London and New York, 1986), and the papers collected in José Ignacio Cabezón, ed.,
Scholasticism: Cross-Cultural and Comparative Perspectives (Albany, 1998).
4
For recent overviews of nonlinear dynamics, see, e.g., Garnett P. Williams, Chaos Theory Tamed
(Washington, D.C., 1997) and Yaneer Bar-Yam, The Dynamics of Complex Systems (Reading,
Massachusetts, 1997). Further on complex systems and self-organized criticality, see the papers collected in
3

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol72/iss72/19
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The claim that computer models can simulate anything of interest in religious and
philosophical traditions breaks with conventional views of the history of ideas.
Nevertheless, the grounds of that claim are remarkably intuitive. Manuscript traditions
were not handed on passively, as traditional textual scholars often imply, but were
steadily transformed by commentarial processes. The most important of these processes
aimed to free authoritative traditions from internal contradictions or to harmonize them
with foreign traditions. Because the reconciliative methods of religious and philosophical
commentators were similar worldwide (conditioned by neurobiological constraints),
whenever rates of textual information flow were roughly comparable, structural growth in
those traditions tended to evolve in similar ways as well. The result is that when two
manuscript traditions of similar exegetical “depth” are set side by side, the systematic
byproducts seen in each layer of those traditions show strong family resemblances. The
longer those traditions develop, the more similar (and self-similar) their abstract byproducts
tend to be, no matter how different their specific contents.
The most elaborate parallels of this sort show up in late-medieval thought, which in a
sense summed up two thousand years of exegetical transformations. No Western
medievalist would be likely to mistake a fourteenth-century scholastic text from Thailand
or Tibet for an ancient treatise, no matter how unfamiliar that scholar was with the
technical jargon of Thai or Tibetan scholasticism. The long chains of verbal distinctions,
nested hierarchies, multilayered analogical structures, and elaborate systems of
correspondences in the treatise would quickly give it away as a product of extended
commentarial processes.
Most Western scholars could guess the date of the text within a century or two, based on
a knowledge of similar structures in a Scotus, or Dante, or similar figure.
What experienced scholars achieve “intuitively,” computer programs can achieve using
formal means. A number of simple ways can be devised to compare the complexities of
scholastic texts; relatively straightforward measures—counts of “scholastic distinctions”
or levels in heaven and hell, or estimates of the degrees of contradiction and/or selfsimilarities in those texts—serve as markers of the exegetical efforts exerted in compiling
the texts. When information flows remain constant, these complexities often correlate
closely with the historical age of those traditions.5
Generalizing these views, our paper argues that a long series of parallel developments,
beginning in the middle of the first millennium BCE, arose from the stereotypical ways
in which manuscript traditions were compiled, transmitted, synthesized, and retransmitted
George A. Cowan, David Pines, and David Meltzer, eds., Complexity: Metaphors, Models, and Reality
(Santa Fe, New Mexico, 1994). For other sources on SOC, see note 48.
5
On some general means of estimating complexity in evolving systems, see, e.g., Bar-Yam,
Dynamics of Complex Systems, pp. 759-81.
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by successive waves of theological and philosophical exegetes. Applying the concepts
of nonlinear dynamics, it is possible to simulate transformational processes of this nature
using relatively simple computer programs. The key to understanding how those
simulations work lies in grasping the stratified ways in which canonical traditions tended
to evolve.
Computer simulations of this sort have limitations as well as uses. Like models in the
physical and biological sciences, they achieve their goals by emphasizing certain data at
the expense of others. Our model suggests that whenever information flows in manuscript
traditions rose and fell in similar ways, self-similar features in those traditions tended to
develop in predictable patterns. But the model doesn’t claim to capture all salient features
in those traditions, nor can it predict the appearance of unique elements in them due to
the influence of single writers. The model provides a useful cross-cultural framework
for studying manuscript traditions, but it cannot replace traditional textual research.
Writing on the limitations as well as uses of nonlinear models, Bar-Yam comments: “A
study of universal principles does not replace detailed description of particular complex
systems. However, universal principles and tools guide and simplify our inquiries into
the study of specifics.”6
Nonlinear models can help us picture the self- similar properties in waterfalls, in the rise
and fall of stock prices, in the distribution of galaxies, or in the growth of premodern
correlative or scholastic systems. But they tell us little about detailed elements in those
phenomena—about the behavior of individual drops in the waterfall, the movements of
single stocks, the positions of single galaxies in larger clusters, or the contents of
individual scholastic systems.
Conversely, the fact that our model “only” predicts the growth of typical features in
premodern systems does not diminish its usefulness in providing a cross-cultural
framework for studying traditional thought—which cannot emerge from the study of single
systems. Whatever its limitations, the model can successfully predict the conditions under
which systems like those of a Sankara, Thomas Aquinas, Zhu Xi, or similar writers can be
expected to appear.
At a fundamental level, the relationship between models and empirical data is no different
in the history of thought than in the physical and biological sciences. The common
argument, going back to Dilthey, that history is unique in treating “particulars” and not
“universals” is groundless, since even biographies and narrative history involve high-level
modeling.
Bar-Yam’s remark that studies of universal principles guide and simplify inquiries into the
specifics of complex systems also applies to our work. Our model throws light on minute
6

Dynamics of Complex Systems, p. 2. For what follows, cf. pp. 788-89

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol72/iss72/19

32

Review: Full Issue

28

Number 72, Spring 2015

acts of textual exegesis whose historical significance is clearest when those acts are viewed
cumulatively, through a wide-angle historical lens; investigated at close range, the
exegetical (or “scholastic”) distinctions of premodern commentators may seem too trivial
to demand serious attention.
An analogy can be drawn to evolutionary biology, in which the accumulation of small
mutations over long periods may lead almost imperceptibly to divergent life forms.
Our model pictures similar small mutations arising in religious and philosophical traditions
through the force of minute acts of textual exegesis; in this case, however, the general
direction of change was not divergent but convergent; the piling up of those acts over long
periods resulted in the growth of elaborate correlative systems whose self- similarities
became increasingly evident by late traditional times in China, Southeast Asia, India, the
Middle East, Europe, and elsewhere.
This paper argues that these parallels were not products of cross-cultural influences or
imagined suprahistorical forces (Jungian archetypes and the like), but of mundane processes
of transmission operative in all extended manuscript traditions. From this view,
exegetical transformations that may seem trivial when viewed in single texts in the
aggregate played a dominant role in the evolution of all the world’s “higher” traditions.

0.2

Overview of Detailed Argument

Our argument is divided into four parts:
1. Parallel developments in premodern thought. In our first section (1.1), we argue that a
long chain of parallels, stretching from the mid-first millennium BCE to the
seventeenth century CE, were byproducts of the inbred and stratified ways in which
sacred or semi-sacred traditions evolved. From this view, each new layer of tradition,
whether embodied in canonical texts or later commentaries, tended to transform the
products of earlier strata in predictable ways.7

7

The model of textual stratification sketched in our paper is related to, but broader in scope than, the
“accretion theory” recently proposed by E. Bruce Brooks and A. Taeko Brooks, The Original Analects:
Sayings of Confucius and His Successors (New York, 1997). The Brooks model focuses on accretional
processes in early canonical sources like the Analects, but it does not focus on the systematic
transformations that arose as byproducts of those processes—emerging, for example, from systematic
attempts by later redactors to reconcile early strata of those canons with later ones. The analyses of
Brooks and Brooks and a number of similar efforts—attempts to “destratify” the Daodejing, the Vedas,
the so-called Q document (in New Testament studies), or various Platonic, Aristotelian, or Buddhist
texts—ultimately evolved out of nineteenth-century attempts to distinguish textual strata in the Torah or
Pentateuch.
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Our model links the speed of those transformations to rates of premodern information
flows (section 1.2). While many factors affected those rates, the most lasting were
tied to developments in literate technologies. Correlation between different stages
of culture and the evolution of literate technologies—the emergence of writing,
simplified scripts, scrolls and codices, paper, printing, and so on—have been intensely
discussed in recent decades, prompted by the long series of revolutions in information
technologies in our own era.
Adding a new element to these discussions, we argue that near simultaneities in the
first emergence of abstract philosophy and theology in the Mediterranean, India, and
China around 500 BCE were tied to a broad diffusion in that era of the use of
lightweight writing materials8. These materials provided the material preconditions for
the growth of manuscript traditions and for the two thousand years of later systematic
developments sketched in our paper.
2. The commentarial engine. Our second section (2.1) looks at the mechanisms
driving those developments. In brief, we argue that these parallels arose from
the repetitive application to sacred and semisacred traditions of a relatively small,
and largely culturally invariant, series of commentarial techniques.9
From a systematic standpoint, the most important of those techniques were
reconciliative in nature. These techniques were used by generation after generation
of commentators to syncretize opposing or foreign traditions or to harmonize
conflicting layers of canonical texts.
This section of our paper illustrates how the same reconciliative methods
generated different systematic structures when applied to different types of texts.
Thus, when used to harmonize early canonical sources, the same reconciliative
strategies could generate abstract pantheons of gods, monotheistic deities, or abstract
ethical or cosmological principles, depending on the exact genres of texts being
harmonized.
In later traditions, typical products included dualistic or trinitarian concepts of deity,
broad systems of correspondences, multileveled pictures of heaven or hell, elaborate
emanational systems, and other diagnostic features of scholastic traditions. Over
many centuries, higher-level integrations of structures like these gave birth to
elaborate multilayered correlative systems—Neo-Platonic, Neo-Confucian,
Buddhist, Hindu, Islamic, or Christian cosmologies, etc. — whose levels of selfsimilarity tended to increase whenever those traditions inbred and grew in complexity.

8

This argument was first developed in Farmer, Syncretism in the West, pp. 78-79, esp. note 52. On
claims concerning developments in supposedly purely oral traditions in India, see note 12, below.
9
. The cultural invariances of these techniques are traced in our broader model to neurobiological data; for
preliminary discussion, see Syncretism in the West, pp. 91-96
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3. Computer simulations of the growth and collapse of premodern systems.
Our third section (3.1) describes designs for our computer simulations, which
draw on nonlinear models used in a variety of nonhistorical fields. Rates of
information flow act as tuning parameters in our simulations; adjusting those rates
allows us to test parts of our models that link those rates with the growth of
correlative systems in the historical sphere.
This section also discusses extensions of our model, applying the concepts of selforganized criticality (SOC) that simulate the collapse of correlative systems in late
stages of the Chinese and European printing revolutions, when rates of information
flow increased by several orders of magnitude above those seen in earlier centuries.
This section thus suggests ways to link the emergence of more “open” thought
systems typical of the modern period with the decline of the “bookish,” and
relatively closed systems treated in our model.
4. Summary and conclusions.
We add brief comments in our final section (4.1) on some implications of our work.
So far as we know, ours is the first model of the evolution of religious or
philosophical ideas capable of being implemented in computer simulations.
The principles behind those simulations are simple, and we anticipate that
increasingly powerful models of their general class will be constructed in coming
decades. The simplicity of those simulations does not prevent them from modeling
the growth of complex historical phenomena. In general, the possibility of building
such models confirms the view put forward twenty-five years ago in a famous
paper by the mathematical biologist Robert May — that nonlinear models driven
by simple iterative processes can simulate the behavior of very complex systems.10
Our paper ends by pointing to some practical uses of such simulations for research
and teaching purposes.

1.1

Parallel Developments in Premodern Thought

Historians have paid increasing attention in the last decade to structural parallels in Eastern
and Western intellectual traditions, building on a heritage in comparative studies reaching
back to Leibniz.11 These parallels show up in all literate religious and philosophical
traditions, including those developing in Europe, the Middle East, India, Southeast Asia,
Robert May, “Simple Mathematical Models with Very Complicated Dynamics,” Nature 261
(1976): 459-67.
11
For Leibniz’s excursions in comparative history, see Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Writings on
China, trans. Daniel J. Cook and Henry Rosemont, Jr. (Chicago, 1994).
10
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China, and Mesoamerica.
Paradoxically, near simultaneities in these developments are clearest in the two major
old-world regions that had the least contact in premodern times—Europe and China.
Since these parallels cannot be explained credibly by direct contacts (e.g., between near
contemporaries like Confucius and the early pre-Socratics, or between Zhu Xi and Thomas
Aquinas), we will place most of our stress in reviewing those developments on China and
Europe. Adopting this approach, we minimize the chances that those parallels can be
dismissed as artifacts of direct cross-cultural influences.
Those parallels stretched from the first canonization of sacred texts in the first
millennium BCE to the decline of traditional thought starting two thousand years later.
In this section we review five of these parallels, pointing to prima facie evidence that
exegetical processes drove each of them. Discussion of specific commentarial methods is
reserved for section 2.1; on this issue, see also Appendix A, below.
The emergence of the first textual canons. The first parallel concerns the emergence of
the earliest sacred canons in the Middle East, Greece, India, and China. This development
can be dated from roughly 700-500 BCE (exact dating here is controversial, but is not
critical for our purposes). These ancient canons provided the earliest, and often most
sustained, objects of commentary throughout Eurasia, often extending into the modern era.








In Greece, the earliest religious canon consisted of the Homeric corpus and, to a
lesser degree, writings ascribed to Hesiod or legendary poet-priests including
Orpheus and Musaeus.
In China, a similar role was played by early strata of the Analects and preConfucian layers of the Five Classics, most notably the Changes, Documents, and
Songs.
In India, analogous roles were served by the Vedas, whose dates are even more
disputed than those of Homer or the Chinese classics (some Indologists push
the composition of the Vedas back to an improbably early period). The end of the
Vedic Age, however, is normally fixed around 600 or 500 BCE.
Early Middle-Eastern canons or protocanons included parts of the Psalms and early
strata of the Torah and Zoroastrian Avestas. Although dating here too is in
dispute, widespread agreement exists that these sources reached early canonical
forms, after long periods of preliterate gestation, in these same centuries.
The Egyptian Book of the Coming Forth of Day, or so-called Book of the Dead,
while not comprising a canon in the same sense as these other works, also found
its first fixed form, including set chapter numbers, in these centuries.

The earliest canons in the Middle East, Greece, India, Southeast Asia, and China differed
widely in their genres and specific contents.
These differences have discouraged
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comparative analyses of these texts or have led to attempts to force-fit them into unitary
molds, as exemplified by recent searches for “lost” Chinese epics.
Despite their differences, all these canonical texts were characterized by later
commentators in remarkably similar ways — most typically as being encyclopedic in
nature and as somehow encompassing all knowledge and truth. These views led later
commentators to tie their systems closely to these texts and to spend much energy trying
to reconcile their contradictions.
Our model pictures the near simultaneity in the emergence of these canons as a byproduct
of a rapid expansion in the mid-first millennium of the use of lightweight writing
materials—papyrus or parchment in the Mediterranean, palm leaves and birch bark in
India, and bamboo strips and silk in China. Lightweight writing materials provided the
necessary foundations for manuscript traditions and for the systematic structures that were
later built on those foundations. While direct intellectual contacts were rare in distant
Eurasian civilizations and cannot explain most parallel developments, innovations in
literate technology moved swifty and could rapidly transform geographically isolated
regions in similar ways.
The fact that stratified manuscript traditions had their origins in roughly the same period
everywhere in Eurasia helps explain why developments in these traditions kept more or
less in sync over the next two thousand years.12
12

Cf. Farmer, Syncretism in the West, pp. 78-79, esp. note 52. We cannot discuss in detail the hotly
debated question of when Vedic sources first appeared in literate form; we plan to deal with this
question in a future study. In brief, evidence supports the traditional view that oral transmission of
canonical texts, backed by powerful mnemonic techniques, played a larger role in India than in most
other ancient civilizations; nevertheless, extensive quotations from opposing textual schools in later
layers of Vedic traditions (e.g., in the Vedic sutras, dating from the last half of the first millennium
BCE), show that the frequent claim that the Vedas were not written down until well into the common
era are exaggerated. While material evidence of writing in post-Harappan India does not begin until the
mid-third century BCE, strong indirect evidence indicates that literacy began before early layers of the
texts ascribed Panini, dated somewhat earlier. Evidence also suggests that the extreme mnemonic
techniques used to fix texts in later Vedic times (use of padapatha texts, etc.) may have first developed
in reaction to expanding Persian literate influences during the early Achaemenid era in Northwest India
(late sixth century BCE). In China, limited use of bamboo strips for writing can be traced to the early
Zhou dynasty, but evidence of extensive use of the material doesn't begin until the fourth century
BCE—exactly the same period as the explosive growth of manuscript traditions in Greece and the
Middle East. In Egypt, papyrus was available as far back as the third millennium BCE, but its export
was restricted until the mid-first millennium—the first period in which extensive evidence exists of
the use of lightweight writing materials elsewhere in the Middle East. For discussion of the latter
evidence, including references to limited earlier uses of such materials, see Raymond P. Dougherty,
“Writing Upon Parchment and Papyrus among the Babylonians and the Assyrians,” Journal of the
American Oriental Society 48 (1928): 109–135. Internal commentaries in Egyptian sources can be
identified as early as the mid-third millennium in the so-called pyramid texts, which apparently once
existed in perishable as well as durable form; these internal commentaries continued in the coffin texts
and Book of the Dead, allowing us to trace conceptual developments in Egyptian funereal texts for
over two millenia. Systematic developments in these texts, which we plan to discuss elsewhere,
provide strong confirmation of the general model discussed in this paper. The pan-Eurasian diffusion
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Near simultaneities in the development of “abstract” thought.
The second parallel involves the simultaneous emergence of classical philosophy and
theology in Greece, India, and China from around 550-300 BCE. Abstract theological
developments in Hebrew thought also date from this era.
 In Greece, this period opens with the early pre-Socratics and closes with the
emergence of the Platonic, Aristotelian, Epicurean, and Stoic schools.
 In China, the period starts with the oldest strata of the Analects and extends
through the “hundred schools” to the time of Xunzi, who was born just after our
terminal dates.
 In India—following for the moment traditional dating—the period begins with
the “historical” Buddha and the Mahavira (reputed founder of Jainism) and closes
with the redactors of the philosophical layers of the Upanishads and Vedic sutras.
 While Hebrew traditions did not generate abstract philosophical constructs of the
sort found in Greece, India, or China, the first development of abstract
monotheism appeared in this period in later strata of the Torah and related texts.
As we point out shortly, this development can be traced to exegetical forces similar to
those responsible for the initial growth of abstract philosophy in Greece, India, and China.
The temporal coincidences in this period are often quite remarkable, at least if we accept
the traditional dates suggested in ancient sources. According to the most common
variation of those dates, to cite one example, we find Confucius, Buddha, and Xenophanes
(the first pre-Socratic for whom we have extended fragments) all dying in the same fiveyear period, 483-479 BCE!
The fact that those dates, and even the historicity of these figures, often rests on shaky
grounds

13

does not diminish the impression that powerful forces in this era were

of lightweight writing materials in the mid-first millennium was closely related to pan-Eurasian
political consolidations in this period—a topic that we also plan to discuss in a later place.
13

The recent tendency, in both Indian and Chinese scholarship, has been to push these dates significantly
forward. Thus recently proposed dates for the “historical” Buddha (if such a figure ever existed), based in
part on archaeological evidence, place him as late as the mid-fourth century. See Heinz Bechert, “The
Date of the Buddha Reconsidered,” Indologica Taurinensia 10 (1981): 29-36, and the remarks in Patrick
Olivelle, trans. and ed., Upanisads (New York, 1996), xxvi, note 23. Tendencies to push these dates
backwards in ancient times were frequently the result of fierce competition between warring schools.
Thus if Confucians claimed that their half-legendary founder died in 479 BCE, Chinese Buddhists were
naturally inclined to put Buddha's death a few years earlier (e.g., 483 BCE) and the Daoists their
mythical founder, Laozi, earlier still (e.g., 602 BCE). Leaving aside this traditional game of oneupmanship, there is no doubt that the temporal window within which classical philosophy began in
Greece, India, and China was remarkably narrow—differing by less than a century in the two most distant
Eurasian societies, Greece and China.
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transforming thought in widely separated cultures in similar ways. Major differences in
the varieties of “abstract thought” that emerged in this period suggest that these parallels
could not have resulted from direct intellectual contacts, but must have arisen indirect
mechanisms of some kind.
Classicists often treat premodern philosophers as “speculative” thinkers, encouraging
purely phenomenological accounts of their thought—or what commonly passes for their
thought.14 In contrast to these views, much evidence suggests that most of these thinkers
were commentators of one sort or another on earlier canonical texts. The famous remark
in Analects 7.1 that Confucius was a transmitter, not an innovator, and sections of the
Analects commenting on the Songs and Documents, have recently been assigned to layers
of the Analects postdating the “historical” Confucius by a half century; the terse sayings
ascribed to Confucius in the text’s earliest strata appear to originate in a period of
restricted literacy and not in the literate courtly traditions of later periods of the Warring
States era.15
No matter whether or not we accept the literal existence of an “historical” Confucius,
however, it is clear that by the last half of the fifth century the early compilers of the
Analects were deeply involved in commentary on the text’s early strata and on preConfucian layers of the Songs and Documents. These exegetical concerns were to
dominate intellectual developments in China for well over two thousand years.
The exegetical concerns of early Greek philosophers are less widely recognized than
those of early Chinese thinkers; however, as Havelock argued back in the early 1960s,
evidence shows that early Greek philosophy largely arose out of commentarial
“integrations” of earlier Homeric myth.16
Occasionally, as in the case of the four- element theory, we can watch abstract thought
arising directly from earlier mythic layers of thought17. By the first half of the fifth
century, much of pre-Socratic commentary had turned hostile towards older mythic
canons—as illustrated in the sharp criticism hurled at Homer and Hesiod in fragments
ascribed to Xenophanes or Heraclitus—but commentary it was nevertheless. Claims
14

These accounts are often accompanied by naïve views of the authorship of early philosophical texts,
which commonly (as in the case of the Analects) turn out to be highly stratified works. As Karlgren
argued about early Chinese texts, and Havelock about pre-Socratic documents, surviving fragments from
this period were typically “worked up” abstractly in the much later documents in which these fragments
survive—and hence do not faithfully represent the thought of the figures to whom they are attributed.
15
See Brooks and Brooks, The Original Analects.
16
E. Havelock, Preface to Plato (1963). On Havelock’s views of the links between Homeric exegesis and
the evolution of the Platonic theory of Ideas.
17
Thus the abstract four elements commonly ascribed to Empedocles show up in Empedocles frag. 6 as
Hera, Zeus, Aidoneus, and Nestis—i.e., as gods of earth, air, fire, and water. Similar shifts from mythic
to abstract forms show up in India in China—in the latter case, e.g., in the evolution of the abstract
cosmological principle of Tian or “Heaven,” whose earliest pictograms were unambiguously
anthropomorphic in form.
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that the Homeric corpus was the repository of “everything knowable” remained strong,
in fact, long after newer philosophical canons were challenging Homer’s religious
authority; thus well into the fourth century BCE, the author (or authors) of the Platonic Ion
felt the need to attack the reciters and exegetes of Homer, who continued to portray the
Iliad and Odyssey as the source of all human wisdom; ironically, the late-ancient
commentators who allegorically “read back” philosophical ideas into Homer were helped
by the fact that many of those ideas originally developed in earlier Homeric exegeses.
Similar developments were simultaneously taking place outside China and Greece.
Indologists commonly affirm that exegetical transformations of early Vedic hymns lay at
the roots of abstract philosophy in India. This view can be supported by much textual
evidence in later strata of the Brahmanas (the earliest Vedic commentaries) and the
philosophical layers of the Aranyakas, Upanishads, and Vedic sutras.
In Hebrew culture, similar evidence suggests that the transcendent creator god of later
strata of the Torah arose from exegetical integrations by the so-called Priestly redactors
of primitive anthropomorphic concepts in earlier levels of the text; syncretic fusions with
foreign concepts, drawing on the same strategies, also played a role in this
development.18 The dates of these abstract developments closely parallel those we have
noted in China and Greece.
Exegetical integrations of early textual canons, promoted by a rapid pan-Eurasian diffusion
of lightweight writing materials (presumably promoted by deeper political and
demographic trends) efficiently explain near simultaneities in the first development of
“abstract” thought in the mid-first millennium BCE. Religious reformers and early
philosophers of the period generated primitive element theories, transcendent and partly
deanthropomorphized deities, and abstract ethical or cosmological concepts (ren, dharma,
“the Way,” brahman/atman dualities, the Logos, “the idea of the Good,” and so on) by
exegetically “working up” conflicting mythic concepts embodied in older levels of
tradition. The hermeneutical problems faced by these commentators, and the methods
used to solve them, were similar throughout Eurasia; common variations in the systems
they created can be explained by differences in the specific canonical texts to which those
methods were applied.
Parallels in syncretic system-building in the imperial age.
A third extended series of parallels took place from approximately 300 BCE to 550 CE, the
first great syncretic age in Eurasian history. The era was marked by the domination of
giant empires in China (collapsing in 220 CE), Rome (in decline from the fourth century
CE), and India (falling around 550 CE). On the intellectual plane, the period witnessed a
long series of attempts to “work up” classical sources into broad encyclopedic syntheses
18

Cf. Farmer, Syncretism in the West, pp. 89–91.
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and higher-level systems.
Some of these syntheses included high-syncretic religions (most prominently, state
Confucianism, Mahayana Buddhism, and Christianity, all arising in the same period) and
first-level correlative cosmologies like those associated with so- called Neo-Platonism,
later Daoism, or the late-ancient predecessors of Neo-Confucianism. In many ways, the
great syncretic systems that evolved in this period unified the intellectual world just as the
great empires unified the political realm.
In China, the first important work of encyclopedic scope was the Spring and Autumn
Annals of Lu Buwei (c. 240 BCE), which according to tradition was commissioned by
the prime minister of the Qin state that later unified China. In the West, a rough equivalent
is found in the Aristotelian corpus, which (according again to tradition) was composed by
Plato’s student and the tutor of the unifier of the West, Alexander the Great. The products
of these highly stratified compilations were not philosophical abstractions like the early
element theories, “the Way,” dharma, or “idea of the Good,” etc., generated in earlier
traditions, but high-level syntheses, elaborate systems of correspondence, and
(increasingly as the period evolved) complex hierarchies of beings that developed
remarkably in sync in Greco-Roman, Indian, and Chinese civilizations.19
Systematizing tendencies in China declined after the fall of the Latter Han Dynasty at the
beginning of the third century CE, but those tendencies continued unabated in the
remaining two-and-a-half centuries of the Western Roman Empire. Pagan scholastic
systems reached their most elaborate states at the end of this period in monumental
exegetical projects like Proclus’s massive Platonic commentaries and Platonic Theology
— which were aimed at reconciling discordant passages of Platonic scriptures line-by-line,
and often word-by-word. The byproduct of Proclus’s efforts was an elaborate correlative
system that was not matched in complexity in any Eurasian society before the later middle
ages.20
19

The exegetical origins of these hierarchical systems (manifested in the West in the so-called great
chain of being, and in the East in systematic orders of Buddhas, avatars, saints, etc.) is most dramatically
demonstrated in the high-syncretic systems that developed in late antiquity along the central Asian borders
of Eastern and Western societies—where Buddha, Jesus, and various Zoroastrian and gnostic divinities
were organized in complex correlative arrays. See, on this point, the fascinating texts translated in HansJoachim Klimkeit, Gnosis on the Silk Road (San Francisco, 1993). Just as in similar systems in
nonhistorical fields, elaborate fractal growths in history are most common along borders or elsewhere
(e.g., at the intersection of trade routes) where opposing forces collide.
20
Given the fact that Socrates and Plato were literally worshipped in the late Academy, the phrase
“Platonic scriptures” is no exaggeration. For suggestions of this, see Marinus’s Life of Proclus,
translated, e.g., in J. L. Rosán, The Philosophy of Proclus (New York, 1949). Parallels can be drawn to
the worship of Confucius, Laozi, and Buddha in late classical times in China or India. Proclus’s pagan
scholasticism was an extreme one that had a deep impact on later Islamic, Jewish, and Christian scholastic
traditions. In Proclus’s system, multiple mirror images of pagan gods were assigned to different
hierarchical levels as abstract “henads.” The multiplication of these deanthropomorphized gods, who
eventually metamorphized into the Christian hierarchies of angels, developed out of exegetical attempts
to reconcile discordant references to classical deities in different parts of the Platonic corpus or its early

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2015

41

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 72 [2015], No. 72, Art. 19

Comparative Civilizations Review

37

Syncretic-scholastic systems of the later middle ages and early modern era.
A slowdown in systematic developments occurred in China and the West in late antiquity
due to the destruction of imperial libraries and other intellectual centers. But large-scale
system building resumed with a vengeance throughout Eurasia in the great age of
scholasticism, which for our purposes can be dated roughly from 1000-1600 CE.21
These second-level scholastic systems arose in response to a massive increase in the number
of sources that were then available throughout the old world; a series of information
explosions occurred in this era that deeply affected every civilization from Europe to
Japan, related to increases in travel, a long series of classical revivals, and to technological
innovations including the development of printing in the Far East and its eventual
transmission to the West. As increasing numbers of sources became available for
synthesis, scholastic-correlative systems arose of unprecedented levels of complexity; in
response to increased information flows throughout Eurasia, reconciliative impulses
overroad all other exegetical concerns.
The cross-cultural similarities in scholastic traditions have often been obscured by
parochial attitudes in traditions or by the propaganda of warring schools. Western
scholars still often characterize scholasticism as the result of attempts “to reconcile reason
with Christian revelation,” obscuring the methodological affinities between Latin
scholasticism and movements elsewhere aimed at harmonizing religious and
philosophical authorities.
In China, early Neo-Confucians are sometimes denied the “scholastic” or “syncretist”
labels on the grounds that they claimed to reject Buddhism and Daoism (no less than rival
schools of Confucianism) in order to revive the “pure” sources of Confucian thought;
despite these claims, these writers drew heavily on Buddhist and Daoist views in
constructing their systems, which from a structural point of view are remarkably similar
to scholastic systems in the West. Similar remarks can be made about Vedantic scholastics
like Sankara, who attacked the Buddhists while quietly incorporating Buddhist principles
in their systems; or about Renaissance classicists (ther so-called humanists), whose
syncretic excesses were often just as extreme as those of the medieval scholastics they
publicly scorned.22
In scholastic writers like Shao Yong, Ibn Rushd (Averroës), Albert the Great, and Nichiren
in the high middle ages, or extreme syncretists near the end of premodern times like
commentaries. Similar bifurcations and abstract hypostatizations transformed Eastern gods and
cosmological principles in Asian scholastic systems. For some evidence here see, for example, the Thai
Buddhist source referenced in note 23.
21
High-scholastic phases of medieval Indian and Islamic traditions would require slightly earlier starting
dates. In general, we would argue for greater continuity than is usually acknowledged between late-ancient
and medieval scholastic traditions throughout Eurasia.
22

Cf. Farmer, Syncretism in the West, pp. 135-37.
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Lama Tsongkhapa in Tibet, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola in Europe, or their syncretic
counterparts in Mughal Dynasty India or Ming Dynasty China, correlative systems
reached their most extreme expression.
The problems faced by commentators in late-traditional societies were no longer
restricted to harmonizing conflicts in a single tradition or handful of traditions; these
exegetes were, instead, often forced to reconcile whole traditions en masse. The syncretic
pressures on their thought led them to construct cosmologies in which every part of reality
was said to reflect every other; these systems allowed them to assign conflicting
statements in authorities to different levels of reality, where each statement could be
affirmed as being true “in some mode.” Multileveled correlative and allegorical systems,
in a limited number of types, show up in Latin scholastics, in literary monuments like
Dante’s Commedia, and in tens of thousands of Neo-Confucian, Buddhist, Hebrew, and
Arabic scholastics who flourished in this era.23
The links between exegetical processes and the birth of high-correlative systems are
demonstrated by the fact that the most elaborate of these systems first appeared in
writers who faced the most difficult reconciliative tasks. Those links have been studied
most fully in perhaps the most extreme syncretist of all times, the Renaissance
philosopher and theologian Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494). Pico lived in an
era in which four centuries of textual revivals combined with the printing revolution to
raise rates of information flow far above those seen in preceding centuries. In late 1486
Pico drew up 900 theses representing the views of the “wise Chaldeans, Arabs, Hebrews,
Greeks, Egyptians, and Latins,” subdivided into 28 subtraditions, that he proposed to
debate and harmonize at Rome before the pope, cardinals, and leaders of all the “warring
schools.” One of Pico's 900 theses (which he claimed could be broken into 600 separate
headings) promised to reconcile Plato and Aristotle in their entirety; others proposed to
resolve the most ambiguous questions fought over in all the major schools. In achieving
these goals, Pico promised to reveal in his debate three or four methods leading to an
understanding “of everything knowable” (de omni re scibili).
In planning his project (which he immodestly hinted might trigger the end of the world),
Pico was forced to draw on virtually every major reconciliative device found in the
previous 2000 years of Eurasian thought. One byproduct of his use of these methods
was an abstract picture of the cosmos that was nearly perfectly fractal in structure (see
Figure 1).

For a striking fourteenth-century parallel in Southeast Asia to Dante’s high-correlative system, see
Frank E. Reynolds and Mani B. Reynolds, trans., Three Worlds According to King Ruang: A Thai
Buddhist Cosmology (Berkeley, 1982). For an overview of other scholastic traditions, see Cabezón,
Scholasticism: Cross-Cultural and Comparative Perspectives.

23
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Pico’s system was closely related to Leibniz’s monadology, developed two centuries later;
but in Pico we can see (as we cannot in Leibniz) the exegetical roots of that system
exposed. Pico was just one of thousands of writers in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century
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Europe, India, Southeast Asia, and the Far East who developed high-correlative systems to
harmonize the flood of presyncretized sources that had piled up over the previous 2000
years — completing developments that began with the origins of manuscript traditions in
the mid-first millennium BCE. In Pico’s 900 theses, the correlative ideas of medieval Latin,
Arabic, and Hebrew scholasticism; of Greek Platonism, Aristotelianism, and NeoPlatonism; and of a wide range of esoteric and magical traditions — each based on syncretic
syntheses of even greater antiquity — merged to form a generalized notion of cosmic
correspondence. The pressures of thousands of years of reconciling books and traditions
resulted in a final metamorphosis of exegesis into cosmology; the idea of cosmic
correspondence, embedded in a thoroughly magical world, now lay at the center of reality;
in Pico’s words: “Whatever is in all worlds is contained in each one”!
When Pico’s commentators reduced his complex verbal symmetries (see 2.1) into
diagrammatic form, the result was a neat fractal portrait of his worlds-within-worlds.
Systems with similar structures can be “grown” in computers by repeatedly applying to
primitive texts methods similar to those of premodern exegetes — a fact critical to the
simulations described at the end of this paper.24
The collapse of high-correlative systems.
One final parallel involves what Stephen Jay Gould has called “the greatest intellectual
transformation in modern Western thinking”25 — the precipitous decline of correlative
systems that occurred between 1550 and 1750.
Some of the reasons for their demise in this period (which has, in fact, been documented
in Chinese as well as Western traditions) can be traced to internal developments in
manuscript traditions. In the works of late-traditional syncretists, correlative systems
became so elaborate that they threatened to collapse under their own weight. With each
leap in complexity, those systems became increasingly distant from the original sources
involved in their synthesis and from any concepts of nature remotely suggested by empirical
observation. Due to the complex correspondences resonating in those systems, moreover,
any assault on any side of them—whether of a philological, scientific, religious, or
It noteworthy that Benoit Mandelbrot, who first coined the term “fractals,” recognized self-similar or
fractal structures in Leibniz and in the so-called great chain of being—although not apparently in
premodern systems outside the West. See the historical notes in The Fractal Geometry of Nature, rev. ed.
(1983). Mandelbrot was the first to strongly emphasize the general relationship between iteration and the
growth of self-similar systems, but given the state of historical studies when he wrote his book, he
could not have guessed that similar processes were also responsible for the development of fractal
growths in the historical realm. Further on fractals in premodern cultures, see the essay by the
mathematical biologist A. L. Goldberger, “Fractals and the Birth of the Gothic: Reflections on the
Biologic Basis of Creativity,” Molecular Psychiatry 1, 2 (1996): 99-104, which stresses neurobiological
elements in such developments. Cf. Farmer, Syncretism in the West, pp. 93-96.
25
Stephen Jay Gould, New York Review of Books 38, 11 (13 June 1991): 11.
24
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political nature—potentially became an attack on them as a whole.26
This collapse was obviously also tied to the development of competing mechanistic models
that began to develop in the mid sixteenth century; by the middle of the seventeenth century,
those models had already had a deep impact on traditions in both Europe and China.
Those systems were attacked from another side by classical “purists” and religious
reformers; the goal of these writers was to return thought to what they viewed as the
ancient foundations of thought, which they identified with an increasingly narrow body of
texts. These attacks were also aided by developments in philology and linguistics; by later
stages of the Eastern and Western printing revolutions, all the philological tools were
available to begin the tedious job of destratifying traditions, cutting through the exegetical
accretions that had gathered in them in the previous two millennia.
The most extreme “purists” and philologists (the groups often overlapped) in China and
Europe from the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries busied themselves with peeling off
successive layers of traditions to get at what they viewed as the authentic cores lying
underneath.27 While they left the job unfinished, by the mid-eighteenth century they had
achieved enough to discredit high- correlative systems in progressive intellectual circles
throughout Eurasia.28
Attacked from many sides, correlative cosmologies began a rapid decline from 1550 to the
mid eighteenth century. The collapse occurred more abruptly in Europe than in China, but
it occurred in both societies nonetheless. An epitaph of sorts for the two thousand years
of exegetes who created these systems was provided by Voltaire in his famous portrait of
the “Theologian,” a bitter-end scholastic whose syncretic excesses ultimately led him in
skeptical directions:
He had mastered the oriental languages, and was as well informed as possible about
26 26

As James I put it to the Puritans: “No Bishop, no King.” The sensitivity of high-correlative systems to
slight perturbations corresponds in the mathematical sphere to the phenomenon of self-organized criticality
(SOC). This fact can be exploited in simulations of the collapse of such systems in the early-modern era.

27 27

On parallels between Ming and Qing Dynasty literati and their Renaissance “humanist” counterparts, see
Henderson, Chinese Cosmology, and Benjamin A. Elman, From Philosophy to Philology (Cambridge,
Mass., 1984).

28 28

Even today, the job of destratifying early textual canons is by no means complete. Studies in the
past decade have gone a long way towards destratifying classical Daoist, Confucian, and Indian sources,
and fresh research on the New Testament (especially in regard to the so-called Q document) has
continued that process in biblical studies. However, in the case of the two major philosophical canons in
Western thought, ascribed to Plato and Aristotle, the job of destratification has hardly begun. Evidence
that research is moving in the right direction can be found in the studies of European classicists like H.
Thesleff and a handful of other scholars. When the stratified nature of these canons is widely
acknowledged, the impact on historical studies as a whole can be expected to be profound.
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the rites of the ancient nations. He knew the Brahmans, the Chaldeans, the fireworshippers, the Sabeans, the Syrians, the Egyptians as well as the Jews. He was
familiar with the variant texts of the Bible. For thirty years he had tried to reconcile
the gospels, and bring the fathers into union . . . The difficulty of organizing in his head
so many things whose nature is to be confused, and to throw a little light on so many
dark clouds, often disheartened him, but as these researches were his professional
duties, he devoted himself to them in spite of his disgust. He finally attained to
knowledge unknown to most of his colleagues. The more truly learned he became,
the more he doubted all he knew. So long as he lived he was tolerant, and as he died he
confessed that he had uselessly worn out his life.29

1.2

Cultural Evolution and Rates of Information Flow

In concluding this section, we would like to make one theoretical observation, fairly
obvious but rarely emphasized, that is critical to the simulations described later. Much
evidence exists that the rise and fall of premodern systems can be closely linked to
fluctuations in rates of information flows. In periods of heightened textual flows — in
eleventh-century China, for example, accompanying the first widespread use of printing,
or in the textual revivals in Europe extending from the twelfth through sixteenth centuries
CE—accelerated developments occurred in systematic thought. Returning to a point
discussed earlier, we find a related phenomenon in the middle of the first millennium
BCE, tied to the expanded use of lightweight writing materials. Similar increases in
information flows also occurred in the period of vast political consolidation in the Han
Dynasty and Greco-Roman period.
Looking at converse patterns, we find declines in the growth of systematic thought in
periods of cultural collapse like those found at the end of classical antiquity, when rates
of information flows dropped far below those in earlier or later periods. Dampened rates
of development also existed in a handful of premodern societies that possessed lightweight
writing materials — including premodern Mesoamerica and ancient Egypt — when the
use of the technology was offset by sharply restricted literacy or institutional constraints
on the use of texts.
Numerous exegetical artifacts can be identified in the literate traditions of Mesoamerica
or Egypt — multilayered conceptions of heaven and hell, protomonotheistic gods,
paradoxical dualistic or trinitarian deities, formal systems of correspondences, inbred
cyclical models of time, and so on — whose growth can be tied to internal commentaries
operating in stratified religious texts like the Popul Vuh or Book of the Dead.30
29

Voltaire, Philosophical Dictionary, trans. Theodore Besterman (London, 1972), p. 387.
The problem of textual stratification has not been widely discussed in relation to either the Popul Vuh
or Egyptian funereal texts, despite much recent philological work on those sources. The existence of both
textual strata and internal commentaries in the Popul Vuh shows up clearly in Dennis Tedlock’s
standard scholarly translation of that work (New York, 1985), although these phenomena are not noted by
Tedlock himself; similar strata also appear in many similar Maya documents, including the so-called
30
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But nowhere in these civilizations do we find the same degree of abstract developments
generated in major Eurasian civilizations in the mid-first millennium BCE, which our
model links to the expanded use of lightweight writing materials and associated increases
in the number and complexity of traditions. The suggestion again is that rates of
information flow and the growth of systematic thought were closely coupled.
In at least one special case, involving the collapse of high-correlative systems in the earlymodern era, a sustained increase in rates of information flow, and not a decrease, was
implicated. In our computational models, the collapse of extreme correlative cosmologies
can be simulated by applying the ideas of self-organized criticality (SOC), which posit
nonlinear thresholds in the evolution of complex systems; once the complexity of those
systems reaches certain levels, those systems begin to collapse.31
It is possible by adjusting rates of information flows to simulate other nonlinearities in
the evolution of correlative systems, including the sudden appearance of anti-correlative
movements that developed in many periods of antiquity (seen, for example, in the
traditions of early Theravada Buddhism, and in similar mystical movements elsewhere).
2.1

The Commentarial Engine

The links between exegetical processes and the evolution of religious and philosophical
systems have been noted occasionally in studies of specific traditions, if not in studies of
premodern thought in general. One specialist in Vedantic scholasticism, Patricia Y.
Mumme, comments:
It is remarkable how metaphysics in Indian thought are so tightly bound to interpretive
strategies. The views of reality seen in the various schools are driven by specific
strategies of scriptural interpretation. In fact, metaphysical categories are often mirror
images of interpretive strategies... It may be a Western bias to assume that a
metaphysical system is the goal of philosophy, and that scriptural interpretation is
secondary or merely instrumental. From an Indian perspective, an orthodox
metaphysical system may be only a by- product of a proper hermeneutical approach
to scripture.. . Western Indologists need to divert some attention from the metaphysical
carts in Indian thought in order to give closer scrutiny to the hermeneutical horses that
may be driving them.

books of Chilam Balam. R. Faulkner’s standard translations of Egyptian funereal texts are created from
hypothetical “ideal” manuscripts, with the result that the heavily stratified internal commentaries in parts
of those texts (e.g., in chapter 17 of the Book of the Dead) are badly obscured. For a partial correction of
this problem, see the works of Thomas George Allen, Occurrences of Pyramid Texts With Cross Indexes
of These and Other Egyptian Mortuary Texts (Chicago, 1950); Allen, The Egyptian Book of the Dead
(Chicago, 1960); and Allen, The Book of the Dead or Going Forth By Day: Ideas of the Ancient
Egyptians Concerning the Hereafter as Expressed in Their Own Terms (Chicago, 1974).
31
For references, see note 48
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As her central example, Mumme points to the way that the use by Sankara (c. 788- 820 CE)
and his commentators of the “double-truth” supported the Vedantic view of “two
[analogical] levels of reality, the ultimately real brahman and the provisionally real realm
of maya or avidya.”32 It can be shown that use of the double-truth as an exegetical
device led to precisely the same results in medieval Japanese, Chinese, Islamic, and
Christian scholastic traditions.
The most general conclusion of our studies has been that much of systematic thought
in premodern literate civilizations—and not just in India—arose from the repetitive use
of just such devices.
Commentarial engines left a long series of exegetical artifacts in their wake, ranging from
isolated metaphysical principles to multilayered correlative systems; the specific structures
generated by those engines depended in part on which layers of traditions they operated
upon. Those structures also varied slightly from culture to culture, reflecting in part
the specific genres of canonical sources lying at their base; thus, similar exegetical devices
might produce monotheistic deities or linear models of time when operating on one series
of texts, and abstract metaphysical principles or cyclical models of time when working on
others.
While the full range of exegetical techniques was culturally invariant, moreover, the
frequency with which individual techniques were used differed from tradition to
tradition—leading to further variations in thought. Key selection principles included how
easily a technique could resolve textual conflicts in a given tradition and how often
authorities in earlier levels of that tradition used the same technique.
These differences, repeated over many centuries, helped generate “path dependencies”
in history, helping explain the predominance in one society, tradition, or subtradition of
specific variations of correlative systems.
Admittedly, much or even most commentarial discussion was systematically neutral; parts
of it, moreover, exhibited strongly anti-systematic tendencies.33 Moreover, systematic
developments in commentarial traditions were often painfully slow, which helps explain
why the links between formal exegesis and cosmological developments are often
overlooked. Over the long run, however, a dozen or so exegetical devices with strong
systematizing features were used so frequently by religious and philosophical exegetes
that steady systematic growths were assured. The long-range pattern, holding true in a wide
range of traditions, was a gradual increase in the complexity, formality, and systematic
Patricia Y. Mumme, “Haunted by Sankara’s Ghost: The Srivaisnava Interpretation of Bhagavad Gita
18:66,” in Jeffrey R. Timm, ed., Texts in Context: Traditional Hermeneutics in South Asia (Albany,
N.Y., 1992), pp. 69-84.
33
On anti-systematic tendencies in traditional thought, see Henderson, The Construction of Orthodoxy and
Heresy; cf. Farmer, Syncretism in the West, chapt. 4.
32
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integrity of correlative thinking.34
Our earlier studies have analyzed the systematic effects of dozens of commentarial methods.
(A summary of a number of these methods and effects is found in Appendix A.)
For the purposes of this essay, these methods can be reduced to two major classes:
Integrative methods, which tended to transform concrete or mythopoeic images into
abstract religious and philosophical concepts; and Correlative methods, which tended to
bifurcate or multiply preexisting religious or philosophical concepts and, when used
repeatedly, to foster the growth of formal systems of correspondence.
Some striking examples of integrative methods show up in the earliest strata of traditions,
reflecting the efforts of early religious and philosophical exegetes to harmonize heavily
layered canonical texts.
In China, supposedly the first commentator to use those methods was Confucius himself
(c. 551-479 BCE) — referring, as Brooks and Brooks suggest, to the fictional “Confucius”
of later strata of the Analects.35 According to tradition, it was Confucius’s goal to restore
the great society of the early Zhou era; to accomplish this required that all extant records
of the sage rulers be examined to uncover those qualities that made an ideal society possible.
Exegetically reworking materials from earlier canonical sources, in particular passages from
pre-Confucian levels of the Songs and Documents, early Confucians abstracted general
virtues such as li (ritual propriety) and xiao (filial piety).36 This process of abstraction
was carried to even a higher level in respect to another virtue, that of “humanity” (ren),
which in early texts often carries the concrete sense of that which is “manly” or “virile.”37
In the reworking of ren ascribed to Confucius, the term was elevated to an abstract plane as
a kind of “Virtue of virtues” — defined, like the Platonic “idea of the Good,” or Vedic
dharma, by still other abstractions. Thus, according to later layers of the Analects, ren
can be viewed as the ability to practice the five virtues of respectfulness, tolerance,
trustworthiness, diligence, and kindness (Analects 17.6). While ren in one sense subsumed
these virtues, however, hints are given that something remained in it beyond all
understanding — even for a sage like Confucius.38 Like the Dao of classical Daoism,
brahman of the Upanishads and Vedic sutras, “idea of the Good” of the Platonists, and
34 34

For discussion of exegetical strategies and their systematic effects, see Farmer, Syncretism in the
West, pp. 59-96 and passim. Cf. Henderson, Scripture, Canon, and Commentary; Judith Berling, The
Syncretic Religion of Lin Chao-en (New York, 1980).
35
Brooks and Brooks, The Original Analects.
36
See, for example, Analects 2.21, 3.8, and 14.43. Brooks and Brooks argue that much of the Songs and
Documents were forgeries written after the earliest strata of the Analects, complicating discussion of the
exegeses of those texts found in its later strata. Discussion of this issue, which does not affect our main
thesis, must be reserved for another place.
37
Benjamin I. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, Mass, 1985), p. 75.
38
Analects 7.33; Schwartz, p. 91.
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the transcendent god of late strata of the Torah, ren remained ineffable and mysterious —
not fully accessible even to sages and prophets.
Nearly four decades ago, Havelock pointed to similar exegetical mechanisms as the driving
force in the development of abstract philosophy in Greece — arising from attempts by
the early pre-Socratics to integrate conflicting ideas in the Homeric corpus. The most
famous product was the abstract dualism of the theory of Ideas:
You can take a word, justice, city, courage, bed, ship, and treat it as a common
name and demand a general definition of it which will cover all the possible poetic
instances. But this procedure is sophisticated. It becomes possible only when
the spell of the poetic tradition has already been broken… But how, while still
working within that tradition, can one start to extrapolate such topics and principles
out of the narrative flux? The answer is that you can take similar instances and
situations which are severed and scattered through different narrative contexts but
which use many of the same words and you can proceed to correlate them and
group them and seek for common factors shared by them all…
So another way of putting the mental act of isolation and abstraction is to say it
is an act of integration. The saga [here, the Iliad] will contain a thousand aphorisms
and instances which describe what a proper and moral person is doing. But they
have to be torn out of context, correlated, systematized, unified and harmonized
to provide a formula for righteousness. The many acts and events must somehow
give way and dissolve into a single unity.39
Integrative processes like these appear in the earliest levels of commentary traditions
throughout Eurasia, giving birth to monotheistic gods, abstract cosmological principles,
systematic orders of virtues or elements, and dualistic views of reality that provided the
bare abstract frameworks for later cosmological developments.
Our second class of exegetical techniques — correlative methods — helped generate many
of the entities that filled out those frameworks, eventually giving birth to full- blown
correlative systems. These techniques came in many subtypes: allegorical methods, the
“double truth,” scholastic distinctions, and others summarized in Appendix A. Despite
their differences, all these techniques were based on the same general principle: conflicts
in authorities can be resolved if we take their conflicting words to refer not to the same
but to analogous concepts standing on different “levels” of reality.40 When traditions
were “worked up” over many centuries using such techniques, the eventual result was
the construction of high-correlative systems in which every part of reality was said to reflect
39

Havelock, Preface to Plato, p. 218.
In part of our model that we do cannot discuss in this paper, the origins of these correlative
techniques are traced to fundamental neurobiological processes. For references, see Farmer, Syncretism in
the West, pp. 91–96.
40
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every other.
Perhaps the most common of these correlative techniques was what is widely referred
to as “standard” scholastic distinctions, which attempted to reconcile conflicts in
authoritative sources by claiming that the same terms appeared in those sources in two or
more analogical senses.
Neo-Confucian commentators, for example, reconciled a major conflict between Confucius
and Mencius over human nature by claiming that in the conflicting passages Confucius
was referring to the tempermental side of human nature, but Mencius to the foundations
of human nature.41 Southeast Asian scholastics used identical means to reconcile internal
conflicts in the Vedic and Buddhist canons, and Western commentators from Cicero to
the Renaissance Platonists to harmonize apparent discord in Plato and Aristotle.
In the visual arts, one famous expression of the technique shows up in Raphael’s famous
depiction of the “School of Athens,” where we find Plato holding the Timaeus and pointing
upwards, while Aristotle holds the Ethics and spreads his hand over the world. The point
was to emphasize that apparent conflicts in those authorities arose from their primary
interests in “higher” and “lower” realities; their outwardly conflicting ideas were
complementary, not contradictory.
The more complex the exegetical tasks, the more complicated these correlative methods
became. To illustrate this principle, we will limit ourselves to citing two passages from
the Renaissance syncretist Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and a third from the NeoConfucian scholastic, Shao Yong. In both of these writers, the repeated use of this and
similar methods led to the construction of unusually elaborate correlative systems.
Our first example, from Pico’s 900 theses, introduces a long chain of correlative
distinctions to harmonize conflicting claims in Plato, Plotinus, Proclus, and other
authorities as to the cosmic location of “beauty.” Conflicts here, as in the simpler
cases discussed above, could be reconciled by invoking a series of verbal modifiers to
suggest that different “modes” of beauty existed on different planes of reality.
Reflecting the outrageous scale of Pico’s syncretic system, the result — which is
suggestive of computer-generated prose — was arguably the most extreme example of
scholastic writing known:
Beauty exists in God as its cause, in the total intellect truly essentially totally, in the
particular intellect truly partially essentially, in the rational soul truly participationally,
in the visibile accidents of the heavens imagerially essentially totally, in subcelestial
41

Cheng I, quoted in Zhu Xi, Sishu jizhu, Xia lun (The Four Books with Collected Commentaries;
Latter Part of Analects) (Taibei: Xuehai Chubanshe, 1974), p. 119.
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visible qualities imagerially partially
participationally. [!]

essentially,

in

quantities

imagerially

The exegetical origins of constructs like these are underlined in another one of Pico’s
900 theses, aimed this time at reconciling apparent conflicts in Pre-Socratic sages over
the metaphysical concept of the “one”:
Although there were three [writers] who said that all things are one — Xenophanes,
Parmenides, and Melissus — whoever carefully scrutinizes their words will see that
the one of Xenophanes is that which is one simply. Parmenides’ one is not the
absolute one, as is believed, but is the oneness of being. The one of Melissus is the
one that possesses extreme correspondence to Xenophanes’ one.42
The point of this thesis is that secret harmonies lie beneath the outer conflicts in the
ancient wisemen — with Xenophanes first revealing God’s oneness, then Parmenides the
reflected oneness in creatures, and Melissus finally the negative oneness of non-being or
prime matter. One obvious byproduct of Pico’s method was a highly articulated correlative
view of reality.
Similar extreme structures show up in the works of the medieval Chinese syncretist Shao
Yong. The structural similarities between Shao’s and Pico’s systems, which were both
heavy with numerological symbolism, can be illustrated by quoting a few sentences from
one of Shao’s larger numerological constructs.
In the following passage, Shao correlates a long series of concepts, including the titles of
four of the Chinese classics — the Changes, the Documents, the Songs, and the Spring
and Autumn Annals — by arranging all of them in every possible logical sequence. Shao’s
motive here was similar to Pico’s when he linked the ideas of Xenophanes and the
Eleatics: to suggest that a uniform view of reality was shared by the ancient sages.
When linked correlatively, the Chinese classics reveal to us all the principles that govern
the world:
The Changes of the Changes means to produce life; the Documents of the Changes
means to produce growth; the Songs of the Changes means to produce harvest; the
Spring and Autumn Annals of the Changes means to produce storage. The Changes
of the Documents means to increase life; the Documents of the Documents means to
increase growth; the Songs of the Documents means to increase harvest; the Spring
and Autumn Annals of the Documents means to increase storage.43
42

Theses 5>26 and 3>70 in Farmer, Syncretism in the West. The original Latin texts are also provided in
that work.
43 43
Shao Yung, Huangji jingshi shu (Book of the Supreme Rules Governing the World) SBBY ed. 5.9a.
Not surprisingly, constructs like this in Shao and Pico were also tied to complex numerological structures—
which can, in a sense, be abstracted directly from their verbal constructs.
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These examples of premodern exegesis are extreme ones, but the strategies that generated
them were commonplace.
Many of the most important features of premodern religious, philosophical, and
cosmological systems arose from the repeated use of such strategies over millennia. A
short list of such developments includes the original birth of monotheistic and
transcendental deities; the development of abstract philosophical language and dualistic
visions of reality; the growth of Buddhist, Christian, and Hindu trinities (and paradoxical
concepts of deity in Mesoamerican thought); the emergence of abstract orders of demons,
aeons, henads, angels, saints, and similar divine beings; the development of multilevel
mirroring pictures of heaven and hell; the evolution of theories of multiple world creations
and destructions; the origins of elaborate typological (linear) and cyclical models of time;
and the growth of fully articulated models of man-the-microcosm, which show up in
every mature premodern civilization.
Higher-level integrations of ideas like these, arising from the efforts of commentators
working over thousands of years, were the primary force behind the growth of
multilayered correlative cosmologies that dominated systematic thought in all major world
societies until early modern times.44
3.1

Computer Simulations of the Growth and Collapse of Premodern Systems 45

In the last several years, we have designed a number of computer simulations capable
of implementing and partially testing the ideas described above. Our work here has
arisen from combining what we have learned from our textual research with general studies
of complex or self-organizing systems. Such studies have made major strides in the past
decade, providing a number of algorithms that can be readily adapted by historical
modelers.46
Below, we provide a non-technical overview of how those simulations
function.
We first realized that simulations of this sort might be constructed in the late 1980s, when
we discovered that the evolution of self-similar structures like those we discovered in
premodern cosmologies were being intensely studied by mathematicians.
Self-similar or fractal structures can be viewed as the signatures or “footprints” of
iterative processes. The discovery of self-similar growths in any evolving system
typically suggests that nonlinear dynamics can be applied to modeling the development
44
45

Cf. Farmer, Syncretism in the West, chapt. 2.
An updated version of the following material can be downloaded as a PDF file from
http://www.safarmer.com/simulations.pdf.

46

For an overview of modeling techniques involving complex or self-organizing systems, see the
references in note 4. For further models related to evolutionary models like ours (in this case, from the
biological sciences), see Stuart A. Kauffman, The Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in
Evolution (New York and Oxford, 1993).
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of that system. As Mandelbrot and others have shown, self-similar structures tend to
emerge in systems that are repeatedly transformed by recursive operations — by
feedback mechanisms in which the output of each prior transformation becomes the
input of each new one.47
What we found remarkable this finding was the similarities between the dynamics of such
systems and those we found in the historical sphere. Our textual studies suggested that
increasing levels of self-similarity in correlative systems were byproducts of the repetitive
application to those systems of a small set of exegetical techniques, especially those of
a reconciliative or syncretic nature.
This discovery suggested that it might be possible to develop simulations of the growth
of correlative systems by adapting nonlinear models already widely used in the biological
and physical sciences — fields in which the emergence of similar fractal patterns are well
known.
Consider the following sketch of a simple simulation. The simulation can be run in either
automatic or interactive modes. In the latter case, a human assistant assuming the role of
“apprentice commentator” intervenes at key choice points in the simulation. Using a
human assistant enhances the simulation’s value as a teaching device and greatly
simplifies computational operations. (In the classroom, we have even used simplified
versions of the simulations using nothing but paper, pencils, and a few specially prepared
“canonical texts.”)
Certain parts of the simulation (e.g., the “contradiction detectors” mentioned in Step 3)
are borrowed from computer models designed to handle complex scheduling tasks for the
U.S. space program.48 A high- level description of the simulation follows (see Appendix
B for a formal expression of the algorithm underlying the simulation):
1. Select primitive sets of texts representing ancient textual genres — short prayers, ritual

or magical texts, court poems, epic or lyric poetry, dynastic histories, oracles, etc. Key
sentences in the texts (statements about divine forces, human virtues, ritual objects, etc.)
are “tagged” as potential objects of exegesis.
2. Sort and randomly combine subsets of these texts to create stratified textual canons.

These canons will typically include numerous textual inconsistencies; for example, the
tagged statement “god X is Y” may appear in one place in the canon, while “god X is
not Y” or “god X is Z,” etc., may appear elsewhere.
47

Mandelbrot, The Fractal Geometry of Nature; cf. H.-O. Peitgen and P.H. Richter, The Beauty of
Fractals: Images of Complex Dynamical Systems (Berlin and New York, 1986), p. 5.
48
See, e.g., the papers in Technical Report FIA-92-17, NASA Ames Research Center, Artificial
Intelligence Research Branch (May, 1992).
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3. Apply contradiction detectors, or alternately use a human assistant, to define a prioritized

list of exegetical tasks for each textual canon.
4. Select a subset of exegetical strategies out of a larger set using best-fit rules for canons

and/or types of exegetical tasks (a human assistant can also be asked to make the
selection). Different sets of strategies can be selected to generate competing
subtraditions.
(Reconciliative strategies are of the general type illustrated in Appendix A, the majority
of which have obvious correlative features; exegetical strategies of different sorts can be
added to model anti-syncretic forces in traditions, which tend to develop in tandem with
extreme reconciliative tendencies.)
5. Apply exegetical strategies to a limited subset of exegetical conflicts in the canon. The

application of these strategies to a canon generates exegetical artifacts, which normally
amplify any existing correlative structure in the texts.
6. Collect exegetical artifacts in commentarial systems, whose basic forms are defined by

simple templates.
7. Combine textual canons and commentarial systems to create stratified traditions.
8. Apply textual degradation rules to selected levels of tradition (shuffle or discard parts

of texts, etc.) to mimic entropic or dissipative processes in manuscript traditions;
different degradation rules can be assigned to canons and commentarial systems.
9. Iterate starting at step 3. Run the simulation until all inconsistencies in the traditions, or

in any partitioned sets of those traditions, are eliminated.
While this simulation is admittedly crude, it will generate systematic byproducts that are
remarkably similar to those generated by exegetical processes in stratified textual traditions.
Those byproducts tend to grow in complexity with each iteration; simultaneously, their selfsimilarities and internal consistencies tend to increase. The fact that (1) the textual quality
of traditions is degraded after each iteration (Step 8) while (2) correlative structure is
repeatedly fed into those traditions (Step 5) ensures that the system will evolve in selfsimilar way in an emergent fashion. It is, in fact, possible to observe the self-similarities
in the system growing in each successive layer of tradition; this mimics the ways in which
such structures evolved in premodern traditions.
Due to the use of best-fit rules that link exegetical strategies to exegetical tasks (Step
4), among the first systemic byproducts that arise in the simulation are abstract objects —
primitive dualities, monotheistic deities, abstract cosmological principles, primitive sets
of elements and virtues, etc. (Depending on the exegetical strategies used, elaborate
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol72/iss72/19
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pantheons of gods may also emerge.)
Abstract dualistic frameworks then evolve; these are followed by broader cosmological
systems, as exegetical artifacts generated in later iterations “fill out” those frameworks.
After a large number of iterations, expanded syncretic-correlative systems (of
found in Neo- Confucianism or Neo-Platonism, or similar scholastic traditions)
that have increasingly complex mirroring structures. Whether those systems
out in hierarchical or temporal frameworks (in either cyclical or linear subtypes)
on which exegetical strategies are driving the system.

the sort
develop
are laid
depends

When best-fit rules are applied, selected exegetical strategies tend to amplify the most
common types of correlative structures found in the earliest levels of a tradition.
The speed with which systematic artifacts arise out of the textual flux is associated with the
rate with which inconsistencies are eliminated from the textual canons; this rate can in turn
be linked to the degrees of initial contradiction in the texts (determined in Step 3), which
vary from canon to canon. Rates of information flows in the system are further associated
with the number of exegetical acts performed in each iteration in Step 5 and with the depth
of information loss that takes place in each loop in Step 8.
Adjustments to these tuning parameters can be introduced to simulate special historical
conditions—developments in literate technologies, increases or decreases in literacy rates,
shifts in levels of travel and cultural contact, textual losses and revivals, political expansions
and contractions, institutional constraints on information flows, and so on.
So long as the “traditions” being simulated contain high enough levels of contradictions,
linguistic output in the simulations (in the form of simple verbal statements) will
eventually develop the kinds of proportionalities found in the hyperscholastic verbal
constructions of late-traditional syncretists like Shao Yong or Pico (see the examples
above) — whose systems, in a sense, “summed up” the results of two millennia of previous
commentarial processes.
It is possible to add functions to the simulation to allow the abstraction of numerological
features out of those systems as self-similarities grow or to translate the output of those
systems into graphic form (of the sort seen in Figure 1). Political, social, and religious
“selection algorithms” can be added to the textual degradation rules in Step 8 to simulate
some of the historical conditions favoring the survival of one type of tradition over another
— including some of the more unsavory institutional controls on thought found pervasively
in premodern societies.
More complex versions of the simulation allow modeling not only of the growth of
correlative systems but of their collapse as well. When the complexity of certain classes
of self-similar systems approach critical thresholds, their sensitivity to even slight
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2015

57

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 72 [2015], No. 72, Art. 19

Comparative Civilizations Review

53

perturbations increases, resulting in states in which minor events can trigger the collapse of
large parts of their structures; this is the phenomenon known as self- organized criticality,
or SOC.49
These thresholds are related to the relative ease with which information flows through
distant parts of the system, which is linked in turn to the global levels of self-similarity
in those systems. At such thresholds, individual elements in the system become sensitive
not only to influences from nearby elements but from those in all regions of the system;
a classical example in physics involves long-range spin alignments in ferromagnetic
systems just below Curie’s point.
The rates with which the rise and fall of such systems occur are controlled by tuning
parameters that can be pictured as representing the energy pumped into those systems.
The nature of this “energy” will vary depending on the system being modeled. This energy
might be food in biology, labor and raw materials in economics, or information flows in
historical models like ours. When those rates increase, they can push the complexity of
such systems to critical thresholds, causing those systems to begin to collapse in dramatic
fashions.
The classical example of this is the collapse of a sandhill, which has been extensively
studied experimentally and in computer simulations. As sand is piled higher in the hill,
the slope of the hill eventually reaches a critical level; after a certain point, any additional
sand added to the pile will cause avalanches of increasingly large magnitude that will
eventually push the slope back below the critical level. To put this another way: as the
complexity of the sandhill approaches a critical threshold, “communication” between
distant regions of the hill increases until the whole system begins to collapse in response to
even small perturbations.
Analogies exist here again with the historical behavior of correlative cosmologies, which
became increasingly vulnerable to attack the more complex and self-similar those
systems became. As Galileo discovered to his cost, as critical thresholds are approached
correlative systems become so cohesive that any attack on any one part of the system
threatens the whole.
In computer simulations of correlative systems, rates of information flows can be adjusted
to ensure that the systems generated in the simulations eventually reach states of selforganized criticality. Simulated scientific, philological, or religious attacks on those
systems might be imagined whenever the “conceptual distance” between those systems
and earlier levels of tradition, or between those systems and models of empirical reality,
For details, see P. Bak, C. Tang, and K. Wiesenfield, “Self-Organized Criticality,” Physical Review A 38
(1988): 364-74; P. Bak and K. Chen, “Self-Organized Criticality,” Scientific American 246 (1) (1991):
46-53; P. Bak, “Self-Organized Criticality: A Holistic View of Nature,” in Cowan, Complexity, pp. 477496.
49
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reach critical levels. At that point, special rules can be applied (e.g., to Step 8) to allow
those traditions to decompose in a realistic fashion.
It is amusing to imagine simulations in which best-fit rules at critical points cause “flips”
in exegetical methods (in Step 4) from syncretic to antisyncretic modes — simulating, in
a sense, the historical shift of Voltaire’s bitter-end scholastic from reconciliative to
skeptical ways of thinking. Once again, the rates of information flow at such points are key.
4.1

Summary and Conclusions

In this paper we have sketched a model of the structural growth of premodern religious
and philosophical systems. In that model, parallel intellectual developments in premodern
China, Europe, and other literate civilizations are pictured as byproducts of exegetical
processes operating in manuscript traditions over long periods of time.
At the end of the paper, we briefly described abstract representations of our model that can
be implemented in simple computer simulations.
In the last decade, we have fine-tuned our model in the classroom to produce a powerful
framework for teaching comparative history. We have also considered ways in which
future simulations can be used to guide research and to help in historical reconstructions.
We anticipate in particular the use of simulations in helping date chronologically vague
or textually depleted areas of premodern history, like those typical of ancient India or
Mesoamerica. Even in the absence of other textual evidence, study of the systematic
byproducts of commentarial processes can help us date those products and can tell us
something about any lost traditions underlying them.
In general, from a consideration of how rates of information flow affect traditions, it is
possible to fill in holes in the evolutionary record of one tradition by extrapolating from
data available in others. The parallels here with procedures used in evolutionary theory in
geology and biology are obvious.
In closing, we want to point out that we recognize that our model may prove
troublesome to those who view traditional religious and philosophical systems not as
exegetical artifacts but as monuments to unconditioned human “genius.” We hope that this
deficiency, if it is one, is offset by a number of historical puzzles that the model efficiently
solves.
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Appendix A: A Few Systematic Effects of Exegetical Strategies
The following is a short list, intended to be illustrative and not exhaustive, of a few
exegetical strategies that had major systematic effects.
The majority of these strategies had a reconciliative purpose: to harmonize traditions, to
unveil the hidden unity in canonical sources, to reconcile new traditions with old ones, or
to co-opt the ideas of warring traditions or subtraditions.
Which strategies were preferred in different traditions — and hence which types of
cosmologies tended to evolve within those traditions — depended in part on (1) the ease
with which those methods solved given exegetical tasks and (2) the frequency with which
those methods showed up in earlier layers of tradition.
The inbreeding of traditions over long periods resulted in the cross-cultural growth of
multilayered correlative systems that by late traditional times exhibited high levels of
structural complexity, formal consistency, and self-similarity.
Partially counterbalancing this development were anti-scholastic (or classicist)
movements that tended to grow in strength the further traditions drifted from the sense
of their base texts; the seesaw battle of syncretic and anti-syncretic forces was a major
theme in the history of thought until the final collapse of high-correlative systems in
early modern times.

EXEGETICAL
DESCRIPTION
STRATEGY
Correlation of gods from Gods of different
different polytheistic
traditions are pictured as
traditions.
bodily parts or inferior
reflections of superior
deities for reconciliative
ends.
Syncretic fusion of
Conflicting concepts of
different animistic
animistic deities are
deities from one or more harmonized to create
tradition.
more transcendent gods.
Processes of abstraction Abstract cosmological
applied to harmonize
principles are generated
diverse references to
through integrations of
moral or intellectual
conflicting uses of terms
concepts in mythic
in earlier layers of texts.
traditions.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol72/iss72/19

TYPICAL BYPRODUCTS
Generation of early pantheons of
gods in ancient Egypt,
Mesoamerica, India, Greece, etc.
Similar tendencies in Chinese folk
religion.
The initial appearance of protomonotheistic or monotheistic
deities.
‘Heaven,’ the ‘Way,’ dharma,
Logos, the ‘One,’ Platonic theory
of ideas, etc. Abstract dualistic
frameworks are created for later
cosmic developments.
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DESCRIPTION

TYPICAL BYPRODUCTS

Conflicting references to
divine beings or cosmic
principles are identified
in paradoxical ways to
harmonize texts.

Simultaneously transcendent and
immanent gods; paradoxical
Confucian- Daoist ‘Way’;
Buddhist, Christian, and Hindu
trinities; dualistic deities in Tibetan
or Mesoamerican traditions, etc.

Order sages, divine
Figures from one or more Grades of Confucian sages,
beings, or inferior
tradition are fit in a
Buddhist arhats, Hindu avatars,
creatures from different single framework by
etc.; gnostic aeons and Neotraditions in hierarchical, assigning them to
Platonic henads; orders of demons
emanational, or temporal different levels of reality. and angels.
series.
Syncretic fusion of
Multiple stories of sages, Eventual transformation of
multiple or conflicting philosophers, and
Confucius, Laozi, Socrates,
stories concerning
tradition founders are
Buddha, Jesus, etc., into semiancient sages,
harmonized by
divine or cosmic beings.
philosophers, and
transforming these
tradition founders in a figures into semi-divine
growing canon.
or divine beings.
Systematic correlations Conflicting references to Abstract schemas of the names and
of conflicting references deities are identified as powers of god in Islamic and
to single deities.
inferior manifestations of Christian scholasticism; the
that god.
kabbalistic sefirot, etc.
Allegory methods
Abstract philosophical or Intensified hierarchical visions of
applied in hierarchical religious ideas read out of reality. Transformations of poetic
frameworks.
(or into) nonand other non- philosophical works
philosophical works.
into cosmological treatises (Homer,
the Odes, Spring and Autumn
Annals, etc.).
Allegorical methods
Concepts or persons in Growth of analogical views of time
applied in a temporal
earlier traditions are
in progressive (linear) frameworks.
framework (typology). pictured as imperfect
anticipations of concepts
or persons in later ones.
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DESCRIPTION

TYPICAL BYPRODUCTS

Conflicting stories,
concepts, divine beings,
or temporal events in
different layers of texts
are reconciled by
assigning them to
different eras in a cyclical
temporal framework.

Multiple creations and destructions
of the world in Greek or
Mesoamerican traditions; concept
of divine avatars and multiple
Buddhas, etc.; reconciliative use of
the “five phases” (wuxing) in
Chinese dynastic histories.

Compilational strategies Conflicting stories,
Multileveled mirroring visions of
in hierarchical
concepts, or
heaven and hell in Christian,
frameworks.
cosmological schemes are Buddhist, Hindu, and
joined in a hierarchical Mesoamerican traditions; complex
manner.
faculty psychologies; etc.
Syncretic syllogisms
Disjoined snippets of
Increased reverence towards holy
texts are conjoined to
books; intensified word magic,
unveil their hidden
bibliomancy, etc.
unities. Heavy use in
Vedic, Neo- Confucian,
Midrashic, and other
commentarial traditions.
Standard scholastic
Apparent conflicts in
Increasingly complex, correlative,
distinction
texts are reconciled by
and hierarchical visions of reality in
adding verbal modifiers Neo- Confucian, Buddhist, Hindu,
as needed to those
Islamic, Jewish, and Christian
concepts.
scholasticism.
Double-truth’ models
Religious or
Bifurcations of reality in the threephilosophical authorities treatise school of Buddhism;
are reconciled by
similar developments in Neodistinguishing
Confucian, Vedantic, Averoistic
complementary realms of scholasticism, and Latin scholastic
truth.
traditions.
Mystical letter/glyph
Mystical letter/glyph
Glyphomancy in China,
interpretations and
interpretations and
anagrammatic manipulations of
anagrammatic
anagrammatic readings texts in India, the Middle East, and
manipulations of
introduced to
the West. Intensified linguistic
canonical writings
demonstrate the hidden realism, fusion of mysticism and
unity of canonical texts. calligraphy, etc.
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EXEGETICAL
STRATEGY
Higher-level fusions of
systems of
correspondences.

DESCRIPTION

TYPICAL BYPRODUCTS

Presyncretized
(correlative) concepts
found in earlier texts are
conjoined in increasingly
abstract forms.

Abstract numerologies of the type
found in Shao Yong or Joachim of
Fiore.
Extreme syncretic-correlative
systems with amplified magical
properties in medieval and early
modern times.

For detailed discussion of individual strategies, see Henderson, Scripture, Canon, and
Commentary and Farmer, Syncretism in the West. For discussion of exegetical methods
opposing these strategies, see Henderson, The Construction of Orthodoxy and Heresy.

Appendix B: Formal Algorithm/Program Information Flow
The following box contains a brief formal description of the algorithm used in the
simulation described above. Program operators appear in italics; materials transformed by
these operators in plain text.
primitive_texts = select_subset_from (prepared_sources)
tagged_primitive_texts = tag_concepts (primitive_texts)
stratified_textual_canons = randomly sort and recombine_subsets_ (tagged_primitive_texts)
loop until no contraditions
contradictions = detect_contradictions (stratified_textual_canons)
exegetical_tasks = prioritize_contradictions (contradictions)
exegetical_artifacts = apply (exegetical_strategies, exegetical_tasks)
commentarial_systems = match_templates_to_artifacts (exegetical_artifacts)
tradition = combine (commentarial_system, textual_canons)
dtraditions/dt = apply_degradation_rules (tradition)
tradition = dtraditions/dt + tradition
end loop
end algorithm
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Responses to Farmer et al.

What Is Better -- Complex Or Simple Civilization?
Andrew Targowski, Western Michigan University
targowsik@wmich.edu
The Farmer-Henderson-Robinson approach to comparing civilizations in statu nascendi at
the level of the big cross-cultural picture is a good example of a method for comparing
civilizations. The selected attributes of pre-modern religions and philosophical thinking
are in agreement with Arnold Toynbee’s (the father of the ISCSC) understanding of a
civilization, namely through its set of values expressed in a practiced religion. The authors
see striking similarities in the patterns of growth and decline in cosmological traditions from
late-classical to early-modern times in different parts of the world. However, later these
similarities disappear, because according to the authors, the maturing religions of
Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism develop independent structures of ideas, symbols,
and patterns of behavior. In other words, a simple world develops and reaches a level of
advanced self-organizing ability, “superiority,” and closed, protected territory.
The question is: what level of world civilization is better? A simple horizontally unified,
open world-wide civilization or a complex one, vertically specialized, closed and hostile to
others? It seems that today world civilization, while transforming into a global civilization,
is at the stage of an early new civilization, similar to that in the mid-first millennium BCE,
studied by these authors. Such global attributes as CNN, Globeish (Global English-basic),
similar dress codes, dollar/euro, and the Internet represent convergences embraced by the
masses that are overwhelmed by the flood of information.
Furthermore, in the past, truth was independent of personality and prior experience of the
observer. Today, truth is relative and “customized” to a user’s profile. Two users posting
the same question will get two different answers from Google since each one has a different
set of cookies. Are we then pre-programmed to know several truths? Can a world without
a unified truth support the modus operandi of a successful, sustainable civilization?
Nowadays, cyber technology is adding a new layer of civilization – virtuality. The young
generation likes it since it can escape from a sometimes brutal reality to an abstracted
virtuality. Is this the beginning or end of civilization? In other words what is better, complex
or simple civilization? How should we live today? This is the question that may be answered
by these three authors, if their research curiosity will go beyond the first millennium BCE.
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Commentary Traditions and the Evolution of Premodern Religious and
Philosophical Systems: A Cross-Cultural Model (1997)
Michael Andregg, University of St. Thomas
mmandregg@stthomas.edu
The authors did their best to apply modern computational modeling methods to a wide
variety of religious texts written long before the birth of Jesus of Nazareth. It is of course
possible to model anything if one tries hard enough. The practical question is whether all
that work is worth something of value after it is done.
Readers must answer that themselves, because “value” is a very subjective thing, like the
hundreds of assumptions that must be made to process raw (thus invariably very ‘dirty’)
data from ancient times into something that can be processed with ‘1s’ and ‘0s,’ the
language of modern computers. No doubt some computers can do miracles, designing
complex machines like modern aircraft and beating human chess Grandmasters. But my
experience with failure in other domains, like the causes of wars, suggests extreme caution.
There is certainly some real value in their review of ancient texts from China, the Indus
Valley, Egypt, the Hebrew Bible and so forth – it is very thorough. And subsequent work
stimulated some excellent inquiries about the probable dates of Vedic texts in particular. I
am much more skeptical of the value of the modeling and attempts to apply a buzzword of
the last 20 years, “neuroscience.” Nothing against brains; I am a biologist and without
brains we could not write or read a single word. But a certain religious reverence has
emerged about what brain science can tell us about ancient religions, similar to the quaint
belief that computers can explain (or even PREDICT) anything if you give them enough
electricity.
So, here are some problems the authors bravely try to overcome. They are extremely hard
problems, so let us be kind and respect their attempt.
1. All of the primary data is extremely ‘dirty’ in that dates of origin are often vague,
manuscripts are often fragmentary and fragments often contradict each other; almost
none of those are ‘original’ but rather copies, and most of those have been ‘touched’
by many unnamed editors who added confusing commentary and subtracted things
they didn’t like. Translations are always necessary, since not one was written in
modern English, and different translators always produce different translations.
Which was the accurate one? That can be a really big problem to the literalists who
think that each word comes direct from the mouth of an infallible god, but that is
another problem. Finally, as the authors are very well aware, people interpret the
meaning of even standardized scriptural literature quite diversely. Thus the term
“exegesis,” which represents the art of trying to figure out what original authors
meant by whatever words they actually wrote before the editors and elements got to
any allegedly sacred texts. Exegesis is more art than science, and the authors use
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that term about one zillion times as they explain the impossible mountain they are
attempting to climb.
2. Some things are very easy to quantify, and thus to model with computers, like
television images or the ballistics of baseballs, bullets and missiles. Other things
are almost impossible to quantify, like the correct meaning of words like “justice,”
“wisdom” and “corruption.” Religious literature is notorious for addressing issues
like justice, wisdom, corruption of tyrants, ethics, souls, and similar philosophical
topics. While the authors identify their algorithm explicitly, they cannot describe
the dozens to hundreds of coding rules they would have had to create, and to train
reviewers in, to prepare these ancient textual fragments, as translated by someone,
for massaging by computers or neuroscientists with skulls in their hands.
3. Therefore I will just note a few of the emergent problems revealed by the mammoth
effort to apply such methods to causes of war, called appropriately the Correlates
of War project initiated by eminent political scientist J. David Singer and historian
Melvin Small. This eventually involved over 30 PhDs at many great universities in
North America and Europe and did a lot to clean up their data.
Unfortunately, the cleaning process required focusing on just those variables that
could be easily and collectively quantified, so issues like civil wars (dynamically
different from interstate wars) and corruption of governance (a major cause of many
wars, especially civil wars) simply got omitted. “Little wars,” especially if they
involved “non-states” like indigenous peoples, got omitted too, so large events like
the near genocide in North America that enabled the University of Michigan to build
its big computers at Ann Arbor simply disappeared from their databases.
And many very important causes of even world wars could not be addressed at all
because there are not enough “degrees of freedom” for their statistics to handle
situations with very few reliable cases.

That is enough on the problem of causes of war except to summarize the general problem.
When you are trying to model hyper-complex phenomena, there is often strong temptation
to erase or ignore the muddy parts so that your statistics can have some harder numbers to
crunch. Problem is, you often erase the really important parts of complex human
phenomena when you do that. One other result: your models can get very good at
“predicting the past” which is one way they are tested. But they are usually awful at
predicting the future, which was the original reason to inquire.
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Consider the relatively easier, but very well-known case of modeling weather. The best
computer models can do amazingly good jobs predicting out for a few days, but none of
them do a very good job once you’re trying to predict a month out. And because of the
great importance of weather to everyone from farmers to astronauts, billions of dollars and
thousands of scholars have been devoted to that task for decades.
Farmer et al. have created an extremely abstract model of ancient thinking about eternal
questions and done their best to fit this into forms and frames created by modern computers
and some (not all) neuroscientists. It is filled with abstract transformations and assumptions
necessary to do that. So I would say that if you like this sort of thought experiment, have a
ball. You will learn a lot.
But if you want practical answers to the dilemmas of modern civilization which is
undoubtedly transforming in many ways, or answers to fundamental religious questions, do
not expect much enlightenment from their brave attempt.
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The Sociological Location of Art
Vytautas Kavolis
rkavolis@sprintmail.com
Selected for this issue by Prof. John Friedman
Friedmanj@oldwestbury.edu

An outstanding expert on comparative civilizations, Vytautas Kavolis was born in 1930 in
Kaunas, Lithuania. He left Lithuania in the wake of the Soviet occupation in 1944 and lived
first in West Germany and then in the United States. He attended the University of
Wisconsin–Madison and the University of Chicago, receiving his master's degree and
doctorate from Harvard University.
He then taught at Tufts University and Dickinson College. He was named Charles A. Dana
Professor of Comparative Civilizations and Professor of Sociology at Dickinson from 1964
until his death in 1996. During this time he also served as a visiting professor at The New
School for Social Research in New York City and at Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas.
Prof. Kavolis was a leading early member of the International Society for the Comparative
Study of Civilizations, when the organization crossed the ocean from its source of
inspiration in Europe to find its permanent home in the United States. He was named to its
executive board from 1974 to 1977 and elected as its president for a term running from 1977
to 1983. Following his second term as president, Prof. Kavolis served until his death as coeditor of the Comparative Civilizations Review.
He was the recipient of Lithuania's National Prize for Culture and Art in 1993 and was the
author of well over 100 articles and sixteen books, including “Artistic Expression: A
Sociological Analysis” (1968) and “History on Art's Side: Social Dynamics in Artistic
Efflorescences” (1972), both published by Cornell University Press. It has been observed
that Prof. Kavolis was comfortable with multiple perspectives, not just three or four, but
eighteen or even twenty-two, and he often revised them, seeming to have new schema every
year.
The following paper has been selected from amongst several unpublished papers which were
recently and fortuitously discovered at home by Dr. Kavolis’s wife, Rita Kavolis, and made
available to the journal.
We are delighted to receive and publish it but note that the references lack bibliographic
citation. Nonetheless, the piece is trenchant and, in my judgment as a professor of American
Studies and Communications, illustrative of the complex contemporary relations involving
the arts, public perception of the arts, and the use of the arts by society.

***********
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There are ultimately only two possible ways to conceive of art sociologically.
In the non-historical (or "labeling”) view, art must be conceived as that which is defined by
a society, or an artistically relevant part thereof, as art. The work itself may or may not
claim to be art; it is "recognized" as such by those with an authority to do so (in modern
societies, by artists and art critics).
This definition implies that art did not exist in preliterate societies until it was recognized
by modern critics, since what now appears to be art has been treated mostly as religious or
utilitarian artifacts. In the absence of the label "art," imposed by us, these objects are indeed
only utilitarian or religious artifacts. Art arises merely in our perception of them, but does
not inhere in the objects themselves (M. Peckham).
This view implies that art has no nature of its own that is to any extent common across time
and space, but represents merely an arbitrary category of perception. Certain objects acquire
a quality, a-having-been-defined-as-art, and that is what is important about them.
The only relevant questions are:



To what kinds of objects has this quality been attributed at particular times?
Why did societies attribute the quality of "artness" to different kinds of objects at
different times?

Since the labeling perspective implies that anything could have been labeled as art, if we
find that certain ways of such labeling either did not arise at all or have not persisted, we
have a basis for a less relativistic notion of art.
The second, historical view of art is based on the assumption that art is that which survives
a series of tests given to objects that function as art (whether the notion of art is, or is not,
recognized in the societies in which it has been produced). When such an object is initially
presented to the view of people other than the artist who made it, it could be viewed as
representing a "claim to art." When it is accepted by large numbers of people in a society,
or by its established elites, or by other artists and art critics, it could be said to have become
a popularly or authoritatively or professionally validated work of art.
But the ultimate test of its artistic quality is whether it can transcend the boundaries of time
and space and be historically and cross-culturally validated. The performing arts, unless
performances are recorded in some manner, cannot, to be sure, be historically validated in
the way in which the "creative" (or rather objectifying) arts can. But this is no reason for
conceiving of all art in terms that are peculiar only to the performing arts.
The historical conception of art implies that art represents a universe with some shared
characteristics that are everywhere recognizable as artistic (whether the concept of art is
consciously identified or not).
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Experimental psychological studies provide some support for this view. They reveal, for
example, that traditional Japanese potters agree to a high degree with American art students
on the relative merits of a series of works of art shown to them. The agreement is greater
than that between American art and non-art students (I. L. Child). Thus, exposure to the
practice of art appears to produce a transcultural consensus on the quality of artistic
attainments.
Practice breaks the bonds of ethnocentric local traditions, which are therefore apt to be more
influential over the behavior of art publics than over the artists themselves--a relatively
unrecognized source of the "alienation" of the artist.
This practice-generated consensus on where art can be seen to exist has several
characteristics:
First, it is partial. Each society and period has its own particularistic criteria as well, by
which it judges works of art. The patrons and publics of art (and even art critics) probably
insist on particularistic criteria more than do the artists themselves. Hence local criteria
should have greater weight in judging works of art to the extent that the artistic enterprise is
dominated by non-artists. This is one reason for the great fluctuations in the economic
evaluations of works of art (Reitlinger).
Second, the artistic consensus is hierarchical. When artists are left alone, they can, in the
long run, roughly agree on the ranking of individual works of art. This happens even in
egalitarian societies, such as the Eskimo or the Australian aboriginal, where nearly all men
participate in artistic activities, but differences in the quality of achievements, and in
individual capacities, are recognized (J. Helm). The notion of a hierarchy of artistic qualities
is therefore not a superimposition of a social hierarchy on artistic experiences.
Third, the consensus on art has expandable boundaries. Works that the artists of a society
have been unfamiliar with can be incorporated, with a discriminating sensitivity to their
merits, into their notion of the "field" of art.
The entrance of new claims-to-art generate evaluative efforts, clashes of particularistic
values, the rise of artistic schools and movements. But such claims are ultimately tested in
terms of the total structure of the field of art.
In turn, this structure evolves by testing itself through the evaluations it gives to works
claiming the right to enter it. The system of art evolves over time and it has blurred
boundaries; but, contrary to some recent theorists (M. Peckham, J. Cage), it does have a
nature specific to itself.
The nature of the system of art seems to derive from sustained experience with the practical
problems of making objects or acts that perform the functions of art and from a sense, which
craftsmanship seems to generate, of what transcends mere craftsmanship. Getzels and
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Csikszentmihalyi have shown, in a contemporary American sample, that craftsmanship by
itself is more highly regarded, in judging works of art, by non-experts than by artists and art
scholars.
The Aesthetic Function
Since craftsmanship is a purposive activity, it appears that the art public is more apt to judge
art in terms of some presumed purpose, while artists judge it in terms of what transcends
any presumed purpose. If it is ultimately the consensus of artists that determines what is
included in the field of art, artistic value must lie in something that is not recognized, even
by the artists themselves, as "the purpose of art."
It follows that works of art cannot be understood in terms of manifest functions they have
been specifically intended to perform. Where they function most purely as works of art,
they perform latent functions -- unintended and unrecognized. See R. Merton for the
distinction between manifest and latent functions.
If this observation is valid, art could be regarded as the generalized system of the society for
the performance of unintended and unrecognized (but nevertheless needed) psychocultural
functions.
If these functions are effectively performed by other systems of the society, art can remain
implicit in them. To the extent that other systems become explicit about their functioning
and rationalize it, art has to emerge as an autonomous system. Art's relationships with
religion and psychotherapy, as well as diverse ambiguities in perceiving it, can be explained
by this conception of the aesthetic function. A variety of consequences follow from it.
First, if its very essence arises from performing unrecognized functions, art must be a less
self-conscious, less “rationalized” and indeed less professionalized activity than any other
in the cultural sphere.
Second, since it must be ready to perform unrecognized functions as they unpredictably
arise, the system of the arts cannot be a specialized system, adapted to a particular set of
circumstances. Rather it must remain generalized, to some extent maladapted to the existing
state of society and functioning in a wide range of areas of ambiguity. But it is precisely
such systems that are capable of social evolution (Sahlins and Service), implanting
structured capacities to perform unintended and unrecognized functions into it.
Third, the survival over time, and perhaps the aesthetic quality, of works of art depends on
how wide a range of unintended and unrecognized functions it can perform. It is because
they have a wide aesthetic range, in the sense that great works of art function for us even
when we do not know what exactly they have meant for their producers (e.g., preliterate art).
Latent functioning is not dependent on the grasp of intended meanings.
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Fourth, it could be argued that an effective organization of any latent psychosocial function
constitutes the aesthetic aspect of the social or psychological system in which it is embedded.
Successful works of art could then be viewed as embodiments of insight into, and
objectifications of, "effectively constructed" but hidden psychocultural processes; and also
as rehearsals, structural models, and foci of crystallization for an effective organization of
otherwise raw and chaotic psychosocial processes. The linkage between "art" and "life"
becomes particularly intimate at this point.
But if aesthetic value depends on consciously unrecognized functions, does an explication
of these functions, by a critic, not erase the aesthetic experience (or prevent it from arising
for those who will, in the future, be conscious of the functions the work of art presumably
performs)?
Not necessarily -- if the work of art, after one of its functions has been explicated, can still
function effectively in other unrecognized and unintended ways.
Artistic, especially literary, criticism could be viewed as a struggle against the (hoped-for)
inexhaustibility of great works of art. One could leave a work of art in peace, and perhaps
forget it, once all of its possible functions have been explicated. Once one has all the
explications systematically set out, why should one need the work of art itself anymore?
But by struggling as hard as he can to reach the limits of interpretation of a work of art, the
critic may be hoping to demonstrate that no such limits exist. The art critic fights against
art in the hope of being defeated by it.
Social Uses of Art
While, to be artistically effective, art must function as art -- fulfilling a great variety of
unrecognized and unintended functions -- it does not generally operate as "pure" art.
First, it may overlap with other cultural systems -- religion, philosophy, science, a secular
ideology -- and perform, in part, the more clearly identifiable functions of these systems. It
is then shaped, to some degree, by the superimposed functions it performs as a part of those
systems.
In general, art tends to become increasingly differentiated from other cultural systems in the
course of social evolution. Yet in some periods a closer integration of art and some other
cultural system, or all of them, may be sought. Thus science has, in most cases indirectly,
affected much of modern visual art (Waddington). It is not to be taken for granted, as several
French theorists of the novel have recently argued, that the most complete differentiation of
art from other cultural systems is most conducive to its authenticity (and, presumably, to
specifically artistic creativity).
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Nor does a self-conscious integration of art with another cultural system enhance art, as
the fiasco of Socialist Realism has shown. It could be inferred from the notion of the
aesthetic function that an indirect, unintended mutual interaction between art and some
other cultural system would be most stimulating to the arts.
Second, art may be used by various social agencies or groups to perform functions these
agencies are interested in. Such use of art by social agencies structures the content and style
of art, influences its level of creative attainment and its total repertoire of functions (social
additions to the aesthetic function that is peculiar to art everywhere). Again, it is not to be
taken for granted that it is necessarily bad for art to be used for extra-artistic purposes.
On the one hand, by using art to fulfill their purposes, social agencies may restrict art's
capacity to function as art. This seems likely to happen to the extent to which social agencies
successfully limit art to performing any set of consciously recognized and intended
purposes. The use of art by more rationalized, "scientific" ideologies should, in this respect,
be more pernicious to it than its use by more ambiguous, "mystical" ideologies -- though art
is used for extra-artistic purposes in either case.
On the other hand, by using art for their own purposes social agencies may also stretch art's
limits in directions which artists might not otherwise have been inclined to explore, enhance
certain of its expressive potentialities at the cost of others, and increase its capacity to
communicate with contemporaries while perhaps reducing its ability to communicate
trans-historically and cross-culturally.
By being forced to struggle against purposes imposed from the outside, artists may become
more aware of what is both peculiar and essential (most worth defending) to art. A complete
elimination of the pressure of being useful in extra-artistic ways may result in both liberation
and trivialization of art.
Like other symbolic systems, art can be used, or function, as a means for attaining the
purposes of any recognizable system of society. In the economy, art can be used as a means
for attaining or symbolizing the possession of wealth, but also as a critique of particular
ways of using it. In the political system, it can function as a means of celebrating, or
emotionally undermining, a particular distribution of power; in the community, it might be
a means of reinforcing or protesting against the existing order of sensibilities, expectations,
social rankings, and social distances. In an ideological system, it can operate to strengthen
the hold of established values by filling the imagination with forms or content suggestive of
these values -- or to question them by presenting forms and content that are irreconcilable
with existing values (Kavolis, 1968).
But even if art objectively functions to promote particular social ends, it is not necessarily
consciously employed to promote these ends.
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Art can be used by any system of society which has any kind of hold over it -- which
commands resources needed for, or relevant to, artistic production, such as wealth, power,
time, cultural symbolism, and cathectic interests built into or spontaneously arising in people
in some way connected with the arts. Art can be used, whether effectively or not, as a means
for either reinforcing or for changing the existing state of affairs in these systems.
Neither of these extra-artistic uses of art seems by necessity aesthetically superior to any
other -- i.e., is likely under all circumstances to bring forth more significant art. What seems
important is whether artists accept the legitimacy of the extra-artistic expectations directed
to their work and incorporate them, unselfconsciously, into their own notion of the artistic
task. If they do so, they should be able to produce good art regardless of the type of extraartistic expectations imposed on it.
Some of the shifts in history from one type of art to another (e.g., from literature to music),
and from one style to another, may be explained by variations in their relative adequacy for
performing the social functions that have been ascribed to, or expected of, art in particular
times and places. At any time, the various arts of a society may all be dominated by one
type of function, or they may specialize, in a pluralistic manner, in performing different
functions. Certainly the "high" and the "folk" arts of a society usually have different social
uses.
An art with a wide appeal in a complex society may perform different functions for different
social strata and other groups (the sexes, the age groups, etc.), as Shakespeare probably did
in his own lifetime and later on.
The style of a work of art may perform one social function, and its content another. And, of
course, the social functions of a work of art which survives in history may well change over
time, as changes in the critical interpretations of these works suggest.
The Cognitive Character of Art
To what extent do the particular social uses of art shape its content and style? To what
extent do the latter, therefore, correctly reflect or distort the objective realities of the society
in which they have been produced? Does use of art by a social agency or group necessarily
imply a distortion, in its interests, of the reality which art may be presumed to reflect? Or
can some groups (e.g., the "progressive" ones, which identify themselves with the direction
of history, in the Marxist view) use art in their own interests without thereby forcing it to
distort reality?
The most general response to these queries is probably that art reflects either subjective
affirmations or subjective denials, symbolic invalidations, of the existing reality. It can
therefore be read only as a record of the history of subjective attitudes toward objectively
existing reality--as "the song of history," but not its “newsreel” (A. Malraux).
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The ways in which art has been used can be assumed to influence, to some degree, the
subjective responses it will express. The subjective responses which exist in the
environment in which art is produced, but which are not "useful" to the groups or individuals
(including the artists themselves) which provide resources for art creation, are less likely to
be reflected in art.
However, insofar as art by its very nature necessarily performs unintended and unrecognized
functions as well, it may reflect even the subjective responses which it is not useful to anyone
involved in the artistic process to reflect. These responses may indeed contradict the
conscious intentions of the artist (Goldmann). Art is never an objective record, and it is
never fully controlled by those who use it -- or it ceases to be art.
The most significant art may well express both the most striking characteristics of objective
social reality and the sense of what is most missed in it -- reflections of reality as well as its
utopian denials. The significance of such art may arise from its discovery of ways to
articulate these mutually contradictory subjective responses to social reality, without
suppressing one in favor of the other.
Cognitive distortions in art arise not from an introduction of subjective attitudes but from a
denial of the ineradicable contradiction, which has a real foothold in the human experience,
between affirmation and denial of aspects of existing "objective" (i.e., mechanically
recordable) realities. Art distorts the totality of human experience in any social setting when
it is biased in favor of either "objective" recording or "subjective" expression.
Art reflects or compensates for the deficiencies of objective reality not only in its content,
but also in style (J. Fischer, M. Robbins). Even completely non-representational arts
therefore have a cognitive character, and subjective orientations to social reality can be
inferred from them (Kavolis, 1968).
Some arts lend themselves more easily to deliberate manipulation in the interest of
consciously distorting the ways in which they reflect reality, whether in style or in content.
Literature, the theatre, and the visual arts (sculpture and painting more than graphics) are
more vulnerable to such manipulation than music.
Representational styles lend themselves more easily to manipulation than highly symbolic
or completely non-representational ones. One reason for moving toward the latter styles is
indeed the desire of artists to escape manipulation. It is deliberate manipulation (censorship,
specification of recipes for works of art by social agencies) rather than merely the use of art
by social agencies and groups that would appear to give rise to distortions of the reflection
of socio-emotional reality in works of art.
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Social Dynamics of Artistic Creativity

If we accept the view that generically artistic functions are both unintended and
unrecognized, it follows that societies (and individuals) can do comparatively little, in a
conscious and purposive manner, to stimulate the production of artistic values: works of art
which fulfill generically artistic functions in a high degree.
That is, while production of art works, or the amount of it, can be determined by conscious
social decisions, creativity, or the relatively enduring quality of the works produced, cannot.
Indeed, Chambers (1928) has suggested that there is historically an inverse relationship
between the level of conscious interest in art in a society and its capacity to produce high
artistic values.
If art performs unintended and unrecognized functions, the creation of artistic values should
be affected by the degree to which art is needed, in particular social settings or by particular
individuals, to perform these functions.
That is, for artistic creativity to become possible, there must be a lot of psychic (or sociopsychological) needs which are neither met by existing social arrangements nor can be
consciously identified and purposefully dealt with by means of social policy. The needs
must be widespread, intense, and not clearly definable (or if they are definable, not subject
to amelioration by concerted social action).
The socio-psychological conditions which increase the need for artistic creativity arise when
rapid changes in either the organization of society or in the emotions of its members produce
a sharply sensed disjunction between personal emotion and objective social structure. Such
disjunctions appear in periods of radical economic, political, ideological, or communal
change.
But while the need for art increases during such periods, the possibility of creating it also
depends on the availability of resources for creating art. The supply of such resources tends
to be diminished in the phase of most intense action during periods of radical change -- e.g.,
during the decades of most rapid economic growth, during struggles for imperial
consolidation, liberation, or change of political system, at the high points of religious (or
secular ideological) reformations.
Artistic creativity is enhanced when an increased social need for art coincides with an ample
supply of resources for artistic production -- thus before and after, but not during, the most
intense phase of any cycle of technological, political, ideological, or communal change in
the society (Kavolis, n.d.).
While social movements cannot create art, they increase the need for it -- which becomes
most effective after they have succeeded, or failed, in changing the system they have
challenged.
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Conscious social policy can affect artistic creativity by supplying, or failing to supply, social
resources for artistic production commensurate with the existing social need for art. Not all
such resources, however, can be controlled at will; the supply of cultural symbolism depends
on its existence in a social system, in a form appealing to the imagination of artists, and not
on the immediate policies of governments, churches, or parties. The latter can, however, to
a high degree, determine the distribution of economic resources.
But while a deficiency of such resources may prevent the creation of works of art for which
the potential exists, economic resources cannot generate artistic values if:
1. the social need for art is not sufficiently intense, as during periods of general cultural
quiescence and social complacency, when existing conditions are taken for granted
by most members of a society (eighteenth-century Italy), or
2. if the society lacks a tradition of, and the skills for, producing works of art.
The type of art in which particular societies become creative when the social need for art is
high is more or less dependent on the kind of tradition and the types of skills already
available in it.
Artistic creativity seems to become inhibited in a cultural tradition which is dominated by
the overwhelming presence of one basic attitude, and stimulated when a tension exists
between two contradictory attitudes roughly equal in strength: between achievement
motivation and interest in self-expressiveness; between an empirical and a metaphoric
conception of the nature of ultimate reality (Sorokin); between restrictive sexual norms and
unsuppressed eroticism (Kavolis, 1971).
Artists seem to be most creative when it becomes possible for individual sensibilities to
challenge socially established dogmas but before such dogmas lose their own capacity to
challenge, or disturb, individual sensibilities.
Artistic attainments also appear to depend on the way in which the artistic enterprise itself
is organized and on informal relationships among artists participating in it.
If artistic movements or informal circles of artists are committed to a ruthless search for
artistic quality and capable of reacting to it with enthusiasm and to failure with criticism,
they are likely to be stimulating, especially for relatively youthful artists incubating radical
innovations.
But artistic circles tend to have an adverse influence on creativity when they prove
provincially insular in their orientations; rigidly committed to one artistic doctrine or
uncommitted to anything other than changing fashion; closely controlled by their publics,
dealers, or critics; or bound together chiefly by non-artistic considerations, such as good
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fellowship, political ideology, ethnicity, kinship and intermarriage, or sexual inclinations
(Kavolis, 1969).
In modern societies, perhaps especially in the large nations, two threats to artistic creativity
have emerged in the possible bureaucratic over-organization of the artistic enterprise,
leaving little room for the cultivation of the unintended and unrecognized aspects of art, and
the early popularization by the mass media of new artistic movements before they have had
time to mature their contributions.
Once artistic movements become widely popular they tend to drop what they have been
doing, even though their possibilities have not been fully realized, since the modern cult of
originality discourages a continued exploration of what others have become familiar with.
Hence what a style is potentially capable of may never be developed.
The arts vary in the degree to which their efflorescences can be generated by conscious
social policy of resource allocation: lyric poetry and watercolor painting virtually not at all,
literature in general not very much. At the other extreme are architecture, the monumental
or technologically complex visual arts, and the performing arts requiring large ensembles of
actors, musicians, or dancers.
The "spectacular" arts which are most directly dependent on the allocation of large-scale
social resources are, of course, also potentially most susceptible to deliberate manipulation
by the social agencies or individuals controlling such resources. In this specific sense, the
small-scale and intimate arts could be described as inherently the most "liberal" ones.
Far from disappearing, they may therefore become particularly important in the more
“manipulative” societies.
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Collective Wisdom and Civilization:
Revitalizing Ancient Wisdom Traditions
Thomas Kiefer
tkiefer@fordham.edu
Introduction
Our question is: can collective wisdom save civilization? On one rendition this question is
rather straightforward and can be empirically answered. For if ‘collective wisdom’ is
understood as the collective knowledge of a society or culture and ‘civilization’ is associated
with a certain level of social or technological advancement, then our question concerns
whether collective knowledge can help create or maintain certain kinds of social structures
or technologies, certain levels of urbanization or kinds of civil infrastructural technology.
Characterized this way, the answer to our question is an obvious, and perhaps trivial, “yes.”
But both ‘collective wisdom’ and ‘civilization’ have alternative definitions, which render
our question less trivial and more important, though more difficult to answer.
‘Collective wisdom’ may not refer merely to the collective knowledge of a particular society
or culture, but can refer instead to wisdom understood as a collective interpretation of human
experience, of what kind of intellect, knowledge, experience, and judgment is required to
live a good and successful human life as such.
‘Civilization,’ although often associated solely with certain levels of social and
technological advancement, can also refer to the moral status and level of development of
an action or individual as when we refer to specific actions or persons as “civilized” or
“uncivilized” in a distinctly normative moral sense.1 To be 'civilized' in an individual moral
sense is what Aristotle called to be eleutherios, to have the individual disposition to be
concerned with virtue (arētē) in both thought and action as the result of proper education
and habituation.2
With these alternative definitions, our question becomes: Can collective interpretations of
human experience, interpretations of the thoughts and skills required to live a good and
successful human life as such, create or maintain individual dispositions to be concerned
with virtue?

Of course, the social and technological senses of ‘civilization’ also lend themselves to normative uses, which
served as a basis for some peoples and nations to deem less developed ones as inferior and able to be mistreated
(or forcefully reformed).
2
See Terrance Irwin’s translation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 1999, p.331 (cf. 1179b5-10).
1
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This essay is an attempt to answer our question thus formulated. I argue that, in one sense,
yes, collective wisdom can save civilization. But in a more important sense, collective
wisdom should be understood as a form of civilization, as the result and expression of a
moral civilizing-process that comes about through the creation and transmission of
collective interpretations of human experience and the concomitant skills to be developed.
Collective wisdom traditions function in this manner by providing an interpretation of what
it means to be human and what thoughts, skills, and actions are required to live a successful
human life at the most general level of analysis. Collective wisdom can have a civilizing
effect on individuals, and indirectly on societies, by providing a type of orienting theoretical
and practical framework for understanding the proper relationship between the self, others,
and the world. Such traditions in effect provide a “blueprint” for the successful human life
as such, by providing guidance on thought and action, on what is appropriate to think, feel,
desire, and do in theoretical and practical contexts.
A wise individual will be a 'civilized' individual in this moral sense, an individual who is
properly habituated and educated so as to now reflectively endorse and desire thinking and
acting in morally civilized ways.
However, this understanding of collective wisdom and civilization is in many ways today
controversial and met with justified critiques and skeptical criticisms. To defend this way of
approaching and answering our question against these critiques, I turn first to ancient
wisdom traditions from civilizations in ancient India, China, and Greece as paradigms for
understanding exactly how collective wisdom can achieve the end of civilizing humanity.
Based on this analysis, I sketch the outlines of a revitalized wisdom tradition able to civilize
individuals today. But any such tradition must be updated to reflect the advancement of
modern natural science and to meet the demands of living in our diverse, pluralistic, and
globalized world.
Ancient Wisdom Traditions
The term ‘ancient wisdom tradition’ requires explicit definition. By ‘ancient wisdom
traditions’ I mean what we would call today the ethical-philosophical-religious traditions
that developed across various ancient cultures during the so-called "axial age,"3
approximately 800 BCE to 200 BCE.

3

This is a term popularized by the philosopher Karl Jaspers in the early 20th century to reflect the radical
changes in thought that occurred in several places around the globe in this period.
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This age of “turning” saw the rise of new forms of thought, new ways of thinking about
society, religion, ethics, and what it means to be human. This entailed reflection on the
implicit aspects of human experience, claims and assumptions about the nature of reality, as
well as a critique of social values and habits deemed inimical to harmony, order, or virtue.
To be more specific, by ancient wisdom traditions I will be referring to the wisdom traditions
that developed from the dominant strands of thought within ancient India, China, and
Greece. It is within these ancient civilizations that distinctive wisdom traditions developed
for the first time in recorded human history, often in contrast to previous cultural, religious,
and mytho-poetic traditions. For this reason, it is to these traditions we can look to
understand general features or requirements of wisdom traditions before turning to our
contemporary situation and need for updated or revitalized ancient wisdom.
This emphasis on India, China, and Greece is not to conceal or deny the influence of
Egyptian and Near Eastern influences on ancient wisdom, nor is it the claim that such
traditions did not exist at all in pre-Columbian America, Africa, or Austronesia. Generally
we should acknowledge that much of “western” civilization originated from non-western
sources,4 but the traditions of ancient India, China, and Greece have had a type of
cohesiveness and influence that other traditions have not.
What are some features of the wisdom traditions of ancient India, China, and Greece?
Generally, each of these traditions focused on ‘wisdom’ in some form, whether understood
as contemplative insight into the true nature of reality, or theoretical knowledge about the
eternal law or order of the cosmos, or practical knowledge about what constitutes the good
human life.
Importantly, this type of wisdom was understood as a certain kind of insight or knowledge
or way of life accessible to normal human beings without the aid of revelation or mystical
insight derived from super-human sources or super-natural faculties, respectively.5 The
4

The particularities of western thought specifically tend to dissolve when it is recognized that Greek culture,
the foundation of "western culture," is really a product and amalgamation of Egyptian and Indus-Valley
civilizational influences. This fact, however, is often met with suspicion and skepticism, especially when
reactionaries defend the purity of the western tradition (see Mary Lefkowitz’s 1997 Not out of Africa).

However, if one can get past these presumptions, then it becomes clear that "western" and "eastern" civilization
and philosophy have numerous overlaps in both form and content. Indian forms of idealism come very close
to certain Parmenidian, Platonic, and Neo-Platonic forms; see P.S. Sastri's 1976 Indian Idealism and R.
Harris’s 1981 Neo-Platonism and Indian Philosophy, for examples. More generally, the trend of emphasizing
the continuity across traditions can be seen in the emerging field of “world philosophy;” see Robert C.
Solomon's and Kaathleen M. Higgins's 2003 From Africa to Zen: An Invitation to World Philosophy for an
important example.
5
The difference between a wisdom tradition and a mystical or religious tradition was not clear-cut in the
ancient world, at least not to the extent that philosophy is distinguished from religion today. This is no mistake,
for wisdom, mystical, and religious traditions make metaphysical claims about the ultimate nature of reality.
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attempt to provide an articulation of the intelligibility of human behavior is found generally
in myths, cultural narratives, and moral parables as well as specifically in the works of
individual thinkers considered wise or sage-like; individuals such as Confucius, Aristotle,
and the Buddha stand out in this regard.6
The specific conception of wisdom differs across traditions. For example, following
Pythagoras and the Pre-Socratics,7 wisdom for the Athenian school, Socrates, Plato, 8
Aristotle and their followers, was importantly related to a specific type of scientific
knowledge (epistēmē) and practical wisdom (phronēsis) that results from the proper usage
of reason (logos) and understanding (nous)9 concerned with the nature of reality (Kosmos).10
In Confucianism, Taoism, and the Yin-Yang tradition in China, wisdom is not as closely tied
to the proper rule of reason or usage of our distinctive cognitive capacities in the Greek
sense, Chinese thinkers will even speak of a mind-heart complex that the Greeks would
likely reject. The focus instead in the Chinese traditions is on properly orienting oneself
according to the nature of reality and responding appropriately to the demands of social
existence.
The difference, however, lies in the method of each and the ways in which such claims are realized and put
forth. Wisdom traditions, I contend, place an emphasis on human capacities and faculties, whatever these may
be, as distinct from divine revelation or the operation of super-natural faculties. What we call super-natural
may have been part of what, say Plato, would have called the natural state of the human soul, for example, not
something that requires an intervention or change in the natural order.
6
Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a-1095b; Lee Dian Rainey, 2010, p.23-30.The importance of eastern thinkers is
often overlooked or diminished in western thought insofar as these eastern thinkers are considered somehow
“not philosophers” or external to philosophy proper (i.e. philosophy in some “western” sense). However, such
dismissal of ancient and non-western sources of wisdom often comes at the expense of meaningful interaction
and engagement.
7
The Ionian search for a fundamental principle of nature can be interpreted as a type of proto-science or early
form of science, insofar as they attempted to explain the natural world without resorting to mythic explanation
or super-natural vagaries. Perhaps Anaximander is an outlier in this regard, in that his reference to the
"indefinite" (apeiron) as the archē provides little by way of actual explanation.
8
This can be seen from throughout both the "earliest" Socratic dialogues such as the Euthyphro, Apology, and
Crito, to the middle Platonic dialogues including Gorgias and Republic, and onward to the later dialogues,
Timaeus, Statesman, and Laws. Aristotle devotes significant time and space to a consideration of these issues
throughout the works attributed to him, perhaps most clearly in the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics.
9
Reference to the divine mind or Nous plays an important role in both Plato's Timaeus and of course in Book
XII of Aristotle's Metaphysics, as the prime unmoved mover and final cause of the Kosmos (Timaeus, 29a,
34b-c, 42c; Metaphysics, bk. 12, 1074b-1076a).
10
Greek and Roman philosophers up to and including Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and the Stoics
made metaphysical naturalism and its ethical consequences the centerpiece of their philosophical
considerations. See Sarah Broadie’s 2010 essay, "The Ancient Greeks" in the Oxford Handbook of Causation,
for a detailed analysis of this line of thought. As noted in the above, the idea that the natural world constitutes
a Kosmos or a law-governed whole may be considered a hallmark of much of ancient Greek philosophy.
Although there were alternative perspectives put forth by deterministic thinkers such as Democritus and
Empedocles, both thinkers who denied teleology in the form of final causation, these mechanistic and
probabilistic natural philosophies nevertheless made some appeal to law-like function (nomos) or rulegoverned regularity of nature (see Aristotle's Physics 186a-187b; Long and Sedley, 1987, p.266; Inwood, 2009,
p.203).
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In the Yin-Yang tradition, wisdom entails living according to the interdependence of reality,
despite the appearance of disparate opposed binaries (e.g., active/passive, male/female,
good/evil, etc.).11 The wise Taoist sage is one who lives a life in harmony (he) or resonance
(gan ying) with the nature of the Tao or “way” of Nature or Heaven (Tian).12 The Confucian
sage (junzi) obtains humaneness (ren) and thereby wisdom by properly cultivating virtue,
responding appropriately to the demands of specific social relationships, performing
important rituals, and respecting just laws (li).13
In the Vedic and Brahmanic traditions, wisdom refers to a type of insight into or
contemplation of truths concerning the relationship between the ego, the true self (Ātman),
and the nature of reality as such (Brahman), which in turn has important practical relevance
for what amounts to correct action (karma) and proper ritualization according to the eternal
law (Santana dharma).14
These are but a few examples from these traditions; see similar strands can be found in the
Stoic,15 Sramana,16 Mohist, 17 or Neo-Confucian18 traditions as well.
We must be careful here because much of what I am focusing on are the dominant themes
and strands in these traditions, which is not to imply that these traditions were by any means

11

Yin and Yang are the opposing yet complimenting principles of reality, which manifest in various dualities
that must coexist for reality to be constituted (light-dark, heaven-earth, hot-cool, active-passive, man-woman);
this is in some ways similar to the Empedoclean conception of ‘Love and ‘Strife’ as archai.
12
The concept of the 'Tao' most likely began as an ethical consideration based upon accepted principles of
Yin-Yang before turning more fully into a metaphysical principle, the eternal Tao (see Lao Tzu’s Tao Te Ching,
specifically ch. 1.1-2.3; 8.1-10.3; 18.1-20.2; 23.1-24).
13
The teachings attributed to Confucius are filled with references to implicit, ordered patterns in human
activities, for example, with the Five Confucian Relationships. Specifically, this theme reoccurs throughout
the Analects (Confucian Analects, bk. 1, ch. 1-2; 6-7; 9-11; 13-14; bk. 2, ch. 1-3; see also bk. 3 and 4).
14
The Vedas represent the foundational texts in the tradition of classical Indian philosophy. These take the
form of rishis or sacred hymns that outline the proper ordering of the world, up to and including human
behavior, social arrangement, and religious ceremony (Rigveda, hymn 1, hymn 4-11.). The Rigveda is the
most important of the Vedas besides the later Vedanta or Upanishads.
15
Due to the fragmentary nature of Stoic philosophy, this section is derived in large part from the Long and
Sedley's 1987 collection, The Hellenistic Philosophers, which collects primary and secondary texts from
various Greek and Roman Stoic philosophers and their critics. Specifically, see p.266-280; p.313-344; and
p.359-423.
16
Sramana tradition gave rise to the yoga, Jainism, Buddhism, and some schools of Hinduism.
17
Mozi was a Taoist before developing his own framework for understanding ethical commitments; at first
glance his views align closely with utilitarian principles (Collinson, 2000, p.226-232).
18
In many ways the Neo-Confucian thinkers, influenced by Taoism and later Chan Buddhism, played the role
of Plato to the Socrates of Confucius. By this I mean that the Neo-Confucian thinkers, beginning with Zhou
Dun-yi, developed a metaphysic that aligns with the ethical principles outlined by their master, who did not
himself write any texts and focused mainly on ethical concerns rather than metaphysical considerations; see
Siu-chi Huang's 1999 Essentials of Neo-Confucianism, especially the historical and philosophical contexts
chapter and chapter two.
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monolithic, and like every tradition, each has its own associated set of subsequent detractors,
skeptics, and offshoot traditions.19
Nevertheless, and despite important differences and disagreements within and across
traditions in the specifics, ancient wisdom traditions, both dominant and reactionary, were
generally concerned with addressing or removing to various degrees: suffering,
unhappiness, or illusion; and conversely, concerned with attempting to create in or lead the
individual or collective to: pleasure, happiness, or insight.
The specifics in each case do differ owing to the particularities of the culture and language
in which these traditions arose, but there are nevertheless common themes and elements not
completely determined by the particularities of a culture, language, or time period.
That such interpretations of human experience and human nature can become a tradition at
all, let alone traditions capable of spanning hundreds of years and multiple cultures and
peoples, is significant and cannot be easily denied by the most ardent defenders of relativism
or constructivism.
But in the interest of space and to maintain focus on our question at hand, I will examine
only two related themes found in these ancient wisdom traditions, one theoretical and one
practical, though necessarily related: 1) the relationship between ethics and metaphysics,
and 2) the moral development of the self and human nature.
The Relationship between Ethics and Metaphysics
The most important aspect of these ancient wisdom traditions for addressing our question is
the belief that there is an essential relationship between ethics and metaphysics and that
understanding and living out this relationship is a necessary condition for being wise. The
idea is that what one ought to think, feel, desire, and do is necessarily a function of the way
reality is, specifically the nature of human beings and how human beings “fit” within the
context of the world, usually considered as an ordered totality (Nature, Tao, Kosmos,
Brahman).

19

For even the Skeptics and Sophists held that their conclusions were correct about the nature of things by
emphasizing agnostic indeterminacy and the supposed gulf between nomos and phusis, or human-made law
and nature, respectively. Even atomists like the Epicureans, thinkers who rejected the rationalism of the
Athenian School and Stoicism, believed that an adequate understanding of the world had ethical consequences,
namely happiness as the lack of the fear of death and the judgment of the gods. Even the anti-rationalist
dimensions of Taoism and Chan Buddhism in China rejected Confucianism because they held that it was all
too human when compared to the truth of non-human reality. And even the non-orthodox strands in Indian
philosophy, Carvaka, Jainism, and Buddhism, claimed to various degrees to describe the true nature of reality,
often in direct contrast to certain elements in the Vedic tradition.
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Relatedly, the nature of reality is understood through necessary reference to human beings
and human nature, and this is one main reason why these traditions often rely on organic
metaphors and anthropomorphic language to describe reality.
In these traditions wisdom requires a type of metaphysical or theoretical understanding of
both what is the case and what ought to be the case, which cannot be separated without
incoherency. The wise individual is able to live a successful human life because she
understands what it means to be a human and what is required to live harmoniously with the
nature of reality, of which human beings are but one part. This in turn requires understanding
human experience and human nature as manifestations of the nature of reality, capable of
reflectively identifying with and harmoniously ordering one’s life according to the recurrent
patterns found in nature. Achieving this ideal entails what the Stoics called “living according
to nature” (kata phusin),20 what the Taoists called Wu-Wei or the 'way of naturalness' or
harmony through non-action,21 and what the Vedic-Brahamanic adherents call moksa or
liberatory self-knowledge of the identity between the true Self (Ātman) and the fundamental
principle of reality, Brahman.22
However, understanding and living out the relationship between ethics and metaphysics is
not automatic because false beliefs and hallow desires can prevent human beings from
recognizing and adequately responding to it. It becomes difficult or impossible to
acknowledge that metaphysical knowledge is ethically important because it is required to
help us ignorance or misunderstanding about what is truly real, or what is desirable and
valuable for beings like us.
Conversely, it may be impossible to acknowledge that ethical knowledge and action are
metaphysically important because human beings are understood in these traditions as partly
responsible for the proper function of reality insofar as human beings play a certain role in
its operation.
It may even be held that metaphysics and ethics are not related at all, that metaphysics can
be done without reference to human beings and value, or that ethics can be independent from

20

In Stoic philosophy, living 'kata phusin' or 'according to nature,' was the metaphysical and ethical end or
telos of human nature; according to Seneca, "For man is a rational animal. Man's ideal state is realized when
he has fulfilled the purpose for which he was born. And what is it that reason demands of him? Something
very easy - that he live in accordance with his own nature" (Seneca, 1969, p.88-89). The relevant meanings of
the ancient Greek word phusis range from 1) nature as an active process of becoming (e.g. the growth of a
seed into a tree), to 2) the specific characteristics of the thing in question (e.g. the nature of a dog), to 3) a
normative term that refers to characteristics an individual ought to have owing to its nature in the second sense;
and finally, to 4) the ordered whole of all that is (Kosmos) as determined by law (nomos) and structure (logos).
I owe this breakdown of the meanings of phusis relevant for the Stoics to Adolf Bonhöffer by way of William
O. Stephens; see, Bonhöffer, 1894, p.13-14, and Stephens, 1994, p.276.
21
Tao Te Ching, ch. 2.
22
Katha Upanishad p.1, ch.2, verse 24; Mandukya Upanishad, verse 2.Brihadaranyaka Upanishad p.1, ch.4,
verse 10.
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the way reality is on some more fundamental level underneath social and cultural
constructions.
In these traditions the way to address these potential incoherencies is through a focus on
human nature as the manifestation of the relationship between ethics and metaphysics.
The concept of human nature (atman,23 hsing, phusis) is fundamental in these traditions
because human nature is considered the intersection between ethics and metaphysics and a
site for the interpretation of both. Claims about human nature, such as the claim that a human
being is a rational animal or a social animal or a divine animal, are theoretical claims that
have direct practical consequences, concerning, for example, the proper trajectory or end
goal of human development and the objective conditions under which human beings can or
ought to survive, live, and flourish. That being said, these traditions do not deny, though
perhaps they are often victim to, the ambiguity and danger associated with identifying
human nature and making epistemological claims about our access to the metaphysical
nature of reality.
This ambiguity and potential danger was raised as far back as the ancient Greek Sophistic
claim that much of what we attribute to be fundamental aspects of (human) nature (phusis)
is socially or culturally constructed (nomos). But the relation of this ambiguity to wisdom
comes in the form of an enlightenment or transcendence that results from correctly
identifying human nature as a microcosm that mirrors the macrocosm of the totality of
reality.
This is perhaps most clearly seen in Plato's allegory of the Cave, which tells of the dangers
of illusion and the attempt to enlighten others, but similar ideas can be seen in the Yin-Yang
and Taoist warnings against relying on dualisms created by human language and the Hindu
understanding of Maya, the phenomenal veil of illusion that underlies naïve realism. In these
traditions the danger lies in erroneously identifying some aspect of human nature as essential
when it is merely contingent, say the assumption that Homeric conceptions of virtue are
simply necessary and natural. The associated danger is the distortion or concealment of the
relationship between ethics and metaphysics, which in an extreme form entails the denial
that we have any access to human nature and reality as it really is beyond mere phenomenal
appearances and the social constructs.
The Moral Development of the Self and Human Nature
The first theme concerned the necessary conditions for wisdom in terms of theoretical
beliefs about the relationship between ethics and metaphysics. The second theme concerns
the necessary conditions for wisdom in terms of practical belief, desire, and action.
I am using the lower-case ‘A’ to distinguish between the atman composed of five ‘sheaths’ or kosas (physical
[annamaya kosa], breath [pranamaya kosa], mind [manomaya kosa], intellect [vijnanamaya kosa], and bliss
[anandamaya kosa]) and the Ātman that is the innermost core and true nature of the Self.
23
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These two themes, of course, are directly related to and augment each other, for, to borrow
phraseology from Kant, theoretical belief without practical action would be empty and
practical action without theoretical belief would be blind. But given the relationship between
ethics and metaphysics, how can the relationship between ethics and metaphysics be
cultivated and actually lived out in terms of practical belief, desire, and action?
The answer to this question is found in the belief in these traditions that the self and human
nature do not begin as fully developed or complete, both developmentally and morally, but
can and must be developed over time toward certain ends or goals of fulfillment.
The idea is that human beings developmentally and morally begin from an initial, inchoate
state, in many ways less than human in a normative sense of the term. From an initial state
of egocentrism, the individual develops morally -- given the appropriate kinds of habituation
and education, resulting in a concern for virtue or justice or humaneness. Living out the
relationship between ethics and metaphysics is a process of reaching the most complete state
of human moral development, which entails an understanding of the natural moral laws of
reality, or the relationship between self, other, and the world.
This is to become ‘civilized,’ to be free from hollow, defective, and irrational desires and
instead willing to act in distinctly moral ways. But this requires the individual to identify
with the higher parts of the self over and above the lower parts and proclivities that we have
toward what is unhealthy, base, and disordered.
In the initial inchoate state, of both individual ontogenesis and moral development, the
human being is driven by lower and more basic aspects of our nature. Clear examples of this
characterization of moral development is found in the Platonic-Aristotelian conception of
the tripartite conception of the soul, the five sheaths of kosas of the self in the Hindu
tradition,24 and Mencius’s four beginnings or “germinations” (tuan), natural predispositions
that each individual human being has toward virtue, which can in turn be cultivated and
grown into an internalized disposition toward virtuous thought and action.25 In either case,
moral development or the lack thereof concerns the cultivation of and identification with the
higher parts of the true self, the self that is most fully human, beyond all particular attributes
and contingent identity characteristics.
The moral development of normal human individuals can and must be directed or else it
may never mature or may develop in a twisted manner. This is achieved through the correct
kinds of external stimuli, from moral habituation, socialization, and role modeling toward
the end of cultivating an internal disposition toward virtue, and ultimately wisdom. This
development enables an individual to associate with ever larger categories, beginning from
a concern with the ego, to family members, community, city- or nation-state, and eventually
Nature or the totality of reality itself.
24
25

See previous footnote, 23.
Graham, 2002, p.20.
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Moral development does not require the total denial of the lower parts of the soul and the
selfish or vicious predispositions that we also have, but a channeling of our amoral needs,
drives, and desires in virtuous ways that respond to the moral reality of other persons and
moral agents. That being said, this process is also subject to errors and distortions, and the
individual can become morally twisted and may have distorted desires toward ends that are
unhealthy, immoral, or otherwise unnatural.
An individual can in this way become “stuck” in terms of moral development, either because
she is unable to progress beyond some initial stage or has come to desire vicious ends for
their own sake. Due to this possibility some interpret human nature as being inherently evil
or prone to conflict rather than harmony (Xunzi), but these ancient wisdom traditions
generally hold that human nature must be developed and is not innately or automatically
good or evil, perhaps good insofar as the nature of each thing is proper to itself.
Nevertheless, human nature can be perfected but it is not itself perfect or imperfect as such
and without reference to the development of the self.
Wisdom in terms of practical belief and action requires the proper kind of intellect,
knowledge, experience, and judgment. This is a honed sense of what to do and refrain from
doing in practical contexts, a capacity for judgment Plato and Aristotle called practical
wisdom or phronēsis.
A wise individual is able to act in the appropriate ways in the appropriate contexts relative
to the standards of the community and ultimately to the standards of human nature and the
nature of reality. The characterization of wisdom that results from these two related themes
is one that requires both an orienting theoretical framework and a practical skillset that
disposes an individual to think, feel, desire, and act in certain ways.
A wisdom tradition provides this framework and practical skill set, which can have the effect
of morally civilizing individuals in both thought and action. The wise individual is one who
knows what to think and do because he knows how cognition, affection, conation and action
are related to and sourced in human nature, which itself is an outgrowth of cosmic nature.
The wise individual is the human being who has reached her fullest potential qua human
nature, a fully realized state of eleutherios, of the freedom to be able to live a successful
human life and harmonize with the nature of reality.
Revitalizing Ancient Wisdom
Returning to our question, in this section I argue that these elements in ancient wisdom shed
light on why collective wisdom can save civilization by being an instantiation of it. I argue
that we need to revitalize or continue these wisdom traditions by updating them to meet the
demands of the contemporary world and reconcile them with modern scientific knowledge.
This will be a general sketch of what a contemporary wisdom tradition would entail and not
an exhaustive account that will answer all potential worries and objections.
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But first, it will be helpful to focus on what is false, implausible, and even dangerous about
these ancient wisdom traditions. Even if there are plausible aspects of these traditions, these
traditions and thinkers also have shortcomings of their own.
Perhaps the greatest mistake found in many of these traditions is an overemphasis on the
past, the prioritization of conserving social order at all costs, and an associated suspicion of
change.26 This tendency lends itself to a type of naturalistic fallacy, or assumption that
simply because things are some particular way that they ought to be this way, perhaps
because reality is governed by Fate or Destiny. For example, this trend can be seen
historically from biology-based gender essentialism, to the philosophical and religious
defense of 'slave nature' and certain kinds of racism, to the ad hoc metaphysical justification
of the caste system in India, to the reactionary nature of certain aspects of Confucianism,
and the list goes on.
Ancient wisdom traditions at times merely provide metaphysical and ethical justifications
of supposedly natural, necessary, or rational aspects of society that actually resulted from
contingent historical events, contingent ways of structuring society, and empirically false
beliefs about the world. The second major shortcoming that can render these traditions
implausible prima facie is their tendency to anthropomorphize27 reality and the natural world
to a degree that is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with a modern scientific
understanding. Given that much of what the ancients knew about the natural world was false
or distorted or based on certain cultural assumptions, it is easy and today commonplace to
consider these traditions superstitious, primitive, or otherwise backwards, perhaps even
“uncivilized” in terms of social, technology, and moral development.28
These two shortcomings must be recognized as serious, but part of addressing them requires
the acknowledgment that they are not isolated to these traditions alone. In terms of the first
shortcoming, many of us today often fall into the trap of assuming that the ways in which
we think, live, and structure society are somehow how they ought to be, e.g., perhaps
democracy or capitalism or egalitarianism is the most rational or natural or necessary
political, economic, and moral system, respectively.
26

Part of this is due to the cyclical conception of temporality found in these traditions, which stands in stark
contrast to a linear Abrahamic and later modern scientific conception of time. Nonetheless, in effect the focus
on fixity indirectly and at times directly supported a type of reactionary conservatism on the political level,
and at least in the Greek and later Christian traditions, the metaphysical priority of Being over becoming on
the metaphysical level.
27
By anthropomorphism here I mean the types of animism, vitalism, and projectionism that pervade many
ancient, traditional, and indigenous cultures.
28
Religious, mystical, and spiritual traditions, which hitherto provided this orientation are increasingly losing
influence and plausibility, both in the public sphere and intellectually in the minds of many people around the
world. There are, of course, good reasons why these traditional sources of meaning are met with such reactions.
It seems clear that we should at the very least no longer consider these sources authoritative simply because
they are traditions and we should be wary of any non-scientific claims or essentialism. But there are also good
reasons why these traditions came into existence and were accepted in the first place because they are
successful to at least some degree.
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Ancient wisdom traditions are no more or less subject to this cognitive bias than any other
tradition. The difference is that we have the perspective of history to see exactly how they
were clearly mistaken in many respects, though we lack the same perspective on ourselves.
That being said, because we now do know much more about the natural world than the
ancients, we should carefully reject those beliefs and values that were based on mistaken or
partial evidence.
To correct for this shortcoming, we can distill the general and recurring elements in each
tradition and jettison the idiosyncratic elements that likely resulted from contingent aspects
of these ancient cultures. In terms of the second shortcoming, the tendency to
anthropomorphize reality still exists, and perhaps this tendency is necessary to some extent,
because it is easier to explain what is more distant in terms of what is closer in our
experience, even in physics.29
However, this second shortcoming manifests itself differently today in the form of the
apparent contradiction between our scientific knowledge of the natural world and our
practical existence as moral beings. Many of us practically act as if morality and value are
real and objective,30 while also acknowledging theoretically that scientific knowledge shows
that there is nothing intrinsically valuable or moral or human at the "absolute" level of
reality. What we lack is a justifiable, coherent framework for reconciling our practical lives
and our theoretical belief, and without such a framework, we will continue to live out a
contradiction.
A revitalized wisdom tradition based on ancient antecedents can correct for these
shortcomings and reconcile these seemingly disparate domains, but only by updating these
traditions in relation to our contemporary world and recent advancements in natural science,
especially evolutionary biology. Based on our current scientific knowledge of the world, we
now have good reason and evidence to believe that at some more basic level the universe is
constituted by energy in various forms that cannot be accurately anthropomorphized without
projection and distortion of the phenomena. However, we also now have good reason and
evidence to believe that the same principles that constitute the nature of reality are also found
in and constitutive of our evolved human nature.
For this reason, studying human nature and our evolution can allow us to understand what
the ancients already knew about the relationship between ethics and metaphysics, even if
29

Physical events and experiments, even when derived from the use of computers and particle accelerators,
still require human interpretation, and necessarily, some amount of anthropomorphization. This is so because
we must relate whatever we may discover in the arena of physics to our everyday experience of the world by
using imagery, metaphor, and human linguistic constructs. An example of this is the names given to certain
quarks, such as “charm” and “strange,” which are distinctly human ways of sorting out physical phenomena.
30
‘Objective’ here means mind-independent. Value realism or moral realism is the claim that there are value
facts or moral facts and the existence of these facts is metaphysically, epistemologically, and logically
independent of our evidence for them. This is a characterization of realism put forth by David Brink; see Brink,
1989, p.5-7.
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the specifics formulation of the conclusions that we arrive at today will differ greatly in
some respects. That is, we now know that the world is not human. Instead, the human is
world, for human nature and experience are manifestations of the world, rather than
something above or below it. We need not anthropomorphize the universe, but understand
how we ourselves are cosmomorphized.
In this sense Bernard Williams is correct when he noted that, when viewed sub specie
eternitatis, or from an “absolute” view, there is nothing distinctly human or valuable or
moral to be found in the extra-human or mind-independent reality.31 But the fact that value
is not at the end of the day found on the "absolute" level of energy does not render it any
less real, at least not any less real than phenomena like life and consciousness, which are
certainly real in some important sense, though also not present at the "absolute" level of
reality.
One insight gained by analyzing these ancient wisdom traditions for our contemporary
situation is recognition that the relationship between ethics, metaphysics, and human nature
does not cease to exist when it is no longer recognized.
There are those who can and do act as if there is no such relationship, as if the rational mind,
the will, the soul, or individuality cannot be understood through reference to human nature.32
Still others pretend that the coherency of our experience can be maintained by either denying
the objective reality of morality and value entirely, 33 because they are seen as human
constructs, or by denying the objective truth of modern natural science, because it is
somehow dehumanizing or imperialistic.
But all of these options lead to incoherency in both belief and action. In the first case we
must deny the large part of our experience that is filled with value and normativity because
these are seen as mere illusions34 or emotive responses,35 mental expressions,36 or relative
social beliefs37 when compared to a world constituted by lifeless particles and uncaring
fields of energy. In the second case we must deny the objectivity and reality of modern
natural science, motivated in part by a reaction against what Schiller called the
disenchantment (Entzauberung) of the world and any feelings of belongingness in the world.
31

Williams, 1985, p.139.
Thinkers in these camps range from Phenomenologists like Heidegger, Existentialists like Sartre, who denies
that the for-itself (pour-soi) is causally determined by external factors, to Kantians, non-naturalists, and social
constructivists, who all to various degrees deny that reference to a transcendentally real or mind-independent
reality and human nature is required to understand human experience and wisdom.
33
There are numerous metaethical positions that provide skeptical, nihilistic, or anti-realistic accounts of moral
behavior, evaluation, and judgment. Specifically, in the emotivist camp, thinkers like A.J. Ayer, Rudolph
Carnap, Charles Stevenson, expressivists like Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard, as well as error theorists
such as J.L. Mackie, Richard Joyce, and other anti-realists like Sharon Street.
34
Mackie, 1977, 38; see Joyce, 2001.
35
Ayer, 1936; Stevenson, 1957.
36
Blackburn, 1993; Gibbard, 2003.
37
Harman, 1977.
32
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What a wisdom tradition today would need to answer is a question raised by Hans-Georg
Gadamer: “how [is] our natural view of the world - the experience of the world that we have
as we simply live out our lives - related to the unassailable and anonymous authority that
confronts us in the pronouncements of science?”38
These ancient wisdom traditions attempted to articulate recurrent patterns in both the natural
world and human experience toward the end of being able to understand how to achieve
certain goals and create certain kinds of human beings, the goal of wisdom and the creation
of wise individuals. A wisdom tradition as such cannot make individuals wise, but it can
provide the conceptual and practical framework that, if applied correctly, can foster the
cultivation of such individuals, if only fallibly. These traditions in effect provide a type of
“blueprint” for how to think and live successfully and given the recurrent pitfalls that arise
in the course of a human life.
Modern natural science and evolutionary biology provide the current best methods for
isolating and discovering recurrent patterns in the natural world that give rise to complex
forms of life, up to and including our own experience, and importantly, our very need for
wisdom traditions.39 What we mean metaphysically by Nature is surely different than the
externally, rationally, or teleologically ordered reality of the ancients, but there is
nevertheless enough order or regularity in the universe to permit the evolution of complex
forms of life according to certain patterns or law-like relations and forms of causation.
Biological evolution provides the current best explanatory account of how it is possible that
physical and chemical regularities or patterns in the natural world can give rise to life, selfsustaining biological systems directed toward certain goals or features in the environment
necessary for survival and reproduction. Although evolution as such is not externally
directed toward pre-given ends, the minimal necessary conditions for sustaining life and the
constraints placed on the organism by the environment lead through natural selection to the
development of relatively determinate adaptive organismal natures. For instance, a fern has
a type of adaptive trajectory or normal course of development, survival, and reproduction
relative to its evolutionary lineage and directed toward certain features of the (physiochemical) environment. Increasingly complex forms of life have similar trajectories oriented
toward certain features of the (internal) environment for minimally conscious creatures and
the (social) environment for social animals, from wolves to human beings.40
This evolutionary development of adaptive natures can be plausibly understood as a type of
natural teleology, though reducible to complex forms of efficient causation and not a sui
generis teleological principle as the ones found in ancient Indian, Chinese, and Greek
38

Gadamer, 1976, p.3.
There are those of course who believe that evolution demonstrates that value and morality are not real in
any mind-independent or objective manner (as the value and moral realists claim). However, a full defense
against this charge is outside the scope of this essay; see Ruse, 1998; Street, 2006; and Joyce, 2007.
40
Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse provide detailed accounts of how this naturalistic approach can be
used to evaluate human virtues in a Neo-Aristotelian vein. See Foot, 2001 and Hursthouse, 1999.
39
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traditions.41 Taking this seriously requires acknowledging that there is a normal trajectory
or course of development individually and morally for human beings toward certain ends or
goal-states; this is not fundamentally different than other organisms.
This is the naturalistic relationship between ethics and metaphysics. There are thus certain
thoughts, feelings, desires, and behaviors that are fitting or natural for us, in part because
these certain ways of thinking, valuing, and acting allowed our ancestors to live, survive,
and reproduce by fulfilling conditions of life and meeting the demands of the environment.
Flourishing is also made possible as a positivity that supervenes on the maximal state of
development, though flourishing itself was likely not naturally selected, because happiness,
excellence, and even wisdom are not directly fitness conferring. However, because our
cognitive capacities have developed to the extent that we are not driven purely by innate
instinct or learned behavior, we may fail to reach these goals if we have not been habituated
or educated correctly relative to this normal course, and importantly, when we lack a
theoretical and practical framework for connecting our needs and desires to their proper
natural ends in the physical and social environments.
Naturalistically interpreted, wisdom traditions operate by providing these kinds of adaptive
frameworks, to connect up our needs and desires with their fulfillment in a natural, healthy,
and successful way.42
This naturalistic proposal is currently suspect either because it is seen as a type of scientistic
reductionism or because it runs contrary to a large part of modern forms of philosophical
subjectivism43 and Neo-Platonic and Christian assumptions about supposedly non-natural
or supernatural elements of human nature. But there is also a general, Enlightenmentinspired, now mainly post-modern, mistrust of any appeal to nature as the basis for
understanding human nature and experience, especially given the aforementioned
naturalistic fallacy. This suspicion of naturalism and naturalizing projects is justified to a
certain degree, but the problem is not with naturalism as such, but with historical misuses of
the method and concept.
Even if human nature and ethics should be understood naturalistically, this does not entail
that simply because some act is natural it is therefore ethical; this would indeed be fallacious,
41

This entails a type of teleological or goal-directed causation comes operant. Teleological causation here is a
complex form of efficient causation which is not reflective as in humans but results when and because certain
actions have been successful relative to the objective conditions for the existence of life to the extent that the
goal of biological process guides means for obtaining that end. My account here is indebted to Harry
Binswanger's work, The Biological Basis of Teleological Concepts.
42
My naturalistic interpretation of wisdom comes close to Mihaly Csikzentimihalyi’s own in his essay
“Toward an Evolution Hermeneutics: The Case of Wisdom,” but I do not make the claim that wisdom was
selected naturally in the course of evolution, in part because being wise by itself does not directly enhance
fitness. See Csikzentimihalyi, 1995.
43
Beginning with Descartes, modern thinkers who began with philosophical starting point of the subject
rejected non-skeptical versions of naturalism (e.g., Hume, Berkeley, Kant).
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just as the claim that simply because we have always thought and acted this way therefore
we ought to continue to think and act this way. Neither does this mean that rational reflection
and human choice are eliminated, for nothing about nature or reality can force us to act in
certain ways rather than others and what type of world we want to live in and create requires
choice on our part, a choice though that is circumscribed by objective facts about the natural
world and human nature, however.
With caution, we can say at the very least that human nature evolved in such a way as to be
disposed toward sociality, which means that human beings normally survive, reproduce, and
flourish by interacting with and relying on other humans on a regular basis.44 However,
human beings also normally have individual needs and desires that are non- or anti-social in
various ways, which must be channeled and met in healthy ways that are cooperative or prosocial.45 Naturalistically interpreted, morality can be understood as an adaptation for
channeling these needs and desires toward cooperative social functioning, whereby
individuals are induced to meet their individual needs and desires in light of the reality,
needs, and desires of other members of a particular social grouping, say a family, kin group,
community, or nation state, etc.
This normally occurs when individual needs and desires become embedded in the needs and
desires of other members of the group in specific social relationships (e.g., familial
relationships or friendship) or through extended cultural categories (e.g., ethnicity, religion,
nationality, etc.). This means that moral development requires cognitive, affective, and
conative capacities, as well as the appropriate type of upbringing and habituation, and like
all biological processes, this development is subject to disruption, distortion, and even
failure.
Nevertheless, human morality and moral development is constituted and constrained by real,
objective, or mind-independent facts about human nature, our evolutionary lineage, and the
necessary conditions required for social functioning.
Understood in this way, morality is something that human beings do in the same way that
flight is something that many birds do, something appropriate for their bird-form of life, and
a fully developed human individual will be much like a fully developed tree in bloom that
has reached its full potential. This can in turn be understood as a form of ethical naturalism,
a combination of philosophical naturalism and moral realism, though again different in

44

This is in contrast to animals that are non-social and only occasionally interact for the sake of reproduction
or a one off hunt.
45
For example, the regulation of alimentation ensures that a suitable amount of food is allocated to each
member to meet their respective needs, and the regulation of reproduction, coupling, and birth entails a
framework for controlling the transmission of genetic material. Now surely much of this process is largely
implicit and much of it is also the response to instinctual or stereotyped behavioral predispositions sourced in
our primatial and mammalian lineage. But they can and do raise the level of conscious awareness and (critical)
rational reflection.
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many respects from the naturalism and moral realism found in the ancient wisdom traditions
of India, China, and Greece.46
Even though there are general or universal characteristics of human nature, the social and
environmental context in which human beings live can greatly alter the specific form human
development and experience take. Context can be so influential that it can even lead to the
concealment of these patterns in reality and human nature, if and when we are unable or
unwilling to identify with the natural world or choose instead to define ourselves according
to social constructs or technological artifacts. This seems to be the case, as when we
understand ourselves through the categories of our particular time and place or understand
the human mind like a human-made object such as a computer.
To see the effect of social and environmental context on the expression of human nature, we
must understand how our contemporary social and environmental context differs from the
initial evolutionary context in which our ancestors lived for the majority of our anatomically
modern evolutionary lineage.
Anthropological data suggests that for over 200,000 years, anatomically modern human
beings lived in small, mobile groups, eventually forming into small hunter-gatherer tribes.47
In this context, each member of the social group would likely share similar background
beliefs, values, interests, and even genetic material with each other. Each member would
normally have a reason and interest in cooperating with other members of the group, even
if implicit, because individual needs and desires would have been embedded within the
needs and interests of others in the social group.
Compare this context to our contemporary one. Take, for example, New York City, a city
of over eight million inhabitants, a social context wherein individuals often have vastly
different beliefs, values, interests, and genetic backgrounds. In this contemporary setting it
is psychologically impossible to know each member of the social group, and consequently,
possible that an individual may feel no emotional, moral, or even human attachment to those
outside of the scope of direct relationship or the cultural categories which are strongly
identified with (e.g., ethnicity/religion/class).48 Moreover, an individual may have a rational
self-interest not to cooperate with the needs and interests of others outside of our own group
and special relationships. Still worse, an individual may even have a reason to act immorally
46

There are of course numerous ethical naturalist contemporary thinkers such as Richard Boyd, Nicholas
Sturgeon, Peter Railton, David Brink, David Copp, among others. However, these thinkers tend to stop short
of relating this contemporary form of ethical naturalism to its antecedents in the ancient wisdom traditions,
which in turn leads to an unjustifiable focus on consequential states of affairs and objectifiable psychological
states such as desires. What is lost is a focus on the agent-centered dimension of our moral experience, as
understood in the background of our evolutionary lineage.
47
Krebs, 2011, 164-165.
48
This is not to deny that hunter-gatherer societies treated out-groups in a similar manner. Instead, we now
live in a singular society that still has multiple tribes and associations, which cause social ills and can cause
social unrest. But hunter-gatherer societies were more insulated than ours today, and for this reason, there was
an onus placed on the mistrust of outsiders and a justified suspicion toward potential external threats.
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(i.e. non-cooperatively), if individual short-term needs and desires can be met at the expense
of others whom one does not know and is not related to in any overriding moral sense.49
This is but one example that demonstrates that the context50 in which human beings live and
understand themselves can change rapidly owing to technological and social development,
which is development that is not necessarily connected with moral development and at times
in conflict with it.
Social and technological development lead to a type of “gap” that exists due to the disparity
between the more adaptive context in which our ancestors evolved and our contemporary
context, which in many ways in maladaptive or leads to maladaptive development and
behavior.51
This gap can manifest itself in a number of ways, from a normative gap that opens up
between our rational self-interest and our interest in cooperation, to an empathy gap that
results when various subgroups must live in close proximity, and an authority gap that
requires increased levels of internalized authority in a context with increasingly less direct
authority control and intervention in private life.
All of these gaps result from the sheer size and complexity of social settings and can lead to
maladaptive, immoral, and unsuccessful thought and action unless filled. Even capacities
that were adaptive in the initial context may become maladaptive in another; for example,
the human ability to identify with a particular group or culture provides a basis for social
integrity and cooperation in one context, and in another, is the indirect source of
ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and racism. This is similar to the way in which we evolved with
the adaptive craving for sugar, salt, and fat and now are in an environment with an
abundance of these things with the result that we have maladaptive behaviors and an obesity
epidemic.52

49

An individual may nevertheless have a vested long-term interest and reason to cooperate, even with those
with whom there is no relatedness, but human beings also have a psychological tendency to prioritize the shortterm over the long-term, even if this is in some sense irrational, or at the very least, imprudent.
50
We should expect, for example, a society that lives in a desert environment to place a priority on specific
values and define specific actions as immoral; for example, the theft of water in a harsh environment must be
treated with a harsher punishment or prohibition than in an environment with abundant water. A population in
an artic environment will also vary accordingly. But because of certain objective constants (physical, chemical,
and biological regularities) certain values will remain constant and be true, for all intents and purposes, in all
socially possible environmental contexts.
51
This truth can be understood on the physiological level as well. Human beings evolved in an environmental
context wherein highly caloric forms of sugar, salt, and fat were rare. Today and through technology, such
food is widely available and this context stimulates and evolved predisposition we have leading to the obesity
epidemic now increasingly spreading the globe, in both industrialized and developing nations.
52
Factors such as genetics, poverty, and urbanization also contribute to this epidemic. My remarks refer to the
evolved motivational system that induces us to desire sugar, salt, fat in the first place that, when combined
with a particular environment, can lead to maladaptive, unhealthy, and deadly results.
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These gaps can and must be bridged even though they can never be completely closed
because they result from the structural differences in the size and complexity of a society.
However, these gaps can be filled or bridged through orienting frameworks, skill sets, and
education that can enable individual to cope with the challenges of living a successful human
life given the particularities of our contemporary context. But these gaps are not new and
have existed since the development of agriculture, which enabled human beings to live in
highly populated, fixed location cities. These gaps existed in the social setting of these
ancient wisdom traditions and part of their implicit function was to compensate for and
mitigate their danger to social order, harmony, and civilization in every sense of the word.
Ethnicity, religion, and nationality are well-known categories that function by organizing
individuals under a common category and group identity, but unfortunately they can lead to
conflict rather than cooperation when there is no common ground or shared life between
competing categories; a cursory glance at human history or the world today demonstrates
this.
We are in many ways currently still using categories and ways of thinking and acting that
worked and made sense in one context, but are now unintelligible, obsolete, and even
damaging. Indeed, many of the moral problems we face today are due to the fact that often
people are stuck using categories that are maladaptive in our context or identify themselves
by contingent characteristics or socially constructed concepts that emphasize the differences
between us rather than a common ground beyond all religion, ethnicity, and nationality.
Still worse, we are also heir to a mishmash of outdated and often mutually exclusive moral
frameworks that cannot change and adapt to meet the demands of the contemporary world.
But what this aspect of human nature shows is that the physical and social environmental
context can change the way in which human beings think and live in relation to each other.
That is, human nature is only relatively determinate and not static or fixed, and this means
that changing the environment in which we live can develop our capacities in different ways
to meet the differing demands of our contemporary society in adaptive ways (i.e. pro-social
ways). This requires a category that spans the gulf of difference, one beyond creed, color,
or flag that emphasizes a shared or common form of life, despite superficial appearances to
the contrary.
Collective wisdom amounts to reflection on the category of human being as such, through
the specific concept of human nature, which in effect is reflection on the shared common
ground of human experience. Collective wisdom is a process of becoming explicitly aware
of and articulating the cognitive, affective, and conative patterns that we initially follow only
implicitly and without reflection.
This enables an individual to understand what something like a need or desire or belief is as
such, what function it has, and thus which needs, desires, and beliefs should be identified
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with as appropriate, fitting, or natural for creatures like us and which are not (given the
context in which we find ourselves).
In effect, the wise and civilized individual is one who is able to mentally and practically fill
the gaps by mentally and practically simulating the conditions of our initial evolutionary
context (i.e. by thinking and acting as if we are all brothers and sisters, one big tribe, or
really all the same). This simulation is ultimately limited by our psychological and emotional
capacities, as well as our justified commitments to our close friends and family, but it can
allow us to compensate for the difference between our contemporary context and our initial
evolutionary one.
We can to an extent correct for the fact that we are now like the same species of fish taken
from multiple independent rivers and placed in the same aquarium, one filled with artificial
behaviors, plants, and rocks taken to be natural state, and haunted by leftover habits and
prejudices from our respective rivers that no longer work given the demands of a diverse,
pluralistic, and globalized aquatic life.
A collective wisdom tradition today would be concerned with what type of selfunderstanding and skill set are required to live a successful human life as such and given the
particularities of the context in which we find ourselves.
This calls for reference to and a prioritization of human nature, the only category that cannot
be rendered completely obsolete, the only one beyond the particularities of religion,
ethnicity, and nationality. Such an emphasis on human nature, however, differs from a type
of universal humanism, as an emphasis on and respect for humanity as such, for a 'human'
or 'humanity' as such and without condition does not actually exist, as there is no such thing
as a bare particular.
But it is possible that we can each come to think of ourselves first as human animals, natural
beings with a specific human nature, before thinking of ourselves as Asian or White, Jewish
or Muslim, and American or Chinese, etc. A wisdom tradition in effect enables us to change
our environmental context, and indirectly the expression of human nature, by changing the
available categories and concepts through which we think and live.
And it is by having a common form of life and common way of understanding ourselves
that we can be able and willing to cooperate with each other, despite surface-level
differences and distinctions.
Putting this into practice and living out the relationship between ethics and metaphysics of
course requires concomitant institutional53 and pedagogical mechanisms for transmitting
53

Jonathan Turner provides an important analysis ways in which social institutions serve the end of social
order. For my purposes, any successful wisdom tradition must be able to influence, inform, or create social
institutions to exemplify and reproduce the tenets of the tradition; see Turner, 1997.
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and reproducing the self-understanding and skill set required for this way of life in
subsequent generations. But ideally this would take the form of compensating and correcting
for the ways in which historical baggage and our contemporary context disposes us to
maladaptive and uncooperative thoughts and actions.
The goal is a society that best approximates or simulates the conditions of adaptive contexts,
in form rather than content, which would be a situation wherein individuals have a rational
self-interest in cooperating with other members of the social group, and perhaps more
importantly, actually feel moral sentiments and have moral desires toward others in the
appropriate contexts and despite empathetic barriers.
What we would need to create is a social and environmental context that is as adaptive as
possible given the physical and psychological limits of human nature, that is, one that
cultivates the higher or more cooperative capacities and dispositions that we have and that
channels the more basic, non- and anti-social capacities and dispositions that we all normally
have in healthy ways. But this is exactly what the ancient wisdom traditions were attempting
to do, though differing in the specifics, owing to the differences in environmental and
cultural context. This in effect creates a new type of culture, one that applies to each human,
which is not reducible to a particular religion, ethnicity, or nationality.
What we need to acknowledge, and what the ancient wisdom traditions recognized, is that
we cannot fundamentally change what we are, perhaps I should say "yet," but we can be
honest about our situation, and design belief systems, conceptual frameworks, educational
modules, and traditions that work with rather than against our human nature. Part of this
requires acknowledging rather than denying human nature, for human nature is not
intrinsically evil or fallen or in any way unnatural as such but only in certain contexts and if
we let social settings degrade to that point morally.
Now there can be no guarantee that civilization as a type of moral complexity may not be
decreased or destroyed, that social and technological development may not actually lead to
more complex and pervasive forms of immorality. Nothing about the nature of reality or
human nature can force us to be wise or civilized. This requires choice, but civilization in
the moral sense is a very fragile and precious thing that is worth saving and collective
wisdom is our best chance to create, maintain, and develop it.
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Austria-Hungary 1914: Nationalisms in a Multi-National Nation-State
Anthony M. Stevens-Arroyo
stevensa@ptd.net
“Austria is disunity and partition into petty states, darkness, Jesuitism, reaction and the
whorish way of doing things of the patriarchal rule of the police.”
- Ludwig Bamberger, Radical German émigré, 1859
“We shall have a little parliamentarianism, but power will remain in my hands and the
whole thing will be adapted to Austrian realities.”
- Emperor Frantz Josef, 1861
“…civilized states by and large have adopted that organization which, in the whole
continent, rests on historical foundations only in Hungary.”
- Ernő Nagy, Nagyvárad Law School Professor, 1887
Introduction
“Austria is disunity and partition into petty states, darkness, Jesuitism, reaction and the
whorish way of doing things of the patriarchal rule of the police,” wrote Ludwig Bamberger,
an early radical, in 1859. Yet, four decades later on the eve of the 20th century, the Austrian
Empire enjoyed an economic prosperity that was the most impressive in Central Europe.
Vienna became a world-recognized center of scientific and cultural achievements featuring
personages like the Moravian-born Jewish physician Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) in the
new science of psychology and the Pole, Carl Menger (1840–1921) in economics. Who
doesn’t know of Franz Liszt (1811–1886), born in Hungary and who performed in the salons
of Paris and Vienna? The Strauss waltzes by Johann (1804-1849) the father and his sons
made Vienna synonymous with refinement, renowned for its cuisine and fashion in the gay
‘90s. Operettas like “The Merry Widow” by Budapest transplant Franz Lehár (1870-1948)
provided the bridge between the 19th and 20th centuries while celebrating Austro-Hungarian
genius.
In 1914, the nation’s borders sprawled north to Poland and Russia and west to Germany,
Italy and the Mediterranean. Austria-Hungary in the 1910 census was less than a quarter
German (23.9%) or Magyar (20.2%); the two combined did not account for the majority of
the nation’s population that also numbered Czechs (12.6%), Croats (5.3%), Italians (2%),
Slovaks (3.8%), Serbs (3.8%), Slovenes (2.6%), Ruthenes (7.9%) and Romanians (6.4%).
The Empire had provided legal emancipation to more than a half-million Jews earlier than
any neighboring country and the Roma, commonly known as Gypsies, had contributed
immensely to the popular culture in spite of stubborn social prejudice against them.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol72/iss72/19
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Yet, the Great War that began in 1914 was ignited by separatist nationalism that
assassinated the Empire’s Grand Duke in Serbia. It was left to post-war treaties to
dismember this multi-national state into a puzzle of competing nationalities that have yet to
re-establish the stability and prosperity of 1914 when the country was whole.
The questions I raise are these: Was the multi-national nation-state of Austria-Hungary a
historical aberration surely to be avoided? Or, rather, was it an imperfect but prophetic
expression of today’s European Union?” Hence my title for Austria-Hungary in 1914:
“Nationalisms in a Multi-National Nation-State.”
1. Nationalisms and Civilizations
The word play invoked in the title for this presentation cries out for some definitions.
“Nation” is the root term and its historical variants are encumbered against a historical
backdrop. The Italic root is “NAT-”, indicating “birth” or “origin;” whence “nativity” and
“nature.” We often think of “nation” as the place where one is born, but for most of human
history, birth was into a relationship rather than to a place. With that relationship came a
common heritage of historical existence, inherited cultural norms and, of course, language.
The primary meaning of “nation” is relational to social belonging within a specific group:
“place” enters the definition only derivatively and more recently.
We cannot completely discard, however, the role of location in consideration of nationality
as a relationship. Social relationships are anchored by time and place as people of the same
nation adapt to circumstance and environment. Hence, history gives us “Ostrogoths” and
“Visigoths” as defining terms of “eastern” and “western” to the Goth nation.
The technology of travel and communication also alter the application of “nation.”
Compact interrelated groups may be nations, but a small size defines “clan” or “tribe” rather
than “nation.” Contrariwise, modern communications summons groups in Diaspora to a
common identity with movements such as “Pan-Germanism” or “Pan-Slavism.” Migration
forced by material need is perhaps the major reason for evolution and differentiation among
linguistic nations, but the imposition of alien nationality by military intervention is no less
important. In fact, the definition of “empire” leans heavily on the notion of “disparate
nations under a single ruler.”

The topic of Austria-Hungary in 1914 and its nationalisms, therefore, does not contradict
the idea of a multi-national nation-state, since this definition presumes that the different
national identities are not only alive and well, but simultaneously balanced and harmonized.
The starting point for my analysis requires a quick excursus into how Sir Arnold Toynbee
treats of multi-national states in the history of civilization. He links the Hellenist era to the
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Roman Empire in a continuous civilization. Both represent a break with more ancient
civilizations such as the Egyptian and Persian which incorporated subject nations
differently.
Previous to the Hellenist policy, nationality was summarized in religious symbolism: since
the conquering ruler was divinely ordained, fealty required the conquered peoples to honor
the Emperor with worship. The Pre-Greek ancient civilizations looked not so much for the
“divine right of kings,” as it for “the right of divine kings.” The Hellenist approach was to
syncretize a nation’s deities with those of Hellas, so that worship of any patriarchal deity
such as Amun-Ra or Ba’al Samen was simultaneously adoration of Zeus; similarly,
Aphrodite was also honored as Isis (Egyptian) and Ishtar (Bablyonian).
This Hellenist religious syncretism may not have been universally successful,1 but it proved
a more palatable religious accommodation than outright repression. It certainly permitted
the Hellenist hegemony for commerce and law that made Greek Western civilization’s
lingua franca. Successor state Rome was more interested in commerce and domination
than in religious syncretism or even than in the Latin language. A considerable respect was
afforded conquered nations under the legal construct of “lex gentium.”
In effect, the Roman Empire created two levels of law. The most local law followed
established religious customs for worship, inheritance, marriage, and contracts and was
faithful to the existing law of the conquered people. At a higher level, one that required
tribute to Rome and ensured commerce and transit within the Empire, were the Roman
statutes. These statutes were not designed to interfere with local practice, but only to
regulate practices that competed with public order under Roman rule. While Rome
considered itself the hegemonic “gens/people” it recognized that other nations although
subjugated were also “gentes/peoples.” Providentially, even when the Julian emperors
began to demand worship as gods, the lex gentium exempted the Jewish religion in which
such worship would have caused rebellion.2
This Roman concept allowed the Empire to outlast its pagan origins, since the same concept
of lex gentium became the operative concept behind the creation of a Holy Roman Empire
under Charlemagne in the year 800 AD. One notes that in history this proved to be neither
holy nor Roman nor an empire, but with the rise of the Hapsburg dynasty in the 15th century,
the country now known as Austria was a featured contestant in the struggle to use the title
of Holy Roman Empire as a lever of power.

The “abomination of abominations” was reportedly the statue of Zeus placed in the Temple of Jerusalem to
be syncretized with the Hebrew, Yahweh.
1

2

The lex gentium did not apply to Christians, since their religion soon included believers from different
nations besides Jews. Christians would be persecuted because their creed lay “beyond the bounds” (super
stitio from super-stare) of any one nation. This is the justification for the persecution by Domitian, last of
the Flavian dynasty.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol72/iss72/19

106

Review: Full Issue

102

Number 72, Spring 2015
2. The Hapsburgs and Austria from Napoleon to the Ausgleich

The Napoleonic age rendered this imperial fiction meaningless and after the Battle at
Austerlitz on 6 August 1806 the last Holy Roman Emperor Francis II abdicated that title,
contenting himself as Emperor of Austria (Eastern Germany) alone. For the next halfcentury, Austria and Prussia wrestled for hegemony as the principal German state unifying
the congeries of duchies and principalities into a single nation. Religion played a major
role as Prussia in the north favored the Lutheran and Reformation creeds, while Austria
remained mostly Catholic. Following its defeat in only seven weeks in the Austro-Prussian
War of 1866, and the cession of its Italian provinces around Venice, Austria began to look
south to the Balkans and eastward to Hungary for opportunities of expansion.
This historical background suggests that nationalisms can be separatist and centrifugal or
unifying and centripetal. The phenomenon of Austria-Hungary 1867-1914 exemplifies the
interaction of both tendencies within nationalism.
Abandoning the struggle of Austria against Prussia as the hegemonic power in a united
Germany, Austria-Hungary was created as a multi-national state by signing a treaty or
Ausgleich or historic merger of Austria and Hungary as two countries under one monarch.
The Emperor, Franz Josef (regnum 1848-1916) was ruler at the beginning and was to be
there at the end in 1914, with a reign of 58 years that demonstrated his ability to survive as
much as his ability to rule.
The connection to Hungarian sovereignty had begun much earlier when King Louis II of
the Jagiellonian dynasty had lost his life in battle against the Turks at Mohács in 1526. But
that relationship was based on the necessity for Hungary, once invaded and divided by
Ottoman Turks, to rely on a Catholic protector for its Christian population.3

3

The Turks had utilized the Catholic-Protestant theological divisions to establish a Calvinist-dominated subprovince in the northeast sector of Hungary near contemporary Debrecen. Taking advantage of the conflicts
during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), the Ottoman appointed ruler, Prince Gábor Bethlen of
Transylvania, successfully attacked the Austrian-supported Catholic Hungary in 1619, and laid claim to the
Hungarian throne, i.e. the Crown of St. Stephen. This history is very complicated and includes Bethlen’s
renunciation of the title of king based on a condition of enlightened decree of freedom of religion (1621)
before that from any European country. Although the Prince of Transylvania’s aspirations to be monarch of
Hungary were thwarted by other European powers, France eventually supported one of Bethlen’s successors,
Ferenc II (Rákóczi). The idea was to use Hungarians as French pawns to resist Austrian Catholic domination.
Seeing through these deceptions, Rákóczi opted to declare total Hungarian independence, issuing an
unenforceable devolution writ from the Hungarian crown to the Austrian monarch (Josef I) in 1707, an
action for which Rákóczi is much admired in Hungarian history. Defeated in battle in 1708, he was forced
into exile, first to Poland where he was offered the crown at the machinations of Russian Tsar, Peter I. He
eventually settled in the Turkish dominions after 1717, where he gathered leading dissenters from Austrian
domination. A melody reputed to be one of his favorite musical pieces was orchestrated by Franz Liszt in
“Rákóczi’s March,” as part of Hungarian Rhapsody, Number 15 and served as unofficial anthem of Hungary
until the 19th century.
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With the catastrophic loss of Austrian prestige and the crushing of its aspirations to lead a
united Germany after the 1866 war, the decision to create a dual monarchy with Hungary
seemed the salvation of a bad situation for both defeated Austria and sovereignty-deprived
Hungary. The Emperor was famously to have quipped: “We shall have a little
parliamentarianism, but power will remain in my hands and the whole thing will be adapted
to Austrian realities” (Molnar: 207). But his wife, Empress Elizabeth, loved in Hungary as
“Sissi,” had prepared Hungarians to view the Ausgleich quite differently: “What Vienna
gave the Magyars as a punishment, the Hungarians received as a gift” (Molnar: 210). It is
more telling, therefore, to view the nationalities’ project through the Magyar lens, rather
than the Austrian one because the former was innovative, while the latter was merely
temporizing.
3. The Nationalities Law of the Hungarian Experience
The new Hungarian Constitution affirmed in law most of the reforms sought in the 1848
convulsion led by Lajos Kossuth, the dashing advocate of total Hungarian independence
within an imagined Danubian Confederation (Lendvai, 256 ff.). The premature republic
sought by Kossuth collapsed and he left his homeland for exile. The pieces were picked up
by Ferenc Deák (1803-1876) who also had played a key role in 1848.
The heart of innovative reform was in the Nationalities Law that was essentially an 1868
reiteration of Law VIII promulgated on 28 July 1849 in the southern Hungarian city of
Szeged. It guaranteed equality to every citizen “with equal rights, to whichever nationality
he belongs.” (cited in Lendvai, 294, ftn. 23).
While Austria may have pretended that its concessions had left it as the ruling power and
the Hungarian partners of secondary importance, the legal basis for the entire Empire was
closer to the Hungarian aspiration. Despite fealty to the same monarch, each country had
its own independent parliament, used its own currency (although each was acceptable to the
partner) and shared little more than an integrated army and a common foreign policy.
The 1868 Nationalities Act conferred on the Croatian Assembly or Sabor the same
autonomous power as Hungary because Croatia was recognized -- as were Bohemia and
Moravia for Austria -- as historically pre-existing nations now freely joined within the
multi-national nation state for mutual protection and progress.
Deák accepted that the Dual Monarchy had not brought complete independence to Hungary,
but he was willing to accept compromise based on the insight of the great Hungarian patriot,
Baron Istvan Széchenyi (1791-1860): “If the Hungarian earthenware were to knock against
the German and Slav iron pot, it would soon be shattered.”
Recognizing the Realpolitik of the moment, Deák wrote of 1867:
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Most European powers are so great and have at their disposal so much power that
Hungary could not exist in their midst as a single, independent country without an
alliance offering secure support. Fate has placed our country in the midst of Great
Powers, each of which could undoubtedly sweep us away with its superior armed force
if it believed that we stood in the way of its wishes and plans. (Cited in Lendvai 281.)

The logic that a small nation needed to merge with a larger, more powerful one to preserve
its identity would become the reason both for expansion of the Empire and for its undoing.
Offering itself as defender of Christianity against Ottoman persecution, the Empire moved
southward to absorb recalcitrant Balkan provinces such as Bosnia and Herzegovina under
its protection (1878) and eventual annexation (1908); or north where Bohemia and Moravia
had been aligned with Austria against Prussian dominance. The Magyars fostered a similar
expansion into Transylvania, transitioning from a province under the Ottomans (1571) to
liberated Christians a little more than one-hundred years later (1687) and finally as
participants in the multi-national empire. Such also was Croatia’s status. The southern
Polish province of Galicia (1793) was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after the third
partition of Poland since it had survived the Napoleonic restoration of Poland as its Baltic
provinces.
Technically there was not one country by the name of Austria-Hungary but a multi-national
“Cisleithania” (Hungarian: Ciszlajtánia) or "Lands represented in the Imperial Council."
Law required all documents to be published in 8 official languages.4
To govern this diverse, multi-national government, the principal partners, Austria and
Hungary, divided responsibilities towards the smaller nationalities. Then each of the
partners created an executive committee of 60 members who met with their counterpart to
discuss joint matters once a year, meeting alternately in Vienna and Budapest. From these
yearly meetings came laws for all of the Empire “by means of the Emperor’s confirmation”
(Lendvai 285).
No doubt, placing this structure on top of the sovereign decisions by each country as well
as by their constituent members created a confusing and inefficient apparatus. The
delegations could only rehash decisions already made by their separate and equal national
assemblies but without the power to change them. Writing in The Man Without Qualities,
a historical novel about this period, the Modernist author, Robert Musil (1860-1942)
assessed the experience of supra-national government this way:
“German: Cisleithanien, also Zisleithanien, Hungarian: Ciszlajtánia, Czech: Předlitavsko, Polish:
Przedlitawia, Croatian: Cislajtanija, Slovene: Cislajtanija, Ukrainian: Цислейтанія, transliterated:
Tsysleitàniia) was a common yet unofficial denotation of the northern and western part of Austria-Hungary,
the Dual Monarchy created in the Compromise of 1867—as distinguished from Transleithania, i.e. the
Hungarian Lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen east of ("beyond") the Leitha River.” At times the
Ukranians were designated as “Ruthenians” and Rumanians were included as the Transleithanian Province
of Transylvania. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cisleithania.
4
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…the national movements…were so violent that they jammed the machinery of
government and brought it to a dead stop several times a year, but in the intervals and
during the deadlocks people got along perfectly well and acted as if nothing had
happened.” (Musil 30-31).
The Hungarians developed a legal theory for these autonomous nations based on the notion
that the Magyar nation originated not from the will of a monarch, but of an Estates General
consisting of nobles who elected the ruler. Bizarrely, a 19th century legal professor, Ernő
Nagy (1853-1921), mystically linked possession of the 11th century Crown of St. Stephen
with the right to national sovereignty based on the sentiment that “the Holy Crown is the
same for the Hungarians as the Lost Ark is for the Jews."5 Moreover, Nagy considered the
Hungarian model to be the fundamental progressive basis of all Western civilization.
While these paeans of praise from the Magyars were clearly exaggerations, the material
reality of Hungary after 1867 was truly transformational. The economy of Hungary
expanded fivefold between 1870 and 1910. The traditional agricultural base underwent an
industrial phase of food and grain preparation, based on scientific principles of cultivation
and marketing.
Scarcely a generation after the Ausgleich, Budapest had grown to a metropolitan area of
over a million persons and was the largest milling center for grain in Europe, outsized only
by Minneapolis, Minnesota (Kontler 309). The Ganz machine works was “a main
workshop” inventing the transformer (1885) and producing the first electric locomotive.
The carburetor for combustion engines was invented by János Csonka at Ganz (1891) and
the first subway in Europe was built in Budapest in 1896.
Hungarian Jews enjoyed emancipation as nowhere else in Europe and constituted a quarter
of Budapest population, earning the sneers of Austrian anti-Semites that the city was better
called “Judapest.” The public educational system was free and excellent. Six of Hungary’s
eight Nobel Prize winners6 went through the system, as did other notables such as
composers Béla Bartok and Zoltan Kodaly, with philosopher-sociologists György Lukács,
Károly Mannheim, and Károly Polányi (Kontler 306).

5

"De sacra corona regni Hungariae ortu, virtuti, victoria, fortuna... brevis commentarius. " Baron Péter
Révay de Szklabina et Blathnicza: 1613.
6

It was joked that Hungarian was the language spoken by the physicists for the Manhattan Project, speaking
English only when Oppenheimer was in the room.
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4.

Undermining Multi-Nationalism with Centrifugal Nationalisms

The success of the multi-national state in many important socio-economic matters,
however, was not without its contradictions. This legal establishment of multi-national
diversity was not always honored in practice, as nationalistic forces in Austria and Hungary
tended to see their own nationality as hegemonic within the Empire and able to direct policy
unilaterally. Ultimately these forces undermined political stability and, once the outcome
of the Great War was settled, led to the dismemberment of the Empire.
The dissolution process for multi-national states is addressed by Sir Arnold Toynbee in A
Study of History, his multi-volume masterwork of civilizational analysis. In a chapter
(XVIII) entitled “Schism in the Body Social” Toynbee analyzes the role of nationality and
religious minorities within empires. I would add that his Hellenic prototype of internal
proletariats fits the Austro-Hungarian experience. (Somervell Abridgement, Vols. 1-VI:
375 ff.).
According to his analysis, the effort to incorporate national minorities requires the education
of elites drawn from the non-hegemonic minorities. These recruits are placed within social
administration of the state and initially perform the tasks of integration. But with the
passage of time, these persons become aware that they have not achieved equality with the
dominant group.
They become “a large and ever larger floating population of ‘stateless’ exiles,” writes
Toynbee (376), who viewed the effort of assimilation as “the cruel process of
‘deracination.’” This elite possessing considerable organizational and professional skills is
reduced to functions as a proletariat at the mercy of exploitation.
These first recruits had been disinherited in the first instance by being robbed of a
spiritual birthright: but of course their spiritual impoverishment was often accompanied,
and was almost always followed, by pauperization on the material plane, and they were
soon reinforced by recruits from other classes who were material as well as spiritual
proletarians from the start.” (Ibid, 377-78).
Initially, these nationality elites believe in their prospects for successful upward mobility as
a nationality minority. However, they encounter mounting frustrations and eventually
realize that what was a promising future is a disguise of perpetual inferiority. The
consequence is disillusionment with the hegemonic power and bitter rejection of the
assimilative ideal. In other words, the internal proletariat of the subordinate nationality
group moves from a nationalism that is centripetal, favoring union with the larger and
dominant group, to a centrifugal expression that seeks separation from the metropolitan
center.
Toynbee finds an example for this type in the Jewish Maccabees’ rejection of Hellenist
assimilation.
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When we come to examine how these victims of injustice reacted to their fate, we shall
not be surprised to find that one of their reactions was an explosion of savagery which
surpassed in violence the cold-blooded cruelty of their oppressors and exploiters. (Ibid,
378).
Given Toynbee’s classificatory genius, the assassination of the Archduke by the Serbian
nationalists in the Black Hand is not a surprise. To be clear, the assassination was the
beginning of the First World War that spelled the end of the Empire, but it was a culminating
act against decades-old misguided policies, rather than an unexpected rupture of normality.
I would like briefly to sketch the competing visions of the Empire for its internal proletarian
nationalisms and why for both Austria and Hungary the post-war dismemberment was selfinflicted.
5. Austria’s German Bias
Austria’s policy towards nationalism reflected Vienna’s obsession with 19th century power
games. With the amputation of its aspirations to lead all of Germany, Austria no longer
was one of continent’s “great” powers at the beginning of the 20th century: that status had
been relegated to Germany, England, France and Tsarist Russia. Austria offered itself as
the necessary protector of small territories and cultures against Muslim Turkey.
Its foreign policy after 1878, when awarded Serbia as a protectorate by the Congress of
Berlin, was to compete with Russia in accumulating the frayed ends of the Ottoman
provinces. Thus did German Austria seek to preserve its sphere of influence and prevent
Russian penetration into the Balkans.
Carrot and stick are tools of empires. Seeking to pacify rising Serbian nationalism, AustriaHungary allowed Serbia to assume sovereignty as a kingdom within the Empire in 1882.
This “bought time” while the economic ties took hold. Austria’s industrial and commercial
bases were constructed upon exploitation of the underdeveloped Balkan territories. For
instance, railroad lines linked Serbia to Vienna and the establishment of commercial credits
for Serbian agricultural products built up a mutual dependency that delivered 84% of
Serbian exports to Austria-Hungary at the beginning of the century.
This economic dependency might have been broken if Serbia had been permitted to follow
a natural expansion of its borders into Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would have provided
Serbia with an Adriatic coastline among its kindred Balkan Slavs professing Orthodox
Christianity.
But taking advantage of a revolt against Ottoman rulers in Turkey in 1908, Austria instead
formally annexed both Bosnia and Herzegovina, keeping itself as intermediary for
economic development.
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The annexation simultaneously thwarted Russia’s appeal as the great power protector of
Pan-Slavic nationalism and those professing Orthodox Christianity and propped up an
increasingly unpopular German hegemony.
Austria often justified its imperial aspirations by arrogant expressions of German
superiority to Slavic backwardness. Vienna viewed itself as a more enlightened and
progressive master of the Serbs, Bosnians and other Balkan peoples than the retrograde
Russian Empire.
This prejudice, however, undermined the foundation stone for the multi-national state
which rested on legal equality for all nationalities. It produced a propagandistic downward
death spiral because the more Austria deprecated Russia as Slavic, the less appeal it had as
legitimate government for Slavs in the Balkans. The more the educated Slavic Balkan elites
protested, the more they were repressed. The more repressed, the more violent became their
resistance. The more violent their resistance, the more savage was Austrian reprisal.
6. Magyarization and its Consequences
Hungarian policy towards nationalities had its origin on a higher plane and more noble
political premise of equality. The eclipse of the liberal generation of 1848, however, gave
power to conservatives, most notably Kálman Tizsa (1875-1890), the longest serving Prime
Minister in Hungarian history.
Key to understanding the regression away from the enlightened Nationalities Law is the
attitude towards Croatia. Déak in 1861 had stressed that Croatia was equal to Hungary as
a nation-state and not merely as a nationality in diaspora. 7 It became “Hungary’s Achilles
heel,”8 however, because of a refusal to allow the Croats to assemble their own parliament,
or Sabor, as had been promised. Simultaneously, the country’s nationalities suffered from
the Magyarization of public service9 and the school system, notoriously culminated by the
Lex Apponyi under a Minister of Education by that name (1906-1910).
As in Austria, the natural elites of the nationality minorities chaffed under the repression
that violated multi-ethnic promises and the spiral of resistance followed a similar dark path.

“Croatia possesses its own territory. It is in a special position: it was never incorporated into Hungary, but
was our associate, sharing our rights, our duties, our good times and our hardships.” Deák, 1861: cited in
Lendvai, 297, ftn. 24.
8
Gusztáv Gratz, former Hungarian foreign minister, writing in The Era of Dualism (1934) cited in Lendvai
298, ftn. 25.
9
“In 1910, 96 per cent of civil servants, 91.2 per cent of all public employees, 96.8 of judges and public
prosecutors, 91.5 of secondary school teachers and 89 per cent of medical doctors had Hungarian as their
mother-tongue. Similar percentages were found in the staffs of libraries, publishing houses and newspapers”
(Lendvai, 301, ftn. 5). This elite representation compares to the slight majority of Hungarian speakers in the
population (54.5%).
7
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We can perhaps absolve Hungarians for believing that linguistic Magyarization was an
antidote to the siren of Pan-Slavism, Croatian separatism or Polish unity. With the 13th
century devastations from the Mongols, ethnic Magyars had been virtually wiped out.10 For
centuries, the unity of the region had been based, not upon blood descent, but upon adoption
of the Hungarian language.11
What cannot be forgiven is the wanton perpetuation in 19th century Hungary of its top-heavy
social structure, affording hereditary privileges to noble families despite the obvious
contradictions of this feudal practice to the liberalizing spirit of the reconstituted monarchy.
Moreover, the resultant social distance of an anachronistic class structure was magnified by
the practice of latifundia. The concentration of landed property in the hands of so few
distinguished Hungary in negative ways from all its European neighbors except Romania.
Nearly 200 of the nobility each possessed lands of more than 15,000 acres and one alone,
Prince Móric Esterházy, owned a quarter of Hungary’s agricultural fields himself. Kontler
notes:
Hundreds of thousands of peasant families literally vegetated on plots of a few acres.
These were utterly incapable of any sort of modernization; and whereas most of the
major landowners successfully participated in the capitalist economy, these successes
contributed to the consolidation of the economic power and social prestige, and the
preservation of much of the political influence and value system, of the traditional elite.
(Kontler 305).
Faced with such a punishing future, the poor peasants of the Hungarian plain, or puszta,
desperately sought passage to America in the two decades immediately before and after the
turn of the century. They worked in the mines of Pennsylvania and its steel works; they
toiled in the textile mills of Philadelphia and the iron works shops of New York and Newark,
usually hoping to earn enough money to return to Hungary and buy land.
The exodus put even greater burdens on those left behind, with harder work and longer
hours. The remedies for workers were membership in unions and the organizing of strikes
for better conditions, but these were distant from the rural areas and every manifestation
was brutally repressed.
Meanwhile, life in the city offered scant relief, especially for the other nationalities.
Magyarization reserved influence and privilege to those with Hungarian names and longstanding national identity. Thus, along with the Germanic hegemony in the Austrian
10

See Kontler, 78ff.
“Anthropologically and even culturally, ‘Hungarian’ is an extremely mixed phenomenon, so that no such a
thing as ‘pure stock Hungarian’ in this sense has existed since time immemorial. As a result the only
criterion to establish the continuity of a Hungarian people is language; the history of Hungarian origins is the
history of a community whose genetic composition and cultural character has been changing, but which has
assuredly spoken Hungarian or its predecessor language for the last few thousand years.” Kontler, 34.
11
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counterpart, the Magyarization in Hungary reduced the aspiring other-ethnic elites from full
participation in society.
The internal proletariat created by these biased policies mobilized the migrant communities
in exile towards more radical political change. These exile groups became Toynbee’s
“external proletariat.” They agitated on the continent and from America for redress of the
endemic ethnic inequalities that had become part of the social and political structure of the
Empire.
Finally, we must register how scarcity and economic downturns stimulated rebellion against
the status quo. Toynbee wrote:
The radiation of any civilization may be analyzed into three elements – economic,
political and cultural – and, so long as the society is in a state of growth, all three
elements seem to be radiated with equal power, or, to speak in human rather than
physical terms, to exercise an equal charm. But, as soon as the civilization has ceased
to grow, the charm of its culture evaporates. Its powers of economic and political
radiation may, and indeed probably will, continue to grow faster than ever, for a
successful cultivation of the pseudo-religions of Mammon and Mars and Moloch is
eminently characteristic of broken-down civilizations (Toynbee: 405-406).
Mars was definitely the major player in the dissolution of this multi-national expression of
civilization after 1914.
7. Aftermath
This paper is not about the Great War, but a few items merit comment here. First, the
military effort of Austria-Hungary on the eastern front against Russia was largely
successful, especially after the Bolshevik revolution took Russia out of the war. Moreover,
Austria’s other traditional enemy, Turkey, was on the same side.
Second, when it was apparent Germany was going to lose the war because of the American
entry in 1917, the prime ministers of both Austria and Hungary unsuccessfully sought a
separate peace with the Allies.12
Third, Wilson’s fourteen points, upon which the peace treaties were based, called for
autonomy of the Empire’s ethnic minorities and not for full independence. It was largely
because of the pressure of the exiled minorities in Paris, London and New York that small
independent states were carved out of Austria-Hungary. Hungary lost two-thirds of its
territory and Austria surrendered what became Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

Austria’s treaty was different from the Treaty of Versailles signed with Germany: Austria made peace at
Saint-Germain-en-Laye, while Hungary was forced to accept dismemberment in the Treaty of Trianon.

12
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Lastly, the West foolishly presumed that independence would bring about liberal
democracies as an inevitable consequence. They were wrong. Moreover, in the victims of
the dismemberment, nationalisms grew as touchstones of revenge and restoration, of antiSemitism and militarism. This opened Austria to fascism, culminating in the Anschluss
with Nazi Germany (12 March 1938). Hungary under the dictator, Admiral Miklós Horthy,
sided with the Axis in order to briefly regain territories lost after the World War I.
8. Conclusions
One can question whether the multi-national state has proven to be either a success or a
failure, based on the historical experience of Austria-Hungary as viewed retrospectively
from 1914, one hundred years ago. This paper does not pretend to resolve that sticky
problem; however, I venture my opinion that any judgment ought to originate from the
premise that Austria-Hungary did not show the respect for nationalisms promised in the 19th
century when the Dual Monarchy was established. In other words, it offers a vision of what
a multi-national state may look like, but not enough of consistent policy to make itself into
a model of multi-nationalism.
The second question is whether the Austrian-Hungarian model anticipated in any way the
current multi-national cooperation of the European Union.
I begin by suggesting that the genesis of the European Union was very different from the
political opportunism of the 1867 Ausgleich. Nonetheless, the issues such as common
defense, language variation, coordinated policies of public services and a host of
commercial and business practices were essential elements of the convivium invited by the
Empire. These same features figure in other multi-national states that have followed in
history. The most notable of these imitators was Yugoslavia that federated five
nationalities, including those previously in the Empire.
However, we must additionally note that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was also
designed as a multi-national state. Since the breakup of the USSR into constituent nations,
it has become fashionable to consider it to have been a failed state. However one may view
communism as a socio-economic system, one of the positive results of the Communist
Revolution was the creation of several nations with notable tolerance and intermarriage
among different nationalities. While Chechnya illustrates the limitations of this tolerance,
the larger picture suggests a relatively successful integration of various nations.
Certainly, the most likely point of comparison of 1914’s Austria-Hungary is today’s
European Union. In the contemporary European Union, there are clear signs that cohesion
has been achieved by the centripetal force of most nationalisms.
To repeat the effect of this nationalism, I would suggest the following. In order to achieve
a greater prosperity generated by international trade and commerce while avoiding division,
the participating nations of today’s European Union, like those in the 19th century AustroHungarian Empire, gain by belonging to the greater whole. Croats and Slovenes today, like
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Croats and Slovenes within the Empire of the 19th century, view membership in the larger
European community as providing advantages that isolation as separate entities would not.
I would also suggest that the dominance of centripetal nationalisms does not eliminate the
functionality of centrifugal nationalisms. I infer, instead, that the two opposing forces of
nationalisms balance each other.
The desire to benefit the local community is centrifugal nationalism, arguing that each of
the peoples must think of themselves first and foremost. However, the need to extend
commerce and share technological progress persuades the members of the EU to continue
as parts of the larger whole. This is my definition of centripetal nationalism, pulling the
disparate parts toward the unifying center.
When in the Austro-Hungarian Empire the smaller nationalities failed to see advantage to
membership within the Empire for their peoples, the centripetal nationalism was
overwhelmed by the centrifugal forces that culminated in the establishment of small
separate nation states. We do not yet know if this will be the ultimate fate of the EU, for
there are certainly centrifugal nationalisms throughout Europe.
Nonetheless, the dominance of the centripetal or centralizing force does not negate the coexistence of separatist tendencies.
Another factor in creating balance between the two types of nationalisms may be the role
of the supra-national parliament. In Austria-Hungary this joint council was terribly
inefficient, yet it served as safety valve to blow off tensions between the partners. In a
similar way, the current European Parliament for the Union has many new nationalistic,
viz. centrifugal, representatives. But while they reflect the desires to nullify policies
imposing uniformity, their dissent is contained within structures for dialogue.
Thus, a balance is maintained between the centrifugal and centripetal nationalisms. I
suspect that the separatist trends in Scotland against the United Kingdom and in Catalonia
against Spain are balanced with the centripetal nationalisms in both places that seek
admission to the European Union as compensation for independence from the metropolitan
power.
A final reflection on nationalisms within a multi-national nation-state concerns the United
States of America. Here, one need distinguish between multi-culturalism and nationalism.
Multi-culturalism is a result of liberalism which accedes to individuals the choices of
membership in different social groups. Nationalism, race and religion are all surrogate
choices within the framework of liberal democracy.
To these, I would add a new regionalism that shadows the 19th century division between the
northern states faithful to the constitution and the southern confederate states that claimed
the power to nullify the laws passed by a majority population. It is worrisome that those
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rejecting the democratic will of the majority today base their dissent upon a claim to more
authoritatively represent the “real” America and sometimes merge their political activism
with white supremacists, militia groups armed with military weapons, and anti-scientific
religious theories that justify bigotry and racism. These trends also marked the Austrian
Anschluss once a balance with multi-nationalism went unneeded.
The nationalisms within the United States of America that are comparable with the issue
under discussion concern the states conquered and annexed after conflicts with Mexico in
the 19th century as well as the island of Puerto Rico, an American colony. Canada has a
similar conquest origin for its multi-national diversity as both English and French, as well
as immigration that creates a multi-cultural dynamic in addition to the nationalisms.
America’s strong tradition of multi-culturalism for immigrants has historically
overshadowed matters related to the Hispanic nationalism in Puerto Rico and the
Southwestern states. It is not uncommon in American culture to lump these conquered
peoples with immigrants who voluntarily chose the United States as a new country. At
present, the only significant revanchist nationalism with centrifugal impact is in Puerto
Rico.
However, the rise of an internal proletariat composed of qualified professionals from these
colonial groups and the racial minorities does offer a parallel to the factors that ultimately
undid the Austro-Hungarian Empire. An effective analysis of the American future, I would
think, requires the prism of Toynbee’s civilizational process. Learning from the AustroHungarian Empire one hundred years ago is the place to start. And the deciding voices may
come from among Mammon, Mars and Moloch.
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Verge of Collapse? Survival of Civilization in the Anthropocene
Lynn Rhodes1
lynnrhodes2@hotmail.com

Are we on the verge of a collapse of civilization (global, western and Chinese) in the age of the
Anthropocene? The Anthropocene is a term described by ecologist Eugene Stoermer and
independently by Nobel Prize recipient Paul Crutzen. The term considers how human behavior
(man) influences the earth and environment.2
The necessary demands of humanity affect our earth, environment and ultimate survival. China
and the United States both have environmental standards and complex environmental
problems. Comparing the two systems of environmental protection in this paper is but one step
regarding actions being taken.
Some are calling the world’s current environmental condition an unprecedented emergency
where sustainability is challenged with overpopulation, development, and increased consumption
and is showing clear signs of overall degradation, water pollution and air pollution. When the air
in China and parts of California’s central valley, and many other places, are so thick with
pollution that children and adults are warned to stay indoors; when major life activities are
affected; when regional water sources are rendered toxic for thousands of people, undrinkable,
and unsafe for their populations, governments are challenged to enact and implement effective
laws, policies and enforcement. Effective is another word for actionable and something that can
be accomplished with and for society. They must do this in order to protect the people,
civilization, and society, and to protect the environment on which we are interdependent for
continuous and healthy survival.
Is One Big Idea Possible?
There has yet to emerge the “one big idea” alone that would enable countries and governments to
solve today’s environmental challenges and threats to sustainability. The world may be too
complex for a single solution. Yet, many are working to solve different parts of the problem.
They do so within the context of their own experiences and wisdom. They do so understanding
the context of their governmental laws and regulations; challenging existing barriers and working
across real and imagined barriers. They do so independently and in partnerships. They also do so
knowing the global economy and our survival depend directly on the natural resources and
systems (weather, water etc.) of the earth. Populations are placing ever-increasing demands on
existing resources that, without planned or even unplanned adjustments, the demands of society
will ultimately exceed the capacity of finite resources.
China and the U.S. have different systems of using laws to protect the environment. In October
2013, I met with Professor Dongbangjun, Chairman of the Academic Committee of the Criminal
1
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Justice School at Zhongnan University, School of Economics and Law along with Dean Xia
Yong. Dongbangjun is charged with developing a new section of Environmental Law at the
university. He told me that although some laws have been promulgated in China, such as new
environmental law, water protection law, and a special section in criminal law for the
environment, there are few specific regulations for investigation standards, forensic and
operating procedures to implement environmental law effectively.
In Dean Xia’s large conference room at Zhongnan University we discussed collective and
individual work in support of the environment and how or even if it is possible to make a
difference to the health and survival of our civilization(s).
China knows it may be the proverbial canary in the. The air was thick with smog in Wuhan, and
the blue sky and clouds were not to be seen during my visit there. It was a perfect opportunity to
explore the theme of a conference I was planning to attend for the International Society for the
Comparative Study of Civilization (ISCSC): Can Collective Wisdom Save Civilization? Both the
United States and China have large populations, a plethora of natural resources and economies
that depend on development and consumerism. Environmental issues are forcing governments to
collaborate internally and externally. In this sense, we are not independent from one another but
interdependent.
Regional and National Boundaries Ignored
Environmental issues do not respect regional or national boundaries. The gaps between China
and the United States are wide enough to drive a Mack truck or camel caravan through because
of our different types of governments, cultural and societal conditions, population-levels, legal
and regulatory structures. Yet, within these gaps are determined and innovative people hoping to
influence better outcomes than the current conditions. If mankind cannot innovate to make
collective wisdom prevail through the Anthropocene, the environment may decide to modify
civilization on its terms, not ours. The effort requires cooperation by natural and social science
experts, politicians, community members, the media, et.al.
Responding on his website to a report published in the Proceedings of the Royal Society B, by
Paul and Anne Ehrlich on how the collapse of civilization has in the past, been caused by the
degradation of nature, HRH The Prince of Wales said “We do, in fact, have all the tools, assets
and knowledge to avoid the collapse of which this report warns, but only if we act decisively
now. If, though, in our evermore interconnected and complex world, we are to succeed, real
leadership and vision is required. It is just possible that we can rise to this challenge, but to do so
we will need to adjust our world view in a profound and comprehensive way. We have to see
ourselves as utterly embedded in Nature and not somehow separate from those precious systems
that sustain all life. I have said it before and will say it again – our grandchildren’s future
depends entirely on whether we seize the initiative and prevaricate no further.”3
Dr. Andrew Targowski, President Emeritus of the ISCSC (2007-2013) asked if indeed, we will
see the end of contemporary civilization in the 21st century, in an article titled State of
Civilization: Where are we Heading? His illustration, (Figure 1. The Targowski Model) shows
how Western and other civilizations including China, link to global civilization and global
3
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economies. He links these to the development of technology, super-consumerism, and population
growth leading to an ecological bomb; in turn leading to cultural crisis, resource depletion,
climate warming and ultimately the end of current civilization. There are points in his article
with which I agree but also differ. But, as Targowski states, the years of mass applications
enabled by the Internet have promoted a global civilization and in turn, to an accelerated
depletion of the strategic resources of our small planet, Earth.4

Figure 1. The End of the Contemporary Civilization to Come in the 21st Century?
Andrew Targowski 2014

4

Andrew Targowski, President Emeritus ISCSC (2007-2013). State of Civilization: Where are we Heading? The ISCSC
Newsletter Winter 2014 Vol. 53 No.1 International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations. p. 2.
www.wmich/iscsc
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I believe there is an alternative; that modern technology will actually help to cause an increased
capacity and development of the human mind. It is such additional capacity and development
that is critically needed as humankind more fully realizes the age of the Anthropocene with
heightened awareness of its strengths, weaknesses, threats and opportunities.
Ecological Civilization?
In comparison to the Targowski Model there is room for a new “Ecological Civilization” model
that, if realized by enough people, could influence an outcome different than the “End of Current
Civilization”. It could lead to the survival of current civilization as an Ecologically Compatible
Civilization. (Figure 2. The Rhodes Model).
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Figure 2. Survival of the Ecological Civilization in the 21st Century. L. Rhodes 2014

With education and cooperation, shifting the top 5 categories in Targowski’s model to the
Rhodes’ model concepts could alter the outcome from the End of Current Civilization to the
Survival of an Ecological Civilization.
Incremental Progress
Most governments are working within their formal, legal and environmental protection systems
to try and address these issues.
China’s Minister of Environmental Protection (MEP), Zhou Shengxian, announced in February
2014, a reformation of the system of eco-environmental protection and administration. His
announcement is referred to as the “Decision”. Minister Shengxian, is in charge of China’s air,
water, and land from pollution and contamination. The MEP is directly under the State Council
and is empowered and required by law to implement environmental policies and enforce
associated laws and regulations. In addition to its regulatory role, it funds and organizes research
and development. It also serves as China’s nuclear safety agency. The MEP replaces what was
formerly called the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA).
On March 5, 2014 Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang commented, in essence, at the opening of
the National People’s Congress, that the environmental situation in P.R. China was very difficult
and the condition was putting negative or downward pressure on the economy. He stressed the
problem of pollution; a condition that has worsened over the past few years. Li said “We will
declare war against pollution and fight it with the same determination we battled poverty. Smog
is affecting larger parts of China, and environmental pollution has become a major problem
which is nature’s red-light warning against the model of inefficient and blind development.”5
According to Mr. Li 50,000 “small coal-fired furnaces” would be shut down in 2014. Coalburning power plants with production capacity of 15 million kilowatts will undergo
“desulphurization,” and plants with a production capacity of 180 million kilowatts will undergo
“dust removal.” Over 6 million older high-emission vehicles will be removed from the roads and
he promised stringent energy conservation measures to help improve conditions. “Governments
at all levels and the whole society should act more vigorously to protect the land our lives
depend on,” Mr. Li said.6
Similarly, on June 2, 2014, President Obama, using executive authority, issued a new USEPA7
rule to cut pollution from U.S. coal and power plants 30% by 2030. It is the first time a U.S.
president has moved to regulate carbon pollution from power plants – one of, if not, the largest
single source of carbon dioxide emissions.
Dynamics of Sustainability
Having a clear direction stated by the head of a government is one thing. However,
implementing change on a grand scale will be a long process. Steps must begin at all levels to
solve prominent environmental problems and strengthen ecological systems.
5

The New York Times March 5, 2014 Didi Kirsten Tatlow
ibid
7
United States Environmental Protection Agency
6
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The procedures of using law for social and environmental protection in China, like in the U.S.
are multi-faceted. The fact that China’s lawmakers are planning to improve their Environmental
Protection Laws along with high level political support from the prime minister and leading
legislators and reforms, lends weight to implementation.
For the most part China began to build a new legal system about 1979 and passed their early
Environmental Protection Law. The preceding few decades saw the earlier system essentially
deteriorate. The Environmental Protection Law of 1979 grew to include many statutes,
regulations, standards and documents for guidance. Commonly known laws include the Water
Pollution Prevention and Control Law, and the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law and the
disparately used Environmental Impact Assessment Law. Environmental laws now cover
everything from forestry, fisheries, marine areas, wildlife protection, solid waste and traditional
areas of air and water.
At times, both Chinese and U.S. legal cases, are subject to pressure, intervention, and influence
by local governments, financial interests, and other entities which often conflict with a reasoned,
and delicate balance between environmental protection, sustainability and development interests.
As with all laws and regulations, the capacity to implement, safeguard and enforce these systems
and laws, require vigilance and participation by the citizenry, the courts, the media and other
factors contributing towards sustainability. (Figure 3.)

Figure 3. Additional Sustainability Factors
China has a socialist system of law vs. the capitalist system in the U.S. The Constitution of the
PRC reads: “The People’s Republic of China is a socialist state under the people’s democratic
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dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants. The
socialist system is the basic system of the People’s Republic of China. Sabotage of the socialist
system by any organization or individual is prohibited.” Conversely, the Constitution of the
United States does not reference its own social system per se, but references the freedom of its
people. It is in context of the two different frameworks that progress, however incremental, must
occur, with varying authority, capacity and will. The Constitution is the highest law in both
nations. It is under a nations’ laws that environmental protection becomes enabled and enforced.
With distinct types of executive, legislative and judicial powers, the two countries must approach
their lawmaking and enforcement differently. Distinctions are prevalent with legal application of
the two countries. The PRC uses primarily a civil law system. Dean Xia Yong (Xia 2002), wrote
of administrative punishment as a means of social control and described how administrative
penalties are determined at different levels in conjunction with public security. The
administrative cases for public security are grouped into thirteen categories. Encroaching upon
public or private property, seizing, extorting or damaging said property is included in one of the
categories. Deliberately defacing or damaging cultural relics, scenic spots or historic relics; or
deliberately damaging, destroying or removing them without approval is another.
Judicial (criminal) decisions are issued by the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s
Procuratorate8, and advisory opinions and instructions issued by the State Council and other
administrative agencies. The key sources of Chinese law should include judicial interpretation
made by the People’s Supreme Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. Although steps
are being made towards inclusion, most do not include such interpretations and do not build a
body of what is referred to as case-law in the United States.
The United States Constitution protects an individual’s ownership of lands. There is a
consequential difference in the PRC. The Constitution of the PRC states: “Article 10. Land in the
cities is owned by the state.” Additionally, the natural resources in the PRC are controlled by the
government and described in the Constitution. “Article 9. Mineral resources, waters, forests,
mountains, grassland, un-reclaimed land, beaches and other natural resources are owned by the
state.” Property in the PRC is considered to be owned by all of the people while primary
industry, transportation, power supply, and telecommunications, are run by the government.
Privatization of industry in the US is encouraged by the government and in a system of
capitalism, private businesses are allowed and either selectively or at-large, encouraged to
contribute to national industry.
In accordance with China’s transition into a market economy and the U.S. policy to aid
modernization, China began to re-develop its legal system, which it had abandoned in the
1950’s. In doing so, China commenced many ideological and social changes. Moreover, China’s
recent economic growth and introduction into the global economy has also enhanced China’s
economic relationship with the United States. These changes have also caused unprecedented
Western influence.9 Western influence is also causing China to adopt certain aspects of a

8

Supreme People’s Procuratorate is the highest agency at the national level responsible for both prosecution and
investigation in the People's Republic of China. Hong Kong and Macau
9
See EAST-WEST CENTER "China's Capitalist Transition": Capital Investors Sway China's
Leaders; Clamor for Political Reform Growing, (Aug. 24, 2004),
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/research/research-projects/chinas-capitalist-transition-inactive-project Chris
McNally, specialist at East-West Center China. Retrieved 2014.04.27
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Western-style economic legal system.10 In June of 2014 China’s Ministry of Justice encouraged
Chinese lawyers to promote rule of law in a country whose legal model is one ruled by law.11
A study by Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, Department of Management Hong Kong Polytechnic
University, Hong Kong, (Wing-Hung Lo, Fryxell, van Rooij) looked at changes in regulatory
enforcement styles among environmental enforcement officials in China. The studies, using data
collected in 2000 and 2006 showed significant shifts from what is known in China as “rule by
man” to “rule by law”. Rule by law is significantly distinct from “rule of law” in the United
States. The five styles examined were: 1) external influence, 2) prioritization, 3) education, 4)
formalism, and 5) coercion. Two significant shifts were found in interactions among five
different enforcement styles studied. The report indicated that by 2006 a coercive style in
absence of an educational style of enforcement was less effective and that also by 2006 external
influence as an enforcement style appeared to be more effective in combination with a
prioritization style than had been found in 2000.12
Over the past several decades, environmental protection has been a continuous theme in China
even though it has remained largely in the background. Recently however that has changed with
the promulgation of stronger environmental laws and regulations and public declarations of the
war on pollution. The consequences of widespread environmental injustices resulting from
heavily polluted air and diminishing potable water, along with escalating wealth polarization and
illegal land seizures, has Beijing justifiably concerned about social stability (World Bank and
SEPA 2007).13
Every five years, China issues a new 5-year Environmental Protection Plan. The 10th Five-Year
Plan described by Zhu Rongji, then Premier, was written for implementation in 2001. It was then
that a general movement of new thinking about environmental enforcement was energized.
According to the plan, improvements were expected related to better environmental
improvements in concert with improvements in industrial productivity. Clean industry and
production, clean production methods, and incorporation of the cost of expected environmental
benefits, as part of decision-making processes, were emphasized.
In 2007, I meet Professor Mingqing You of the Environmental and Resources Law Institute,
Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, at a conference in Wuhan. In 2006, You had just
published his annual review of Chinese environmental law developments. You described how
the most important developments in China in 2006 were national policy changes, the most
notable of which was the Central government’s promotion of resource conservation and

10

Robb M. LaKritz. Taming a 5,000 Year-Old Dragon: Toward a Theory of Legal Development in Post-Mao China. 11
Emory Intl. Review 1997. pp. 237,252.
11
Law Info China http://www.lawinfochina.com/Search/DisplayInfo.aspx?lib=news&Id=12736 retrieved

2014.06.25
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Wing-Hung Lo, Carlos, Fryxell, Gerald E and van Rooij, Benjamin. Changes in Regulatory Enforcement Styles
Among Environmental Enforcement Officials in China. EU-China BMT Working Paper Series No. 003. EU China
Business Management Project. Pp. 2. http://www.ceibs.edu/bmt/images/20090409/16119.pdf retrieved
2015.01.15
13
World Bank Press Release. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2007/07/11/statement-worldbank-china-country-director-cost-pollution-china-report . Retrieved 2015.01.15
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environmental consciousness.14 In The Conference on Population, Resources, and Environment,
held by the Central Committee of the communist Party of China on March 12, 2005, Hu Jintao,
president of the PRC and secretary general of the Communist Party of China, remarked that
China should develop a resource-conserving and environment-friendly society. He emphasized
that to effect a comprehensive sustainability plan to reduce pressure on population, resources,
and the environment, scientific development as well as economic adjustments would be
necessary. Future economic development should occur in partnership with efficient use of
resources, reduction of environmental pollution, and emphasis on quality and efficacy.15
In the Sixth National Environmental Protection Conference, April 2006, then Premier Wen
Jiabao spoke of the “Three Changes.” The first change required China to begin to prioritize
environmental protection along with economic growth. The second emphasized the current
improvement of the economy and the environment. The third added legal, economic, and
technological tools to enhance environmental protection to tools already being used.16 The
essence of these changes is that environmental protection and economic development should be
emphasized equally, and that all appropriate and necessary measures, including legal measures,
should be taken to achieve this goal. (Mingqing You 2007). Premier Jiabao’s “three changes” are
consistent with Figure 3.Three Spears of Sustainability.
In 2011, China began its 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015). The Plan includes new and revised
rules and goals for environmental protection and management. This Five-Year Plan forcefully
addresses environmental protection laws. It highlights the development of services and measures
to address the environmental and social imbalances, setting targets to reduce pollution, to
increase energy efficiency, to improve access to education and healthcare, and to expand social
protection. The Plan’s annual growth target of 7 percent importantly signals the intention to
focus on quality of life, rather than pace of growth. (World Bank 2014).
By reinforcing the Five-Year Plans, efforts are underscored in order to support China’s
environmental law enforcement. The first citizen allowed to file a lawsuit against a local
government agency over air pollution has triggered debate on effectiveness of current
environmental protection law.17 Allowing room for and encouraging open public debate on the
matter is evidence that high-level, government support for environmental protection is moving
forward and the support for public awareness is gaining momentum with an engaged population
and media coverage.
Since its creation in 1970, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), has
generally been responsible for ensuring enforcement of environmental law in the U.S. This
responsibility has traditionally involved monitoring compliance by those in the regulated
14

Mingqing You. Annual review of Chinese Environmental Law Developments: 2006. Environmental Law Institute,
Washington D.C. ELR News & Analysis. November 2007. http://www.epa.gov/ogc/china/you.pdf . Retrieved
2015.01.19
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Ju Jintao Emphasizes to Implement Environmental and Resources work and Put Social and Economic
Developmkent in a Benign Circle, Xinhuanet, March 13, 2005. http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/200503/13/content_2689920.htm Retrieved 2014.04.28
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Implement the Scientific Outlook on Development in an All Around Way and Accelerate the Construction of an
Environment-Friendly Society (Statement by Wen Jiabao, Premier St. Council. April 17,2006. St. Council Gazette.
Issue 16, Serial No. 1195. http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2006/content_303476.htm Retrieved 2014.04.28
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2014.05.01
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community (such as factories or businesses that release pollutants into the environment or use
hazardous chemicals), ensuring that violations are properly identified and reported, and ensuring
timely and appropriate enforcement actions are taken against violators when necessary.
Individual states in the U.S. historically had the lead responsibility to address environmental
pollution and many states were dissatisfied with the enforcement powers Congress granted to the
EPA. In the 1970’s relationships between the EPA and the state governments were considered
uneasy and cumbersome. For the most part, the states felt they were making considerable
progress for environmental protection and did not like nor respect the role of the federal
government in what they considered the states’ affairs.
In 1988 a comprehensive management review of EPA was conducted by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) and reported that some progress had been made with the state and
federal relationships and environmental enforcement, policies and regulations. There continues
to be a push-pull relationship between the federal and state oversight of environmental
enforcement.18
The EPA can authorize a state to conduct day-to-day program management and at the same time,
environmental statutes allow EPA to withdraw authorization if a state fails to meet certain
conditions, including maintaining the capacity to effectively manage the program and adopting
and properly exercising the legal authorities to enforce program compliance consistent with
federal laws and regulations. In essence, EPA’s ability to directly manage state programs is
limited because of budgetary constraints, staffing levels and other resources. Limits of states’
ability to effectively oversee environmental regulations continue to be evident. Two cases in
2014 highlight individual states’ capabilities or lack thereof:
In one case, regulators in the U.S. state of North Carolina reported that Duke Energy illegally
pumped 61 million gallons of contaminated water from a coal ash pit into the Cape Fear River.
The case is being investigated by several different agencies and regulators have cited Duke
Energy.19 In another case a chemical spill occurred in January 2014 when a chemical known as
methylcyclohexanemethanol (MCHM) leaked from a storage tank next to the Elk River in the
U.S. state of West Virginia. The spill rendered over 300,000 nearby residents in nine counties
without potable drinking water for weeks. State regulations and political will in both cases were
insufficient to prevent or fully monitor the situations. Better response and regulatory measures
are being sought at both the state and federal levels.20
The U.S. EPA’s role in these and similar situations is undergoing re-evaluation. The EPA has a
well-defined enforcement program. Yet, coordinating with and intervening in state
environmental regulations require exceptional communication, norms, and cooperation. The
EPA’s current enforcement process is summarized by their enforcement compliance section. It
consists primarily of the following steps: 1) Environmental problem is identified. 2) Congress
passes laws to address environmental problems. 3) EPA issues regulations to implement the
18

1988 Government Accountability Office Management Review of USEPA.
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David Zocchino. LA Times March 20, 2014. http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-duke-coal-ash-20140321story.html . retrieved 2015.01.15
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laws. 4) Compliance assistance helps the regulated community to understand and comply with
regulations. 5) Compliance monitoring assesses compliance through inspections and other
activities. 6) Enforcement actions are initiated when the regulated community does not comply
or cleanup is required. 7) Protection of the public health and the environment is accomplished.
The EPA uses both civil and criminal enforcement depending on the circumstances. Civil
enforcement protects human health and the environment by taking legal action to bring polluters
into compliance with the law. Criminal enforcement investigates and assists in the criminal
prosecution of deliberate or egregious violations of environmental laws or regulations and any
associated violation of the U.S. criminal code. The difference between criminal and civil
enforcement lies in legal standard and burden of proof.
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Figure 4. Key Players in Enforcement of Pollution Control Laws

Many of the local, state, tribal, federal and other stakeholders that make up the U.S.
environmental pollution control enforcement/compliance framework and organizational setting
are illustrated in Figure 4.
The regulating authorities in both China and the U.S. apply a diverse set of regulatory methods
and enforcement tools to bring about compliance. Rule of law, rule by law, government
structures, political will, development, scientific knowledge, and cultural norms will continue to
lead to variability in applying regulations, how they are interpreted and how they are applied.
Both countries have regulatory agencies and governmental structures that change over time in
response to evolving responsibilities, regulations and laws.
In November of 2014, knowing the United States and the People’s Republic of China have
consequential roles to play in combating threats and impacts to the environment, U.S. President
Barack Obama and China’s President, Xi Jinping, reaffirmed the importance of strengthening
bilateral cooperation. They agreed to adopt a protocol, an agreed outcome with legal force under
the Convention applicable to all Parties at the United Nations Climate Conference in Paris in
2015. Both countries have committed to reaching a 2015 agreement that reflects the principle of
common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities, in light of different national
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circumstances. Their joint actions are part of a long range effort to transition to low-carbon
economies. The US intends to reduce emissions by 26%-28% below its 2005 level in 2025 and to
make best efforts to reduce emissions by 28%. China intends to achieve the peaking of CO2
emissions around 2030 and to make best efforts to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in
primary energy consumption to around 20% by 2030. Both sides stated their intention to
continue to improve over time.21
Role of Citizens
The role of citizens and private individuals provide a crucial role in environmental protection and
enforcement laws. In the U.S. citizen participation, specifically authorized by Congress in many
of the federal pollution control statutes, occurs in several ways. Individuals can identify and
report violations of the laws, provide comments on settlements that are reached between the
federal government and violators of the environmental laws in enforcement cases, and initiate
enforcement proceedings directly in response to alleged violations. In addition, individuals may
bring actions against EPA for failing to execute nondiscretionary duties required under federal
environmental laws.22 (Robert Esworthy 2013).
A larger population of environmentally interested citizens is now working individually and
collectively. They employ new tools, new enabling legislation and “permissions” to be engaged
in effective environmental protection. Exchanges of students, scholars and interns are formally
encouraged, by agreement,23 to lend their skills and learn new ones from working across national
boundaries and to help keep the imploding civilizational tipping point (Targowski’s Ecological
Bomb) at bay.
Civilizations Past and Present
Air pollution has always accompanied civilizations. Pollution started in prehistoric times when
man created the first fires. According to a 1983 article in the journal Science, “soot found on
ceilings of prehistoric caves provides ample evidence of the high levels of pollution that was
associated with inadequate ventilation of open fires.”24 In ancient cultures, metal forging appears
to be a key turning point in the creation of significant air pollution levels outside the home. Core
samples of glaciers in Greenland indicate increases in pollution with Greek, Roman and Chinese
metal production,25 occurring at a time when cumulative pollution was relatively small and could
be absorbed by nature.
Some civilizations recognized when they were facing environmental trouble. In his book,
Collapse, author Jared Diamond references how some of the early societies, realizing they were
21

US White House Press Office. U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change. November 11.2014.
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in trouble, were able to change their ways in time to avoid decline and collapse. Six centuries
ago, for example, Icelanders realized that overgrazing on their grass-covered highlands was
leading to extensive soil loss from the inherently thin soils of the region. Rather than lose the
grasslands and face economic decline, farmers joined together to determine how many sheep the
highlands could sustain and then allocated quotas among themselves, thus preserving their
grasslands. The Icelanders understood the consequences of overgrazing and reduced their sheep
numbers to a level that could be sustained. Their wool production and woolen goods industry
continues to thrive today.26
Environmental balance, compliance, and enforcement are complex. The reality of a degraded
environment, rendered unsustainable, is galvanizing ordinary citizens, lawmakers, and national
leaders. Our capacity to act, even incrementally may be the steps of common wisdom that helps
save civilization.
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The Global Civil War:Will the West Survive?
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Introduction
A civil war characterized by revolution and counterrevolution has raged since 1789. That
civil war began as the French Revolution, which celebrated its bicentennial in 1989. A year
after the start of the war in Paris, the first resistance to it emerged in England. Eventually,
over time, that resistance spread over the world and became what can be termed a Global
Civil War, which still continues.
The world civil war started when the kingdom of France was abolished, and the Bastille, a
prison filled with insurgents and criminals, was stormed on July 14, 1789. After some years
of revolutionary rule in France, a republic was introduced. The revolutionary Jacobin terror
started in 1793 and lasted until 1795 with thousands executed, including King Louis XVI
and Queen Marie Antoinette. Royalists who had escaped and counterrevolutionaries in
western France and in many other areas subsequently rose up in an insurgency. The terror
regime, led by the so-called Welfare Executive headed by Robespierre, was characterized
by a bloody repression against the counterrevolutionary insurgents. A totalitarian regime,
led by General Napoleon Bonaparte, emerged in France and was consolidated into the
Napoleonic Empire with a policy of European conquest.
Burke and Revolution
Edmund Burke’s book, Reflections on the Revolution in France, was published in 1790.
Burke was a member of the British Parliament and warned early that the French Revolution
could have disastrous effects on conditions in England. The talk of human rights and
freedom celebrated in France was unmasked in Burke’s book. Instead, according to Burke,
the revolution would end in total oppression and terror, which was the case in 1793.
Burke believed that it was the duty of Britain to save Europe from the Jacobin threat. A war
had to be carried on until the Jacobin advance was stopped and Napoleon defeated. A war
that ended in military victory had to be conducted until 1815, long after the death of Edmund
Burke.
This great Irishman, philosopher and British politician, discussed the global threat of
Jacobinism in a number of letters; one of them was not published until posthumously in
1812; “Letters on a Regicide Peace, 1797.”
The quotes below are from the brilliant Burke biography by Russell Kirk, Edmund Burke –
A Genius Reconsidered (1967):
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In international law war was justified…They may be wrong and violent: but also
they may be ‘the sole means of justice among nations’…Britain should wage war
unrelentingly upon the Jacobins…they were bent on ruining the Christian
commonwealth of Europe…Jacobinism was a general evil, not merely a local one;
so what was being fought was a civil war, not a foreign war…Britain must strike at
the heart of Jacobin power in France. Should Jacobinism be allowed to retain the
core of the European commonwealth, in time Jacobinism would triumph
everywhere…It did not rely on numbers, but upon tight organization and fanatic
belief.

The late American Paleo-conservative Professor Russell Kirk in his brilliant biography of
Edmund Burke (Edmund Burke - A Genius Reconsidered, 1967) described not only French
despotism. Long after the genius died, two more insurgencies developed inspired in some
respects by Jacobinism, namely Communism and Nazism, that subsequently threatened the
European continent and the world. But over 200 years ago, the struggle was predicted by
the prophetic, Irish-born MP:
By propaganda and terror, the masters of such a total state [will eventually
conquer]…Only intervention by a free nation, employing all its resources and faith
with a force and spirit equal to that of the radical oligarchy, can work emancipation…
[from this scourge].
The Jacobin state had to be destroyed, wrote one of Conservatism’s most important thinkers,
otherwise it would destroy all of Europe. We can still hear the voice of Burke across the
centuries impugning against these abstract ideologies: Socialism, Communism, Nazism,
Maoism, Anarchism, and now Islamism. The French revolution initiated a long line of
socialist theories, which reached their height with the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917.
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote the Communist Manifesto in 1848 for the first
communist party. Its main goal was violent revolution and the restructuring of society. The
communists, they wrote, did not hide their views and intentions. They openly declared that
their goal will be reached through violent revolution of all existing societies.
Marx described the Paris commune (the uprising in France’s capital in 1871) as the first
socialist state, which he claimed he had initiated personally. The commune lasted 72 days
and cost more than 20,000 lives. The same year, Marx published the book The Civil War in
France and claimed that the commune was a true dictatorship of the proletariat. In reality it
was never even socialist. The role of the socialists in the leadership was very limited.
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The Model of the French Terror Regime
The Russian revolutionaries used Robespierre and the Jacobins as their models. It was in
connection with the Bolshevik revolution in Russia that the mass murders of the European
civil war were initiated. This has been described in detail in The Black Book of Communism:
Crimes, Terror, Repression (in English 1999; in the chapter, “A State Against Its People:
Violence, Repression and Terror in the Soviet Union.”)
After Bolsheviks seized power, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) initiated
class exterminations. The Russian bourgeoisie was to be eradicated, and the European civil
war cost even more lives. Already in the summer of 1918, European newspapers reported
the terrible crushing of an entire social class, and in 1921, the losses on the European civil
war’s Russian front were reported to be 1.6 million.
Alexander Solzhenitsyn (The Gulag Archipelago, 1974) and Lev Kopelev (To Be Preserved
Forever, 1977) have with great insight depicted this mass slaughter in the Soviet Union that
occurred until the death of Stalin in 1953. Karl Radek, who was the CPSU party
representative in Germany, wrote in 1919 that the revolution did not debate with its enemies.
It just crushed them as counterrevolutionists (The Development of Socialism from Science
to Deed, in German).
German Nazism and Italian Fascism used bourgeois fears that class extermination in Russia
would be the model for Germany and Italy if the communists took power. In Germany, the
Nazis copied the Russian communist technique of extermination of its supposed enemies,
political and racial (Jews).
After some preparations in the 1930s, a new phase of the European civil war started:
Germany and Italy attacked the rest of Europe. Gradually the so-called Steel Pact was
enlarged into the Comintern Pact, including the Asian great power Japan. After the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor, the European civil war developed into a world civil war, which
ended with allied victory over Germany, Japan, and Italy in 1945.
The Cold War
After 1945, the “hot war” developed into a “cold” world civil war (Stefan T. Possony, A
Century of Conflict – Communist Techniques of World Revolution 1848 – 1950, Chicago
1953). Meanwhile, the Chinese communists took power on mainland China in 1949, and a
new era of class extermination was initiated.
This phase of the world civil war is described in The Black Book of Communism (China a
Long March into Darkness) and in Bertil Häggman’s book The Communist Holocaust (in
Swedish, 1982). Mao’s number of victims exceeded those in the Soviet Union and has been
estimated to be around 80 million lives.
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The communist regime in Moscow collapsed in 1991 after the United States of America
under the leadership of President Ronald Reagan had changed American foreign policy from
containing the Soviet Union and communism to liberating the peoples enslaved by the
Soviets in Eastern and Central Europe. A period of economic and political warfare was
initiated in 1982-83 by the United States that led to the freedom of a number of oppressed
peoples.
The Cold War was a world-encompassing revolutionary attack on the West. The
communists in Moscow and all over the world waged a total war to destroy the social
structure of the enemy. The goal was to eliminate the leading classes in the West and
distribute their property (especially to communists). There was no other goal in this phase
of the world civil war referred to popularly as the “Cold War.” Subversion was the method.
The use of military or non-military means was coincidental to circumstances and both legal
and illegal methods were used in order to obtain power in the West.
The Continuing Global/World Civil War
When France celebrated the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution, the French
historian François Furet presented communism beginning with the revolution in Paris (his
book The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century, in
English 2000 and published in Swedish in 2010).
The author of this article claims that from 1789 to 1991, first a European civil war and then
a world civil war has raged. It has continued after 1991 and especially from September 11,
2001, when radical Islam has waged war on the West in the spirit of the French Revolution.

A remaining threat is also the Chinese communist regime, now ruling over more than one
billion people, and revolutionaries in the West and East still supporting continued struggle.
This new phase of the world civil war remains a great threat to the West. Radical Islam
wants, in cooperation with evil, rogue states like Iran and North Korea, to crush the West or
to at least weaken it. The risk is that such evil regimes, now cooperating with Muslim
terrorists, will transfer weapons of mass destruction to be used on Western powers. For
instance, North Korea is believed to have 5,000 tons of biological and chemical weapons
and cannot be trusted by the West.
The terrorists are prepared to attack the United States (“the main enemy”) and other
countries in the West to achieve a maximum number of victims. Since September 11, 2001,
a new phase of the world civil war has developed. The victims this century will not be
counted in the thousands, as during the French Revolution. The new enemies of the West in
the world civil war are planning millions of victims. The 21st century could become just as
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bloody as the 20th century, when Communists and Nazis made mass extermination the main
element of their ongoing global civil war.
Russian aggression in Ukraine, Islamo-fascist terror warfare, unrest on mainland China, and
spreading pandemics in Africa may be the new campaigns in another bloody century in the
permanent global civil war.
Essay and Comments on Sources
One possible definition for Global Civil War could be that the concept is used to describe
simultaneous civil conflicts happening at many locations with little regard for national
boundaries. Alternative applicable terms for it are: “world civil war,” “permanent civil war,”
and “global insurgency.”
There is no comprehensive definition of a civil war. A simple definition is that “it is a
violent conflict in which organized groups within a country fight against each other for
political control or to change government policy” (The Oxford Encyclopedia of the
Modern World, 2008). But in a Global Civil War, national boundaries are relevant but not
descriptive of the wider conflict.
The best discussion on civil war is Professor Reinhhart Kosseleck's article
“Revolution, Rebellion, Aufruhr, Buergerkrieg” in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe.
Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, Vol. 5 (1984).
Seemingly global civil war is a contradiction in terms. Normally, a civil war must be within
a society, because societies are associated with the nation.

Ordinarily, a civil war would not be global. A global war is normally seen as international.
But after 2001 things have changed. Other significant discussions are found in:
Oswald Spengler (1880 – 1936)
This German civilizationist and historian used the term world civil war to explain the fall of
the Roman Empire, based on the role of Germanic tribes both within and outside Roman
territory.
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (1917 – 2007)
This American historian associated world civil war with the promotion of numerous Marxist
and Marxist-Leninist anti-colonialist groups that were often supported by the Soviet Union
- a phenomenon the United States and the rest of the West opposed.
It is difficult to say if the radical Seattle leaders contacted Osama Bin Laden or whether it
was the other way round. It does not matter, in any case. They appear to work in tandem.
The Third World War is unlikely to be a conflict between the United States and Afghanistan
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol72/iss72/19
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on the issue of terrorism. It appears it will develop into a much larger conflagration involving
most countries.
Buckminster Fuller (1895 – 1983)
This American futurologist discussed the concept of world civil war in Ideas & Integrities
(1963).
Bertil Häggman (1940 )
This Swedish attorney and author discussed the world civil war in an article in the Swedish
publication Contra (in Swedish). Mr. Bertil Häggman, LL.M., attorney, author, director,
SwedenE-mail: bertilhaggman@hotmail.com
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Witchcraft in the Early Modern West
Larry Gragg
lgragg@mst.edu
In 1617, on the Channel Island of Guernsey just off the northern French coast, a woman
named Collette Du Mont confessed to practicing witchcraft. She told a court:
That the Devil having come to fetch her that she might go to the Sabbath, called for
her without anyone perceiving it: and gave her a certain black ointment with which
(after having stripped herself), she rubbed her back, belly and stomach: and then
having again put on her clothes, she went out of her door, when she was immediately
carried through the air at a great speed: and she found herself in an instant at the
place of the Sabbath, which was sometimes near the parochial burial-ground: and at
other times near the seashore in the neighbourhood of Rocquaine Castle: where,
upon arrival, she met often fifteen or sixteen Wizards and Witches with the Devils
who were there in the form of dogs, cats and hares: which Wizards and Witches she
was unable to recognize, because they were all blackened and disfigured: it was true,
however, that she had heard the Devil summon them by their names.1
Du Mont was only one of at least 100,000 people tried on charges of practicing witchcraft
between 1500 and 1700 in Western Europe. Of that number, authorities likely executed over
40,000.2 Historians have offered a variety of reasons for the emergence of the large witch
hunts of the period. They have variously “been attributed, in whole or in large part, to the
Reformation, the Counter-Reformation, the Inquisition, the use of judicial torture, the wars
of religion, the religious zeal of the clergy, the rise of the modern state, the development of
capitalism, the widespread use of narcotics, changes in medical thought, social and cultural
conflict, an attempt to wipe out paganism, the need of the ruling class to distract the masses,
and the hatred of women.”3 In this complicated pursuit of answers to the question of how
such a profoundly horrific death toll could have occurred in early modern Europe it is
essential to examine the context in which beliefs about witchcraft developed.
To the modern skeptical mind, the case of Collette Du Mont which involved diabolical
witchcraft, magical powers, and familiar spirits seems irrational and remarkably
superstitious.
Yet, people in the early modern West lived in a mental world dominated by the supernatural.
They sought meaning for their lives in an intriguing mix of pagan relics, Christianity,
“wonder” stories, and witchcraft. Historians over the past few decades who have
investigated witchcraft beliefs in Europe and in the European colonies in the Americas have
1

Brian P. Levack, The Witch-Hunt in Early Modern Europe (London: Longman, 1987), 14.
John Demos, The Enemy Within: 2,000 Years of Witch-Hunting in the Western World (New York: Viking,
2008), 38 and Merry E. Wiesner, Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2007), 1.
3
Levack, The Witch-Hunt, 2-3.
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discovered an almost universal belief “from intellectuals to peasants,” as Joseph Klaits has
explained, “in the reality of invisible spirits, both angelic and demonic.”4
An examination of their “invisible world” helps the twenty-first century observer better
understand not only the stunning outbreak of witchcraft trials in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries in Western Europe, but also it provides another window through
which one can view the social relations, values, and attitudes of the people who populated
the continent’s villages.
To begin, it is important to note the sources that historians have drawn upon to investigate
the beliefs of people who largely have left no personal paper trail. There are, for example,
few diaries or letters of ordinary folk from the early modern era. Instead, historians have
tended to rely upon court records, wills, sermons, the accounts of church wardens, and “what
contemporary observers said people thought and did.”5
Increasingly, however, scholars also have examined what people may have read as an
indicator of their beliefs. Beyond the proliferation of Bibles (there were about a half million
copies of Luther’s German Bible by 1574 and 600,000 Bibles available in England six
decades later), inexpensive publications became increasingly popular in the early
seventeenth century. Broadsides, pamphlets, almanacs, catechisms, chapbooks, ballads, and
penny “godlies” were readily available in urban book stalls, and in the countryside, peddlers
became a common presence hawking the latest “little books.” 6
Even those who could not read, and estimates for literate Europeans in the seventeenth
century range only from a quarter to half of adults, had a chance to discuss the publications
with the literate in churches, coffee houses, taverns, and town squares. For the diligent
researcher, as Margaret Spufford has shown, these publications offer “valuable clues” in the
quest to “reconstruct the mental world” of early modern Europeans.7
Drawing upon all these types of sources, it is evident that in both Roman Catholic and
Protestant areas, most people were at least superficially Christian. However, parishioners
4

Joseph Klaits, Servants of Satan: The Age of the Witch Hunts (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,

1985), 3.
Christopher Haigh, The Plain Man’s Pathways to Heaven: Kinds of Christianity in Post-Reformation
England, 1570-1640 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 6-7.
6
Geoffrey Parker, Success is Never Final: Empire, War, and Faith in Early Modern Europe (New York:
Basic Books, 2002), 231; Larry Gragg, The Quaker Community on Barbados: Challenging the Culture of the
Planter Class (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2009), 13; Margaret Spufford, “Portraits of Society:
Popular Fiction in 17th-Century England,” History Today, 32 (February 1982), 11-12; Margaret Spufford,
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England (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), 72-73.
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regularly frustrated their spiritual leaders with their shallow understanding of the faith. To
be sure, they exhibited a belief in God and in a heaven and a hell, but often little
understanding of Christianity beyond that. For example, Martin Luther in the 1520s claimed
the “common man” in Saxony villages knew “absolutely nothing about Christian doctrine.”
A sixteenth-century English observer wrote that many in the parish “let the Preacher speake
never so plaine, although they sit and looke him in the face, yet if ye enquire of them so
soone as they be out at the church dores, ye shall easily perceive that (as the common saying
is) it went in at the one eare, and out at the other.”8 A minister in Kent, England, in the early
seventeenth century wrote that only about one in ten of his parishioners “knew the basics of
Protestant doctrine.”
As late as the mid-seventeenth century, Geoffrey Parker has written, “Protestant leaders,
from almost all countries, execrated in similar terms the ‘incorrigible profanity of the
multitude’ who seemed totally, almost congenitally, incapable of learning and remembering
Christian doctrine.”9 To be sure, there was much hyperbole in the critiques offered by
frustrated clergymen, but through the seventeenth century, such comments were common.
Poor attendance at worship exacerbated the situation. There were instances of excellent
attendance, most often in urban areas, but in most parishes, packed pews were uncommon.
One English clergyman in 1572 noted, for example, “A man may find the churches empty,
saving the minister and two or four lame, and old folke.”10 Six decades later, another
clergyman complained that parishioners went “ten times to an Alehouse before they goe
once to a church.” The worst attendance was among the poorest parishioners who seldom
were present except to marry, baptize their children, and bury family members.11
Englishman Arthur Dent spoke for many whether they faithfully attended or rarely attended
worship services when he wrote in his The Plaine Man’s Path-way to Heaven of the ease of
attaining salvation: “If a man say his Lords prayer, his tenne Commaundements, and his
beleefe, and keepe them, and say no body no harme, nor doo no bodie no harme, and doo as
he would bee done too, have a good faith to Godward, and be a man of Gods beliefe, no
doubt he shall be saved.”12
For the largely rural population, beyond their generally limited understanding of the
Christian faith and the challenges of understanding salvation, there was a long oral tradition,
often embellished with each generation, about creatures that could affect their lives. There
8

Quoted in Patrick Collinson, The Religion of Protestants: The Church in English Society, 1559-1625
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 201.
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and People: The Church and Religion in England, 1529-1689 (London: Routledge, 1991), 82.
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Harvard University Press, 1992), 19.
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Keith Wrightson, English Society, 1580-1680 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1982), 213 and
220.
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appeared to be a near “universal” belief in elves and fairies, non-human creatures that could
be, in turn, malicious or helpful. They might abduct babies, intimidate travelers, or sicken
domestic animals or, on the other hand, they might bring riches to the fortunate. As Brian
Moynahan has shown, “Country lore was rich in hobgoblins, imps, fairies, pixies, and elves.
Animal ‘familiars’ were held to be able to divine the future.”13
“Wonder stories,” as historians Alexandra Walsham and David Hall have discussed, were
another tool used by the people of the early modern era to understand their world. The stories
were “wondrous” because they often were based upon apparitions people saw in the
heavens. “Phantom armies,” Walsham has written, “appeared high above hundreds of
continental cities in the course of the period. Charging cavalry were discerned in the
firmament near Nuremberg in 1554 and over Croatia in 1605, while a vision above Poland
in January 1581 incorporated an ominous funeral procession of hooded black figures.”
But what did the myriad apparitions mean? To the clergy and their devout followers, the
extraordinary images represented “sermons inscribed by the finger of God in the sky.”
Clergymen drew upon these “signs” to explain God’s plan for his earthly followers and to
emphasize God’s sovereignty.14 This divine order in the universe rather than occult forces,
the clergy told their parishioners, explained the seemingly capricious events in humans’
lives. Whether it was poor harvests, the survival of a child in a village decimated by a plague,
or the destruction of an earthquake, these were results of the intervention of a just God –
not demons, other gods, or magicians.15
Yet the men of the cloth remained frustrated by a population who rejected their sermons
about a sovereign God and who turned instead to a wide array of practitioners of magic.
English clergyman Robert Burton complained, “Sorcerers are too common.” One could find
“cunning men, wizards and white witches...in every village.” The Puritan minister William
Perkins agreed. “As the ministers of God do give resolution to the conscience, in matters
doubtful and difficult,” he wrote, “so the ministers of Satan, under the name of wise-men,
and wise-women, are at hand…to resolve, direct and help ignorant and unsettled persons in
cases of distraction, loss, or other outward calamites.”16
Across the Atlantic, in Puritan Massachusetts, many people went to fortune tellers, used
charms, and practiced astrology. The Boston minister Cotton Mather complained that too
13
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many of his fellow colonists “would often cure hurts with spells, and practice detestable
conjurations with sieves and keys, and peas, and nails...to learn the things for which they
had a forbidden and impious curiosity.” Because of these experiments, he concluded, “the
minds of many had been so poisoned” that they turned to the practice of witchcraft.17
Ordinary folks in Europe most often identified witchcraft with maleficia, or malice toward
individuals, their families, or their property. They worried about neighbors who might be
using occult powers to destroy their crops, kill their livestock, or sicken their children. It
was a commonly held belief that practitioners of maleficia could torment someone by
sticking pins or needles into the wax image of someone. There is little evidence that they
saw some Satanic plot against Christianity in the instances of malice, let alone that they
believed they were crossing an unacceptable line in resorting to counter magic or charms to
ward off the malice. “For human sickness,” Jacqueline Simpson found, “one should make a
‘witch bottle’ by filling a bottle with the victim’s urine plus pins or thread, or boiling it.”
This technique allegedly prompted a witch to lift her spell because of the pain she endured
from the counter magic.18
This widespread resort to the occult carried significant negative implications for clergymen.
It reflected more than religious indifference; rather, in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, they struggled to eliminate popular religious beliefs, particularly about magic and
maleficia that suggested Satan and his earthly agents could intrude upon God’s sovereignty.
“It is simply impossible,” English author John Webster wrote, “for either the devil or witches
to change or alter the course that god hath set in nature.”19
New England Puritan Samuel Willard offered a variation on that theme, one that
acknowledged that Satan could play havoc with the divinely ordered universe, but only if
God permitted it. “God is the Supream Governour over the whole World,” he wrote, “and
though the Devils are risen up in rebellion against him, yet he holds them in his hands, curbs
in their rage, and lets it out as and when he pleaseth.”20
Against this backdrop of conflicting views of the forces in control of the “Invisible World,”
a wide-ranging assault on witchcraft developed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
For most of the Christian era, witchcraft had actually posed little threat to the Church. While
Christian leaders condemned all magic including witchcraft, most of their focus was upon
explaining its “illusory nature.”21

17

Quoted in Ibid, 9.
Simpson, “Rural Folklore,” 163.
19
Quoted in Edward Bever, “Witchcraft Prosecutions and the Decline of Magic,” Journal of
Interdisciplinary History, 40 (Autumn, 2009), 276.
20
Quoted in Richard Weisman, “Witchcraft and Puritan Beliefs,” in Elaine G. Breslaw, ed., Witches of the
Atlantic World: A Historical Reader & Primary Sourcebook (New York: New York University Press, 2000),
79.
21
Bever, “Witchcraft Prosecutions,” 265.
18

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol72/iss72/19

144

Review: Full Issue

142

Number 72, Spring 2015

Indeed, the Church did not issue its first important statement on witchcraft until around 900
A.D. The Canon Episcopi, which was a letter of instructions to bishops on how to deal with
witches, acknowledged that some people believed in witchcraft, but dismissed its reality
while acknowledging the reality of Satan and other demons. It noted that there were “some
wicked women” who had “been seduced by the illusions and phantasms of demons” and
believed that in the night “they ride upon certain beasts with Diana, the goddess of pagans,
and an innumerable multitude of women.” Yet it was just that, only an illusion. Such people
should be punished, but not through a trial. Instead, if a bishop were to “find a man or woman
follower of this wicked sect” the Church instructed them “to eject them foully disgraced
from their parishes.”22
However, religious and secular leaders, beginning in the late fifteenth century, began to
worry about an organized cult of witches, a heretical threat to Christianity. Indeed, in 1484,
Pope Innocent VIII condemned witchcraft as heresy.
Within two years, Heinrich Kramer and Jacob Sprenger, Dominican inquisitors, published
a manual for fellow inquisitors. Their Malleus Maleficarum (The Hammer of Witches),
endorsed by Innocent VIII, was the first major treatise on witchcraft. Over the next four
decades, the Malleus Maleficarum was reprinted often and other books on witchcraft soon
followed.
By the early 1600s, a remarkable collective new picture had emerged about witchcraft.
Rather than simply performing random acts of malice toward their neighbors, witches and
wizards, in this new narrative accepted by many religious and secular leaders across the
continent, rejected Christianity and made league with Satan. They flew to mass meetings,
often called sabbats, where they “parodied the mass” and stole “communion wafers and
unbaptized babies to use in their rituals” before signing a pact with Satan, copulating with
their new master, and pledging to do evil in a campaign to destroy Christianity.23
As Brian Levack and other scholars have made clear, “We still do not have any evidence
that either a witch cult or a group of persons performing some ritual that was interpreted as
witchcraft actually existed.”24 Nonetheless, authorities believed that such a force was
threatening their society, and from the late 1500s, governments across the continent passed
laws making the practice of witchcraft a capital crime, and many of those laws allowed the
use of torture.
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To be sure, there were skeptics who challenged this continent-wide rush to criminalize an
age-old practice. Two Germans, Jesuit priest Friedrich Spee and physician Johann Weyer;
French essayist and Renaissance philosopher Michael Montaigne; and English gentleman
Reginald Scot all wrote about their concerns with witchcraft prosecutions. Weyer’s
publications, De Praestigiss Daemonum (1563) and De Lamiis (1582), were among the
earliest challenges to the legal proceedings against the accused. Although he acknowledged
that the Devil was real, Weyer argued that the accused were deluded people who only
believed that they had signed a pact with the Prince of Darkness. As a consequence, people
should not be prosecuted for an evil that only existed in their imagination. They needed
treatment for their delusions, not prosecution.25
Spee, who published Cautio Criminalis seu de processibus contra sagas liber in 1631, was
appalled at the credulity of the population when it came to matters of the occult.
“It is incredible,” he wrote, “what superstitions, jealousies, lies, slurs, mutterings, and the
like there are among the common people in Germany.” It seemed “God no longer does
anything, nor nature, but everything is done by witches.” And he found the leaders no better.
He declares: when “everyone shouts with great passion” about the threat posed by occult
forces, “the princes therefore command their judges and counselors to begin to try witches.”
Particularly pernicious in Spee’s view was the use of judicial torture.26
Montaigne, after questioning an accused witch, concluded, “It is putting a high price on
one’s conjectures to have a man roasted alive because of them.”27 Indeed, the French skeptic
ridiculed authorities who vigorously promoted witchcraft prosecutions. “The witches of my
neighborhood,” he wrote, “are in mortal danger every time some new author comes along
and attests to the reality of their visions.”28 Reginald Scot explained that he wrote Discoverie
of Witchcraft (1584) on “behalf of the poore, the aged and the simple.”29
He viewed the women accused of practicing witchcraft as “old, lame, bleary-eyed, pale,
foul, and full of wrinkles; poor, sullen, superstitious, and papists, or such as know no
religion.” More importantly, similar to Montaigne, Scot argued that most of the evidence
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brought against the accused was “frivolous,” largely “guesses, presumptions, and
impossibilities contrary to reason, scripture, and nature.”30
Over time more critics emerged, including materialist and political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes who in his major work Leviathan (1651) challenged all assertions of spiritual or
supernatural causation and criticized “rude people” for their beliefs in “fairies, ghosts, and
goblins, and of the power of witches.”31 In 1692, Thomas Brattle, a Boston, Massachusetts
merchant and member of the British Royal Society, echoed Weyer’s arguments when he
asserted that those who confessed in the Salem witch prosecutions largely were “distracted,
crazed women” and their contentions that they attended sabbats, with their “mock
sacraments” truly reflected no “reality.”32
Yet the early skeptics had little impact on the secular and religious leaders pursuing the
campaign against the Devil and his agents on earth. Indeed, they too became targets of
attack. In 1597, King James VI of Scotland even took the time to write a book entitled
Daemonologie in response to Reginald Scot’s views.
Ironically, the scores of tragic witchcraft cases have given historians remarkably helpful
material in their quest to understand social relations in early modern Europe.
Most of those accused of witchcraft lived in small villages where people interacted with
neighbors on a daily basis. They were face-to-face communities where most knew everyone
else. Living in close proximity accentuated the likelihood of conflict. Arguments over
trespassing and begging and disputes over boundaries, livestock, or even insults often
created long-standing ill will among neighbors. These disputes frequently played a role in
charges of maleficia.33
Two examples from the 1692 Salem, Massachusetts, episode demonstrate the link between
disputes and witchcraft charges.
Samuel and Mary Abbey testified that they had boarded a poor woman named Sarah Good
“out of charity.” However, they told prosecutors that Good was so “spiteful” and
“maliciously bent” that they forced her to leave their home. Over two years later, the
Abbeys’ livestock began dying in “an unusual manner” and they believed that a vindictive
Sarah Good had used witchcraft to get her revenge against the Abbeys for casting her aside.
In the case of Bridget Bishop, a man named John Londer testified that about eight years
earlier he “had some controversy” with Bishop “about her fowls that used to come into our
orchards or garden.” Not long after their confrontations he claimed that he was awakened
Quoted in “Reginald Scot: The Unreality of Witchcraft, 1584,” in Levack, ed., Witchcraft Sourcebook, 286
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one night by “a great weight” on his chest and he saw the “likeness” of Bishop. Bishop’s
specter choked Londer who claimed that he “had no strength or power . . . to resist.”34
These two examples illustrate one of the most significant facts discovered about the
witchcraft prosecutions. Women were much more vulnerable targets than men when people
began hurling accusations of witchcraft. There were a few places like Finland, Estonia,
Iceland, Russia, and Normandy where men were a majority of the accused. Overall,
however, more than seventy-five percent of the accused were women. Indeed, in a few
German villages, all the adult women were accused of practicing witchcraft.35
In the last three decades of the twentieth-century several radical feminists concluded that
such a disproportionate number of women among the accused surely represented, as Anne
Llewellyn Barstow wrote in 1994, “an intentional mass murder of women.”36
For many of these authors, the late fifteenth-century publication of the Malleus Maleficarum
was an important point of departure.
The book truly is a misogynistic rant.
Authors Kramer and Sprenger argued that “there was a defect in the formation of the first
woman, since she was formed from a bent rib.” This made them necessarily “more
superstitious” and “more impressionable” than men. Moreover, “they are feebler both in
mind and body” with “weak memories.” Because of these inherent weaknesses, the authors
claimed “a wicked woman is by her nature quicker to waver in her faith and, consequently,
quicker to abjure the faith, which is the root of witchcraft.” To make matters worse, “all
witchcraft comes from carnal lust, which is in women insatiable” and “for the sake of
fulfilling their lusts they consort even with devils.”37
Building upon the bile they discovered in the Malleus, radical feminists have gone on to
argue that witchcraft prosecutions were, in part, an effort to stop women who were
challenging their patriarchal society particularly “independent women…who had spiritual
knowledge or were midwives, herbalists, or healers.”38
34
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In recent years, scholars have become increasingly critical of this narrative. As Alison
Rowlands has explained, “Academic historians…are dismissive of such interpretations,
criticizing radical feminists for their assumption that witch-hunting was ‘woman-hunting,’
their over-reliance on the Malleus, their unwillingness to engage with manuscript records of
witch trials, and their ahistorical use of the terms misogyny and patriarchy.” For example,
there is not good evidence that authorities specifically targeted healers and mid-wives in
their witchcraft prosecutions.39 It is also true that negative characterizations of women
predated the large witch hunts and continued to prevail in the era after the decline of
widespread witch prosecutions.
Still, feminist accounts have been helpful particularly in making the unmistakable case of
male domination in the drafting, implementing, and enforcing of laws dealing with
witchcraft. After all, even though women often were among the accusers in witchcraft trials,
the legislators, prosecutors, judges, inquisitors, juries and executioners were all men.40
It is also true that women, particularly widows, who had inherited land, seemed to be a
challenge to a society that had an expectation that property would always remain under male
control and sometimes that made them vulnerable to charges of witchcraft, especially if they
failed to defer to men or had particularly aggressive personalities.41
One intriguing line of inquiry has to do with other areas of life where women faced a
“general criminalization of female behavior.” As Merry Wiesner-Hanks has explained,
“along with witchcraft, accusations of women for other types of crimes also increased during
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, particularly gender-related ones such as prostitution
or infanticide.” Some scholars have seen this trend as another indicator of the efforts of men
to control women.42
Historians have struggled, however, to explain why older women were more vulnerable to
accusations of practicing witchcraft than younger women.
For a generation, many accepted the view offered by Alan Macfarlane and Keith Thomas
who argued, as the case of Sarah Good above illustrated, that Englishmen believed that older
poor women were becoming increasingly marginalized by a capitalist economic system that
was displacing a more communitarian ethos. Their kind had once been able to rely upon the
assistance of their more fortunate neighbors, but now those neighbors increasingly rejected
their pleas for alms and many assumed that the poor would be tempted to use the occult to
gain revenge against their wealthier neighbors.
Rowlands, “Witchcraft and Gender in Early Modern Europe,” 451-452.
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Some in France agreed. Magistrate Nicholas Remy, for example, argued in his 1595 work
Daemonolatreiae libri tres, that witches by and large were “beggars, who support life on the
alms they receive.” Yet, other interpretations have modified that view. “Older people,” Brian
Levack has observed, “especially if they were senile, often manifested signs of eccentric or
anti-social behavior” and such actions made them targets of accusations.43
It is also likely that it took several years for women to develop a reputation for dabbling in
the occult and necessarily did not face accusations until later in life. Since wives usually
out-lived their husbands, elderly widows often had no spouse to defend them in court against
charges of practicing magic or witchcraft.
Over time, the aging spinster or widowed witch became a caricature, one that put many
women at risk. In Chelmsford, England, for example, during a witch hunt many villagers
were willing to suspect “every old woman with a wrinkled face, a furred brow, a hairy lip,
a squint eye, a squeaking voice, or a scolding tongue, a skull cap on her head, a spindle in
her hand, a dog or cat by her side.”44
The work of historians in the past couple of generations, then, has given us a prototype of
the most vulnerable to witchcraft accusations during the early modern era in Europe. Brian
Levack has summarized it well: A witch was “hardly a typical villager. Older and poorer
than average, and more often than not unmarried, she did not adhere to the traditional
behavioural standards of her community or of her sex. Cranky, acerbic and often angry about
her plight, she attracted attention, hostility, suspicion and fear.”45
After almost two centuries of prosecutions, the witch hunts in Europe ended in the late
1600s. Most people still believed in witchcraft. The intellectual elite became ever-more
skeptical if not dismissive, but some prominent late eighteenth-century Englishmen like Dr.
Samuel Johnson and jurist William Blackstone still acknowledged a belief in witchcraft.
Further, Owen Davies has pointed out “there is no evidence to suggest that there was a
decrease in the number of complaints to justices.”46 However, judges and other secular
leaders increasingly became skeptical of the excesses evident in so many of the large witch
hunts.
As Edward Bever has shown, a sufficient number of leaders “in Western and Central Europe
. . . had lost their certainty about the prevalence, if not the potency, of maleficium; the
danger, if not the existence, of a diabolical conspiracy; and the practicality, if not the
possibility, of identifying and punishing those involved in either pursuit.”47 After
Rowlands, “Witchcraft and Gender in Early Modern Europe,” 460 and Levack, The Witch-Hunt, 129 and
134.
44
Quoted in Gragg, Witch Crisis, 12.
45
Levack, The Witch-Hunt, 139.
46
Owen Davies, “Witchcraft: The Spell That Didn’t Break,” History Today, 49 (August 1999), 8.
47
Bever, “Witchcraft Prosecutions, 263.
43

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol72/iss72/19

150

Review: Full Issue

148

Number 72, Spring 2015

generations of trying to eradicate witchcraft, secular leaders in Europe simply concluded
that there was no reasonable way to try witches and repealed the statutes prohibiting its
practice.
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Laina Farhat-Holzman God’s Law or Man’s Law: The Fundamentalist Challenge to
Secular Rule
Times Publishing Group, Aptos, 2002
Laina Farhat-Holzman Strange Birds from Zoroaster’s Nest, Revised Edition
None The Less Press, Lenexa, 2003
Laina Farhat-Holzman How Do You Know That?: A Guide to Critical Thinking about
Global Issues
The Center for Sustainable Business Practices, Kalamazoo, 2011
Laina Farhat-Holzman World Changes: Ten Inventions That Changed Everything
The Center for Sustainable Business Practices, Kalamazoo, 2012.
Reviewed by John Grayzel
jgrayzel@aol.com
Laina Farhat-Holzman is a prolific author, the copious extent of whose production
challenges the reader who is ambitious enough to go below any one work to grasp the larger
issues and positions she presents. The four books that concern us now are: 1) Strange Birds
from Zoroaster’s Nest (Revised Edition), 2) God’s Law or Man’s Law: The Fundamentalist
Challenge to Secular Rule, 3) How Do You Know That: A Guide to Critical Thinking about
Global Issues, and 4) World Changes: Ten Inventions That Changed Everything. When
read together they not only exemplify the value of taking a more expansive perspective of
Farhat-Holzman’s work but also give rise to a hope that Farhat-Holtzman herself will
continue her intellectual journey to its compelling conclusion.
Strange Birds from Zoroaster’s Nest (Revised Edition) was originally published in 2000. It
is a gem of a work. There certainly are a handful of other books that can serve as more
extensive introductions to Zoroaster and Zoroastrian thought, such as Zoroastrianism: An
Introduction by Jenny Rose or In Search of Zarathustra by Paul Kriwaczek. However, one
of the enticing uniqueness’s of Strange Birds from Zoroaster’s Nest is precisely the pithy,
clear and sensitive way it goes directly to the heart of Zoroaster’s teaching. It focuses in on
Zoroaster’s major foundational contribution to all the world’s later major religions: namely
his transformation of the understanding of religion from that of “paying off evil forces with
sacrifices”, what the writer calls “a protection racket”, to a process of deep self-awareness
and deliberate ethical behavior”. (Farhat-Holzman, 2003, 14)
It was Karl Jaspers who most prominently asserted the idea of a transformational age of
religion: an age that ushered in both a new sense of moral understanding, and a new sense
of the role of the individual in the search for that morality. Jaspers, who called the period
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between approximately 800 and 200 B.C.E. the “axial age”, saw this period as the age during
which the spiritual understanding of humanity made a major rotational shift in a series of
parallel but largely independent religious emergences. These included the teachings of
Zoroaster, Buddha, Confucius, Moses, Jesus and Mohammed.
Farhat-Holzman, using more recent chronological evidence, makes the case that, in fact, is
was Zoroaster who was the founding influence on all these religions. She asserts the need
to give him a far greater recognition for being the “founding father” of morality-based
religion per se, through the direct influence of Zoroastrianism on the other Faiths. To
support this position, Farhat-Holzman follows the train of Zoroastrian belief through
Judaism, Christianity and Islam as it progressed, respectively, from its origins as a conceived
battle between Ahura Mazda and Ahriman (Zoroastrianism) to becoming the battle between
fulfilling or not fulfilling God’s word (Judaism), to becoming the battle between God and
Satan (Christianity), then the battle between Believer and Non-Believer (Islam) and,
eventually, arriving at the abstract philosophically choice between good and evil.
Farhat-Holzman’s advocacy for recognition of Zoroaster’s positive historic role, however,
is counter-balanced by her less than positive portrayal of the life cycle of the religion per se.
This includes her description of the establishment of Zoroastrianism as the official religion
of the Sassanian Empire, and the increasing domination of its priests, rituals and dogmas.
Eventually Zoroastrianism came into conflict with rising Islam, and was subsequently
persecuted by it. Today Zoroastrianism’s relatively few remaining adherents are mainly the
generally prosperous Parsees of India. The ultimate irony is the accompanying survival of
the seemingly misguided dogmatic thinking of its priests who today, though the community
faces increasing diminution in numbers because of intermarriage, insist that only the
offspring of both a Zoroastrian mother and father can be recognized as a member of the
Faith.
Farhat-Holzman’s God’s Law or Man’s Law, The Fundamentalist Challenge to Secular Rule
was published between the original publication of Strange Birds from Zoroaster’s Nest and
the present second edition. It is important in and of itself, but also to our understanding
some of the additional material Farhat-Holzman has added to the second edition. That new
material work goes beyond specifically discussing Zoroastrianism to bringing in present day
fundamentalist Islam and its increasing conflict with almost every expression of an
globalizing world, religious and non- religious, that fundamentalist Islam sees as evil
personified.
In God’s Law or Man’s Law, the author looks at “good” and “evil” today as basically a
struggle between rationality and science on one side and fundamentalist religious doctrines
and cults on the other.
She recognizes that these fundamentalists do not take their cues from the nobler thoughts of
the great religious thinkers of the past. Rather they are the servants of present-day powerPublished by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2015
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hungry leaders who feed upon the sense of threatened loss of identity felt by large numbers
of people suffering under the disorientations of the modern world. I will refrain from
outlining the specific material Farhat-Holzman presents because her book is an easy and
quick read. It is a short but broad coverage of most of the major present day religious groups
and doctrines in conflict with modern progressive thought and practices.
As such, it is an inviting resource for dialogue and debate on how fundamentalist religions
distort not only humanist oriented rationality but also the most meaningful contributions of
religion to civilization. As the author herself says:“ I am not attacking the founders of the
world’s great religions…. the institutions that followed these prophets are to blame.
Religions take on a life of their own, and for all the steps forward in morality and ethics that
come with each new religion, dreadful cultural behaviors return and somehow become
enshrined.” (106)
World Changes: Ten Inventions That Changed Everything is the author’s succinct
demonstration of the means by which rational thought and empirically based decisionmaking made, on ten occasions, transformational changes to a world filled with superstition
and dogma. This book and the fourth work under discussion, How Do You Know, are
basically short works specifically designed to be resources for academic courses. The first
book identifies ten critical inventions: fire, agriculture, water technologies, printing press,
telescope, communications, transport, energy, the computer and future transformative
science – i.e., space travel and brain science, as her candidates for the ten human inventions
that have most qualitatively changed human life. As a short teaching resource it offers a
stimulating pre-packaged presentation of facts ideal for discussion and debate. However,
unlike the other three works, it does not particularly focus on the role of religion in today’s
world. I have included it, however, because I feel it represents an important piece in the
puzzle of understanding and appreciating the larger picture Farhat-Holzman’s intellectual
endeavors.
How Do You Know That? focuses on the need for critical thinking, particularly on issues
that Farhat-Holzman feels strongly about. These include religion and religious
fundamentalism, Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iran, all of them situations that she
feels we “got wrong”. Like World Changes: Ten Inventions That Changed Everything, it is
really designed as an instructional tool and does not provide any “right” answers.
What it does certainly demonstrates is how many ways we can go wrong, regardless of
whether the intent is benevolent (e.g. Paul Ehrlich wrongly warning we would run out of oil
by the end of the twentieth century) or aggressive (e.g. George Bush going into Iraq). The
“we” here is mostly the United States and this is certainly not a book for those who believe
that America is always right. Rather it is a book to prick the balloon of delusion that seems
to so easily affect policy makers, especially those who come to situations with already well
developed understandings and who resist ever taking a look at the quality of their
information before beginning to speculate on what it means.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol72/iss72/19

154

Review: Full Issue

152

Number 72, Spring 2015

The author has written many focused short works. While many of these often reference
each other, they are not openly presented as parts of any larger grand thesis and are thus
easily thought of as separate intellectual products. I, however, do not see matters this way.
I think that without looking at the larger picture which these works, as a collective, portray,
one misses the power of the larger argument as well as a possible critique as to what is still
missing. So, with the caveat that I am speaking for my own conclusions and not the authors,
I suggest the following synthesis:
Farhat-Holzman is at her core a scholar of civilization and therefore putting her works in the
context of the phenomenon of civilization may be the best way to fully appreciate them.
Civilizations wax and wane. Civilizations spring to birth, display energetic expansion,
consolidate in maturity, eventually give way to the encumbrances of vested interests and,
after overextending themselves, grow feeble and then die – usually at the hands of a lethal
challenge – whether natural or human. It should not surprise us therefore that this cycle is
also true of the role religion plays in the rise and fall of the civilizations with which they are
associated. The problem is that it is one thing to objectively analyze the rise and fall of a
past civilization and yet another thing to have to emotionally experience the fall of your own
civilization in your own time and place.
Dr. Farhat-Holzman understands just how great have been the achievement of Western
Civilization, and just how little those who want to bring it to an end understand of its
greatness. She also expresses her simmering disappointment, verging on anger, at those of
its purported leaders who so often seem even less informed and more foolish than their
adversaries. I suspect that Thucydides, when he wrote the Peloponnesian War while in exile
from his home state of Athens, felt somewhat the same as he watched Athens’ mistakes in
its war with Sparta. A more recent example might be Milovan Djilas, the close associate of
Marshal Tito, who, while in prison for his freethinking, produced prolific commentaries on
the degeneration of the communism of the times and the likely sad fate that faced Yugoslavia
in the coming future. In both cases, the fact that each of the commentators had been isolated
from active engagement in their societies gave them a degree of added objectivity and
separation from the unfolding tragedy of their times.
In contrast, Dr. Farhat-Holzman is passionately concerned and involved in today’s world
and she has a clarion message she wishes to give. That message appears to be that Western
Civilization has been the major advancer of humanity in the last five hundred years.
Moreover, that advancement has been clearly science and technology-driven. And, while
there is a legitimate question to ask as to who paid for, and who benefitted by, this progress,
if you believe in the advancement of civilization you have to also ask: who else would have
done it better or even could have done it at all?
At the same time, Dr. Farhat-Holzman’s message of the need for a “frank accounting” of
who has contributed what to human civilization, while certainly relatively positive to the
Western, does recognize that critical elements of the West’s social and philosophical roots
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come from a very different more distant past, when, as she sees it, religious certitude rather
than critical thinking, (which she describes as “a logical train of thought, challenging
assumptions and coming to a measured conclusion”; 2011, 2), determined the reigning
cultural beliefs. On the other hand, she, herself, presents powerful evidence that today such
critical thinking is becoming harder and rarer, given the nature of overwhelming and
constantly changing information, and the domination of opinion by narrow disciplinary
specialists.
In the end, I hope the time will come, the sooner the better, when Farhat-Holzman will write
a synthesis of her independent works and meld her varied observations and conclusions into
something greater than the sum of the parts. Personally, I suspect what is holding this back
is her reluctance to, like Thucydides and Djilas, come to terms with the evidence that she is
studying: the unraveling of her own present civilization, a civilization that seems incapable
of meeting even the most obvious and lethal of planetary challenges, such as atomic
weapons, global warming and catastrophic environmental degradation.
In this respect, How Do You Know That, the work that on the surface seems the least relevant
to the others, may actually hold the key. Farhat-Holzman describes well the challenges
fundamentalism presents to solving problems through critical thinking. But How Do You
Know That is replete with examples showing that official and unofficial Western, and
especially American, policy and practices are increasingly anything but well informed or
well thought out.
Though still a technological powerhouse, today’s America is not the gathering place of great
minds in terms of either wisdom or critical thinking. Rather it is dominated by ideological,
dogma bound “priests” and “friars” of the established “Church of the Moneyed, the Powerful
and the Special Interests.” We may call them by other names such as economists, political
scientists, policy analysts, consultant, pundits, but in the end we worship at their feet and
repeatedly pay for their usually wrong divinations.
Is there really that much difference between these pundits of neo-liberal western corporate
capitalism and those priests of Zoroastrianism who over time forgot the deep morality
behind Zoroaster’s message and replaced it with self-enriching rituals?
The Roman Empire always had barbarians on its borders. Its problems arose when, because
of its internal rot, it could no longer defend itself against them. Is our situation today vis-àvis fundamentalism really that different from Rome in its decline? And if it isn’t, then don’t
we have to come to the conclusion that our reigning western civilization and its religion are
beyond saving and are mere shells waiting to be blow over by the rising wind of a yet to be
recognized replacement?
Of course, maybe I am misreading the message that comes from an encompassing reading
of these books. Maybe science and critical thinking can still save the day. But whether I
am right or wrong, these books have proven provocative to read and I certainly await Dr.
Farhat-Holzman’s next work to clarify the thoughts they have raised in my mind.
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Bernard Lewis, The End of Modern History in the Middle East
Hoover Institution Press, 2011
Reviewed by Laina Farhat-Holzman
lfarhat102@aol.com

Bernard Lewis is one of the best and most respected scholars of the Middle East. During
his long life, he has seen the first signs of the Middle East and Muslim world begin to stir
after four centuries of sleep. Their awakening has not been a happy one, it seems, because
of their failure to recognize their own institutions have been more responsible for their
economic and social backwardness than the colonial master they prefer to blame. Even in
blaming colonialism, the Arab world focuses only on European, not Ottoman Turkish
colonialism.
Lewis believes that a growing number of educated Middle Easterners are beginning to see
that it rests with them to change the institutions that have left them in a state of “failure to
thrive,” the analysis of the United Nations Human Development Report of 2002. Were that
report to be updated in 2013, the failure to thrive has become far worse.
The problems, as seen by the Arab intellectuals who wrote this Report, are the same as those
seen by Bernard Lewis: more than half of Arab women are illiterate; the region's infant
mortality rate is twice as high as in Latin America and the Caribbean, over the past 20 years,
income growth per capita has also been extremely low. The Report highlights the causes
of these deficits and identifies three areas where Arab institutional structures are hindering
performance and crippling human development: governance, women's empowerment, and
access to knowledge.
This small book has an insightful introduction by Fouad Ajami, another of the best of
Middle East scholars, this one born in the region itself (he is a Lebanese). Ajami gives us
the history of the Hoover Institution (a Stanford University think tank) which had been
indispensable in the ongoing scholarship about the Soviet Union. The scholarship took a
new turn after the fall of the Berlin Wall with the founding of a Working Group on Islamism
and the International Order. We learned on 9/11 how much our country is engaged and
dangerously exposed in this newly radicalized Muslim world.
Radical Islam (Islamism) has “declared war on the states in their midst, on American power
and interests, and on the very order of the international state system. Although they are a
minority in the world of Islam, they are very determined that they would use terror if
necessary to restore a central dictatorship (the Islamic emirate) that will force the world to
recognize and yield to their notion of the Religion of Allah.”
Islam in its greatest period was a crossroads civilization with trading routes and mixed
populations: a supranational empire. The modern world is a complex of nation states with
largely common values and, under the influence of America and Western Europe,
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increasingly liberal international norms, all of which are abhorrent to Islamism (and difficult
even for mainstream Muslims).
Religious toleration, gender and racial equality, secular education, and a free and largely
capitalist global economy are particularly opposed by the Islamists, to the detriment of the
entire Muslim world.
Bernard Lewis is at the forefront of the scholarship analyzing and pinpointing what the
Muslim World needs to flourish and join the currents of modernity.
Introduction
The book’s Introduction, also by Fouad Ajami, provides the biography of Bernard Lewis’
long life. Lewis worked for British Intelligence during World War II, and he morphed from
an academic medievalist to a scholar with a taste or modern affairs. “In 1940,” he said, “we
knew who we were, we knew who the enemy was, we knew the dangers and the issues….
It is different today. We don’t know who we are, we don’t know the issues, and we still do
not understand the nature of the enemy.” It is to this end that Lewis has written his many
thoughtful books on the history and varieties of the Muslim World. This book is his latest.
Chapter One: The End of Modern History in the Middle East
Modern history in the Middle East began when General Napoleon Bonaparte invaded and
conquered Egypt (easily, despite Egypt being a colony of the Ottoman Empire). This began
a period when Europeans had the ultimate power over the region, starting with Britain and
France, and ending with the rivalry of the US and Soviet Union. Despite the end of military
and political intervention by the West, Middle Easterners continue to assume that real
responsibility and decisions still lie elsewhere. These beliefs lead to “wild and strange
conspiracy theories directed against those whom they regard as their enemies: Israel, Jews,
the US, and the West. There is still a widespread belief that America is an imperial power
in the Middle East, which, if this were true, would by now have modernized and westernized
the region far more than it is today.
The Islamists, medieval though they are, understand enough of modernity to know how to
manipulate it. Groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood have been able to run in an election,
win, and then attempt to make democracy mean, as we have seen before, “one man, one
vote, one time.” There are public statements about democracy, but then private statements
scorning this value.
Although we have seen Islamists winning elections, Lewis tells us that there is a marked
difference between the democrats and the Islamists: “the former have a program of
development and betterment, while the latter offer only a return to a mythologized past.
The problem is that the weaknesses of the democrats are immediate and obvious; their
strengths are long-term and, for many, obscure.”
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The one Middle Eastern state with what appeared to be a decent democracy was Turkey,
which since the election of its first Islamist president, is undoing a half century of
parliamentary democracy. His political party (Justice and Development) “reveals attitudes
that are anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, anti-Western and, more generally, anti-liberal and antimodern. Its leaders and spokesmen show affinities --- and form alliances --- with the most
extreme elements in Iran and in some of the Arab countries.”
In a discussion of the Palestinians’ long struggle against Israel, Lewis notes that the
leadership continues to make terrible choices that do nothing but hurt them. Their first error
was choosing the Axis in the Second World War. They then chose the Soviets in the Cold
War and Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War. This is astonishingly wrongheaded! They have
lost the goodwill of the United States, but more serious was the loss of the goodwill of the
Arab members of the anti-Saddam coalition --- the Saudis, the Kuwaitis, and the other Gulf
States, their supporters and paymasters in the struggle against Israel. Their support for
terrorism has lost them even more than that on a global level.
In assessing the future conflicts in the region, Lewis sees a continuation of a cold war
between Israel and the Muslim world. He speculates that Syria might pursue its long-time
goal of becoming once more a “greater Syria,” but his book was written before the current
civil wars and Syria’s bad decision to use poison gas. This story is not yet over.
Iran is at a crossroads. The Islamic Republic is not much loved by its population, and bad
decisions (such as the nuclear program) have sent the economy into disaster mode. Lewis
speculates that the Iranian Revolution may culminate in a Napoleon or a Stalin (he sees a
fascist future there) but notes that this venture could end as both Napoleon’s and Stalin’s
did.
The regional chaos may also result in geographic changes, pushed by aggression. Iraq tried
to swallow Kuwait; Syria has planted its foot on Lebanon; Egypt is eyeing the Sudan; and
Libya may soon break up into its constituent sections. This chaos also opens the door to
adventurism from outside of the Muslim world. Weakness invites intervention.
The two most urgent commodities that will roil the region are oil and water. The third
source of turmoil is a population explosion, already putting stress on water; and new energy
sources may render oil less of a golden goose. Tourism, one of the region’s best
opportunities for self-support is in collapse because of the chaos and anarchy. Egypt is
suffering most from this decline.
Finally, Lewis says that “the competition between democracy and fundamentalism will
have a direct bearing on another choice --- between outward and inward modernization.”
Outward modernization is the purchase of modern war technologies or, in Saudi Arabia,
modern technologies in general, which they have no capability to produce.
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Inward modernization is learning to manufacture and ultimately design such technologies,
something not happening in the region’s outdated educational systems. “In this respect, the
Middle East still lags far behind other more recent recruits to modernity such as Korea,
Taiwan, and Singapore.
“There are three factors which could help transform the Middle East: Turkey, Israel, and
women---the first previously aloof, the second previously excluded, the third previously
suppressed.” Of these, the most important is women. Support for this sector is coming
from the overseas Muslim populations in the US and Europe. There can be no modernity
without women as partners in today’s world.
Perhaps the best hope for the region is the gradual if reluctant emancipation of women.
“Already in the nineteenth century some Muslim observers noted that one significant reason
why their society was falling behind that of the West was that they were depriving
themselves of the talents and services of half the population----the female half.” In large
parts of the Muslim world, women are still subject to constraints and disabilities far worse
than anything prescribed in Muslim scripture and law or even practiced in early Islamic
times.
“For each and every country and for the region as a whole, there is a range of alternative
futures: at one end, cooperation and progress toward peace and freedom, enlightenment and
prosperity; at the other, a vicious circle of poverty and ignorance, fear and violence, tyranny
and anarchy, hatred and self-pity, leading perhaps in the end to a new alien domination.”
If the Muslim world doesn’t reform and catch up with the rest of us, they will be a tempting
target for some new empire or other. (China?) Their choices at the moment are to continue
to fragment, or to launch a new holy war, a jihad, which could again provoke the response
of an opposing holy war, a new crusade.
Chapter Two: Propaganda in the Middle East
This chapter explores the ultimate purposes of propaganda: getting one’s ideas across and
accepted. Lewis explores its uses in the West (including Hitler and Stalin), America, and
the Muslim world with its current propaganda campaigns by the Islamists. A large part of
the latter involves the unthinking belief in conspiracy theories, theories that can result in
mindless violence.
Chapter Three: Iran: Haman or Cyrus
This is a wonderful discussion of the two possibilities for the emergence of Iran after the
demise of the Islamic Revolution: a worse society (fascist), characterized by the evil Haman
in the Bible; or a return to Iran’s humanistic roots as exemplified by the first great Persian
shah, Cyrus. The country could go either way.
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Chapter Four: The New Anti-Semitism---First Religion, Then Race, Then What?
Many thoughtful people have asked the question: Why are Jews so universally hated? What
did they do?
Lewis goes back through history to explore antiquity, in which ethnicities engaged in
mutual dislike and often warfare. The dislike was rooted in different allegiances, and we
can see this today in our own lives.
The conflict between Rome and Judea was a case in point; the Romans did not hate Jews
for their religion (the Romans didn’t care); but they responded to a revolt in Judea and
settled it by exiling most of the population from their land.
The hatred did not become religious until an emerging offshoot of Judaism, Christianity,
came into competition and conflict with the mother faith. When the Roman Empire adopted
Christianity as its state faith, the competition with the older religion went viral. Jews were
hated for not recognizing the new cult and not getting in line under the Roman Empire.
They became the permanent “other.”
After the Enlightenment, fathered by those who were disgusted by the religious wars
between the Protestants and the Catholics that roiled Europe for two centuries, religion was
discarded as a reason for hatred. Race became the focus of anti-Semitism, and this concept
was backed by a bad misuse of science.
The problem with the racial analysis is that, unlike religion, race cannot be changed. One
could escape religious persecution by converting (as many Jews did to Christianity and
Islam). But what can one do with race?
Today’s struggle between Israel and the Palestinians (and the entire Muslim world, even
where Jews are not living) has spawned a new sort of anti-Semitism, one with roots in the
racial theories of Hitler, adopted eagerly by the Muslim world and equally, it seems, by
intellectuals in both Europe and to a lesser degree, the United States --- an extraordinary
double standard.
What is good for the goose is not good for the gander. The Palestinians (or Muslims
altogether) can do things that Israel cannot because the standards are different. During the
founding war for Israel, 750,000 Palestinians fled (and in some cases were pushed) from
the new state. At the same time, 750,000 Jews were pushed (or murdered) from Arab
countries where they had been living for millennia. The UN set up camps for the
Palestinians, where they sit even today. The UN did not worry about the Jewish refugees
who took care of themselves (or had a few years of help from Israel). But the propaganda
emphasizes the Palestinian plight, never the Jewish plight.
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“For more than a half a century, any discussion of Jews and their problems has been
overshadowed by the grim memories of the crimes of the Nazis and of the complicity,
acquiescence or indifference of so many others. But inevitably, the memory of those days
is fading and now Israel and its problems afford an opportunity to relinquish the unfamiliar
and uncomfortable posture of guilt and contribution and to resume the more familiar and
more comfortable position of stern reproof from an attitude of moral superiority. It is not
surprising that this opportunity is widely welcomed and utilized.
“One might argue that when Arabs are judged by a lower standard than Jews, as for example
the minimal attention given to the atrocious crimes committed at Darfur, this is more
offensive to Arabs than to Jews. Contempt is indeed more demeaning than hatred. But it is
less dangerous.”
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Jean Haussmann, In Search of the Origins of Nazi Monstrosity: From Persecution to
Annihilation
Dorrance, 2011
Reviewed by Joseph Drew
josephdrew4920@verizon.net
We are now about one human lifetime away from the Holocaust. The literature on this
monumental human disaster has boomed, but the struggle to understand the causes of it has
not been successfully concluded. Why did they do it?
Into the discussion comes a stimulating new book. It’s entitled “In Search of the Origins of
Nazi Monstrosity: From Persecution to Annihilation.” The author is Jean Haussmann, a
Swiss citizen.
The book is actually an extended outline. It explores, lists, and examines many probable
and interrelated causes of the Holocaust. In the process, new light is shed on this
abomination.
Haussmann grounds much of his analysis in the culture of those he calls Austro-Bavarians.
During the course of the book he adds some from the Sudetenland, but these are minor
figures. What Haussmann shows is that the Holocaust had its point of origin in the culture,
outlook, religion, intellectual forces, philosophy and music of the region encompassing
Bavaria and Austria. It is a region which has close internal affinities; he reports that
Churchill wanted to create it as a separate country, after the end of World War II. Even
today, there are strong similarities, as Bavaria seeks to retain its unique status within
Germany and Austria, while opting to be a neutral land, has to contain repeated outbursts of
neo-Nazi politics.
And sadly, the author concludes, Bavaria and Austria haven’t changed all that much. Look,
he notes, at the violence which occurs, with mass approval, during the Oktoberfest, even to
this day. Bavaria, he says, still shows tell-tale signs of homogeneity and irrationality.
The book begins with three levels set up for researching. There are the “material executors”
– those individuals who conducted much of the actual murdering. There is, next, the civil
servant class that supported the Holocaust. And finally, there is the idea itself of the
Holocaust, a monster “sui generis,” which Hitler and his closest allies always sought and
which, as seen in the notes from Wannsee, they forced on others less fervent in their antiSemitism.
Haussmann says of the actual murderers that they were men who yearned for limitless
power. With poor educational backgrounds, a lack of training in critical thinking, a feeling
of alienation from the modern world, and fascination with violence already coursing through
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their culture, these people constituted the perfect machinery for perpetrating mass cruelty.
They could do so with moral indifference.
The civil servants, on the other hand, took on the German attitude of duty first, no matter
what. The idea was expressed in a letter written to his son by the father, a high magistrate,
of one concerned official who was upset by the operations of the Holocaust. Your job is to
do your duty to the best of your ability, the father declared, and let those at the top who set
the policy take the weight for it. The civil servants organized the killing with great
efficiency, their ambition and lack of personal values making it all possible. Furthermore,
as Hegel had taught, the state and the individual had become united, one in purpose, so the
Prussians in the administration thought the German state was to be all powerful.
Finally, the Nazi leadership kept the goal of mass murder to themselves. There was an
extraordinary homogeneity of the real Nazis, all coming from the region of Austria, Bavaria,
or Sudetenland, many the earliest followers of the Nazi party. Haussmann shows by a
significant number of tests that the Austro-Bavarians were in fact hugely overrepresented
amongst Germans involved in the actual killing jobs. He looks in depth at the sentences
handed out in Nuremberg; the sentences of death often went to those whose origin was in
this particular region. Further, a study of the IQs of those held for trial at Nuremberg shows
that the smarter ones were not condemned to death. His conclusion is logical: the early
Nazis, those who attained high posts in the regime, were recruited from amongst the less
intelligent Austrians and Bavarians.
What were the underlying trends that culminated in Germany taking this extreme, horrible
direction under the Nazis? There came upon the victims of the Holocaust a “perfect storm,”
says Haussmann, the confluence of several historical trends that he explores. The violence
and murder of the Holocaust was a regression; it went back to the Inquisition. Catholic
assumptions – particularly about evil undesirable people who can only be purged by death - figured greatly in the zeitgeist that became Nazi extermination policy. Further, could the
violence have been based in part on the fact that Nazi leaders mostly came from a
borderland, where nationalist fervor always runs strongest?
Next, Haussmann notes the effect of Freudian psychoanalysis, a school of thought that
developed in Austria and with which Hitler was apparently somewhat familiar. It lent to the
Holocaust the idea of a subconscious (and perhaps irrational) level of the personality.
From popular theater music came the impact for Austria of the operetta. This form
developed in Vienna, where it was very popular. It offered a “desirable but unobtainable”
world, mostly of upper class life. Thus was highlighted the opposition between the desired
life and the dramatic underlying reality.
Further, Austria was a setting in which both ritualistic crimes and incest were frequently
found, Haussmann says. He reports that the Austrians have not been able to control this
fixation about incest, even to the present day. The country recently focused on a man who
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had his daughter locked up below the house; over the years of her captivity, she bore him
children.
He then examines in more depth Austrian and Bavarian Roman Catholicism, which has been
extremely authoritarian in nature. Plus, Catholicism, like psychoanalysis, is “quite strong
at a ritual level in the search for mental balance,” says Haussmann. Both Catholicism and
psychoanalysis provide a limited territory in which men are seen as acting on impulses they
can’t control. These impulses often are evil and lead to suffering. Such impulses must be
eliminated for the benefit of the patient and of society.
As to serious music, the Dionysian music of Wagner (with its cradle in the Bavarian town
of Bayreuth) centers on conflict; on dissonance which must be resolved; and on the concept
of a Nietzschean final solution, which must always be overwhelming and take place with
the death of the interpreters and which constitutes a catharsis of the “cycle of life that was
unable to withstand the violence of experience.”
Wagner developed the total art form. To him, mankind was on the brink of disaster; people
face if not total victory, total annihilation, often both. This means overcoming all obstacles
even if doom awaits. It is catharsis by death, a terrible price for the individual to pay but
one which opens up a new era for the future generations. Internal doubts are resolved; there
is but one approach, an all-engaging vision.
What these strands build is a totalizing interpretation of the history of mankind, perennial
conflict and death as the inevitable outcome, even when sublimated by intense love. It is
also a completely pessimistic view of the world. You have, thus, arrived at the nexus which
led to the Holocaust.
Haussmann explores and emphasizes a number of these points:
1. Nazi dogma draws radical conclusions, just as the Roman Catholic Church did during
the Inquisition. Capital punishment is based on the idea that the individual cannot be
rehabilitated and the malefactor constitutes a virus affecting all society.
2. The zeitgeist, the spirit of the age, as seen in Wagner, reaches its resolution only in death.
There is a need to clean the house. This is related, says Haussmann, to the need for
order, always persistent in Bavarian and Austrian culture.
3. According to the author, animals have a strong desire to maximize violence. We, too,
genetically may need a catharsis in order to overcome the strain of killing. We see this
in the book of Job. We see this in the life of Christ. We see this in the Roman coliseum.
So the Nazis in the concentration camps were like the wolves, with their prey which
must be violently destroyed. It’s genetic, Haussmann thinks. And, interestingly, while
the Prussians want no doubt, the Austrians like complexity.
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4. Historically, as the intellectuals of Vienna surrendered after the Anschluss to the
provinces and their dogmatism, a terrible culture of murder arose in Austria. Haussmann
discusses two instructive, if horrid, cases. Locals voluntarily hunted and killed escaped
Soviet officers from Mauthausen concentration campus; they called it the “rabbit chase.”
There was also the killing for sport of 200 innocent Jews at Rechnitz, forced to build a
wall against possible Communist attack. The Nazis who shot the prisoners were
attending a party thrown by a countess, as the war was concluding in March of 1945;
they thought to have “a last hunt”, some fun. They wanted, the author says, one more
chance at the luxury of total power of one man over another.
5. Thus, a series of relatively independent elements converge and forge certain latencies
into an identifiable force.
This is a powerful book which presents many ideas about what caused the Holocaust.
Perhaps not every element of it will bear up under further scrutiny, but many of these points
do, in fact, constitute part of the explanation for the most egregious mass murder ever to
occur in the history of the Western civilization.
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Niccolo Leo Caldararo, The Anthropology of the Credit Crisis: Magical Thinking,
Irrationality and the Role of Inequality
More to Come Publishing, 2013.
Reviewed by Andrew Targowski
targowsik@wmich.edu
Rather Too Greedy to Survive Than Too Big to Fail and Too Dangerous to Exist?
The author of this rare -- since truthful -- and very well-referenced book is an anthropologist
who applies his reflective and inter-disciplinarian knowledge and skills to analyze the
complex society of Western Civilization, particularly its financial dimension and ability to
trigger social crises. His primary hypothesis is that the current Great Recession, which is
the result of the Financial Crisis of 2008, cannot recuperate despite the messaging of many
politicians and economists.
Many intellectuals try to analyze the current situation from other points of view than the
financial one. Professor Niccolo Leo Caldararo from San Francisco State University argues
that complex societies, just 10,000 years old, behave similarly to primitive societies, which
knew how to save and distribute surpluses of important living resources. This ability
penetrates religions and political systems of complex societies and is the trigger of financial
booms, busts and economic hardship through centuries and millennia.
Furthermore, the author claims that the ability to save and transfer wealth (under different
forms) is at the core of the successful society. This achievement, the production of
surpluses, was the great invention of the Neolithic period some 10,000 years ago.
Remembering that the birth of civilization took place about 6,000 years ago, the growing
application of irrigation systems in domesticated society created good business and a
surplus of wealth. This new wealth had to be protected; therefore religion was engaged as
well as administration, military, cities and so forth. Eventually these entities organized
themselves under a form of a civilization.
This game between saving and distributing wealth led to the development of credit and a
banking system. As a result it led to a conflict between labor and capital. The Soviets
supposedly took care of labor and Nazist Germany took care of capital. The result of these
cares is widely known and the author spares time not to explain to the reader about the
outcomes of those experiments. Fortunately. The author thinks that we learned nothing,
since we should elaborate the optimal system based on the solutions developed in Japan,
Sweden, India, and China after World War II. Apparently the author knows what he is
saying since he defined this system in his 2004 (2013 second edition) book on The
Anthropology of Complex Economic Systems: Inequality, Stability, and Cycles of Crisis.
After a very profound discussion and review of literature, the author says that Presidents
Bush (jr.) and Obama’s rescuing of banks at the dawn of the 21st century was limited to
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2015

167

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 72 [2015], No. 72, Art. 19

Comparative Civilizations Review

165

rescuing “aristocracy” instead of taking care of employment and innovations. The result of
this policy is the fact that banks are not too big to fail but to survive. Eventually they may
disappear even in the 21st century, since they are a liability for the future. Their utility
function (commercial transactions) can be taken over by the Internet and its digital coins of
many sorts, (examples include the Bitcoin system of digital currency)
Returning to the author’s anthropological analysis, he reminds us that hoarding food or
caching materials for future use is not a unique trait in humans; it is shared by many animals.
Some anthropologists emphasize the display of wealth over desire to hoard (possess in
secret). In such a way humanity defines its social status. The big bankers’ behavior in
focusing on big bonuses exemplifies their plan to save resources for the future. Even on
such a scale that they will never be consumed. But what is wrong that those huge bonuses
are provided even if business goals are not accomplished? This kind of behavior is possible
because the contemporary bankers are not limited anymore to a utility-oriented function but
have became brokers who take care of the distributions of wealth for customers. On the
way they collect portions of that wealth, which leads to diminishments of wealth in the
hands of society and its ability to save wealth for future consumption. Therefore, it leads
to permanent financial catastrophes.
The author argues that the best textbook on the theory of the economy was written by
Melville Herskovits in 1940 (revised in 1952) - Economic Life of Primitive Peoples. He
argues that this book applies the uniformitarian approach in analyzing primitive humans’
ability and creativeness in production and exchange of goods. Only one thing has changed
in modern society, namely that we spend more money to incarcerate people in prisons than
to educate our young generation (the so-called “school to prison pipeline”). Needless to
say, those prisoners are often victims of their own inability to produce and/or distribute
wealth or take an honest part in these processes. In many ways, the prisoner has become
the product, and our society builds a physical and professional infrastructure to service this
product.
The applied anthropological approach to modern banking explains why the regulators and
CEOs of financial institutions have no contacts with customers and act in an almost abstract
space of wealth. They do this because their ancestors in the Age of Hunters traded with
tribesmen in the same manner. To avoid problems the hunters would leave killed animals
in selected empty places and collect payments in goods in the same places without any faceto-face contacts. In other words, modern men behave like primitive men. The former’s
invention is only gambling with saved funds and with the help of insurers and governments
which can eventually cover the losses.
The author is sorry that education is affected by financial deregulations since the statesupported colleges and universities steadily become private institutions (due to the
diminishing income from taxes) which look for wealthy sponsors who provide funds but
are restricted by their ideology that the sky is the limit and the common good is too
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expensive. This new situation in Western Civilization leads to its decline and backwardness
in globalizing the world.
In the end, the author criticizes the current prescriptions concerning how to improve
Capitalism as the unique and only political system for the world. Among them he
recognizes: (1) “do nothing,” since government is the problem, and (2) regulate the market
and financial institutions. In these approaches there is nothing about the roots of the current
crisis, which is not a classic one but take place in the classic cycle. The author likes
Japanese communitarism which has some roots in Shinto—the religion of nature as a
common good.
The book defines as the main problem of modern society the increasing inequality and the
growth of wealth of the top 1%. Therefore, one must reintroduce the wealth tax, like that
which was in practice during the presidency of D. Eisenhower and is in use in France,
Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Scandinavia and other well-to-do countries today. This kind of
taxation is not income tax and its purpose is to stop intergenerational wealth concentration
(case of W. Buffett and others).
In conclusion, the author says that he has proven that the market is not as chaotic as it is
portrayed in financial textbooks, but rather it is driven by Capitalism’s strongest trait, which
is an extension of Darwinian natural selection where there must be winners and losers. It
is needless to say that, uncontrolled by the opposite Hegelian force, Capitalism will
negatively impact civilizational achievements, eventually leading to a return to the primate
society once found in the Stone Age.
Are we ready to listen to such a message, which is very truthful but inconvenient?
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Tatu Vanhanen, Ethnic Conflicts: Their Biological Roots in Ethnic Nepotism
Ulster Institute for Social Research, 2012
Reviewed by Mariana Tepfenhart
mtepfenh@monmouth.edu
The author of the book, Tatu Vanhanen, is Emeritus Professor of Political Science at the
University of Tampere, Finland and Visiting Researcher at the Department of Political
Science at the University of Helsinki.
The topic of ethnic conflict has generated a lot of debate among scholars from different
fields who tried to explain the causes of such occurrences and to understand why some
conflicts escalates into genocides and others are moderate and have been resolved
successfully.
Most of the previous theories explain ethnic conflicts through cultural and environmental
factors and they did not produce results that can be tested. Dr. Tatu Vanhanen provides a
new interpretation based on genetics. He argues that the evolutionary roots of ethnic conflict
can be traced to “ ethnic nepotism” which is defined as the human “ disposition to favor and
align with relatives in conflict situations”. (Vanhanen IX). This is a behavior that is
characteristic in all people but it has more significance in ethnically divided societies. He
focused on the idea that all organisms struggle for survival, according to Darwin’s
evolutionary theory. This struggle for resources is omnipresent and it affects human
societies, too. It is this competition for scarce resources that is at the base of all interest
conflicts.
The author uses two empirical variables to test his theory. One is ethnic heterogeneity (EH)
to estimate the significance of ethnic nepotism in the conflict. The second one is the scale
of ethnic conflicts (EEC) – to measure the intensity of the conflict from minor incidents to
genocide.
His book is divided into eight chapters and covers 176 independent countries for the time
period between 2003-2011.
Using the Scale of Ethnic Conflicts (EEC) and Ethnic Heterogeneity (EH), the author sets
out to test his hypotheses. He has used a scale of 1 to 5 to measure the significance of ethnic
conflicts in different countries, with 1 representing minor incidents and 5 representing high
level of ethnic violence. Each country was measured based on this scale. Ethnic pluralism
is determined by the percentage of the largest homogeneous ethnic group.
Tatu Vanhanen presents three types of ethnic groups : one based on racial differences, one
based on linguistic, national and tribal differences and one based on religious communities
(Vanhanen, 46.)
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The most important for the study of ethnic conflicts are the racial differences. If the country
studied has a population with 90% homogeneity, other types of ethnic divisions are taken
into account such as national income per capita, human development and level of
democratization. He continues with an in-depth analysis of 176 countries based on the
variables mentioned above.
The study concludes with the idea that ethnic nepotism measured by the level of
heterogeneity is the root of the emergence of ethnic conflicts in any ethnically divided
society. It explains 66% of “the global variation in the estimated scale of ethnic conflicts.”
(Vanhanen, 215)
Because ethnic nepotism is encoded in our genes, it is expected that ethnic conflicts will
continue in the future.
His theory contradicts the explanation of the origins of ethnic conflicts based on
socioeconomic development of a country or the level of democratization, although these
factors can lead to a peaceful resolution of a conflict. He argues that democratic institutions
should be adapted to the ethnic structures of a country to meet the demands of a pluralistic
society. Thus, these institutions can prevent the escalation of the conflict.
Another way to mitigate an ethnic conflict is biological mixing. He gives as an example
Latin America where a large percentage of population is racially mixed. This process is
slow in the United States and Western Europe. In countries with a religious division like
Israel, mixing can be very difficult.
Institutional reforms are listed as another possibility to mitigate an ethnic conflict. Each
ethnic group should be allowed to participate in national policy. In some countries, parties
based on ethnicity are banned but the author quotes Benjamin Reilly from the Organization
for the Security and Cooperation in Europe who “affirms the right of the ethnic minority to
form their own parties and compete for office on ethnic basis.”(Vanhanen, 224). If
democratic ways are not available, ethnic groups will find other ways to achieve their goal.
However, power sharing could be very difficult in places where two groups are competing
for the same territories, as in Israel.
Partition is the last resort to end a conflict. Some can be peaceful, as in former
Czechoslovakia, but others can be bloody, as in former Yugoslavia. In many cases, partition
does not guarantee peace; we see tense relations between India and Pakistan.
Tatu Vanhanen moved away from conventional theories regarding the causes of ethnic
conflicts and focused on genetics. However, he did not disregard other factors. With precise
scholarship, original research and brilliantly argumentation, the book changes our
perspective of the roots of the ethnic conflicts.
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Brian Fagan, Floods, Famines, and Emperors: El Nino and the Fate of Civilizations
Basic Books, 1999
Reviewed by Lynn Rhodes
lrhodes2@hotmail.com
Brian Fagan, a well-known, prolific science writer and archaeologist, has written an
insightful book bringing history, cultural survival and climate change facts together in a
provocative work entitled Floods, Famines, and Emperors: El Nino and the Fate of
Civilizations. Being in the field of environmental protection for 35 years, I found the book
pertinent and thought-provoking. Although written in 1999, it is even more relevant today,
in the age of the Anthropocene, where the balance of man, environment and sustainability
(of both) is at risk and a matter of political debate about facts and supposition.
“Anthropocene” is a proposed term for the present geological epoch, from the time of the
Industrial Revolution onwards, during which humanity has begun to have a significant
impact on the environment. It is derived from anthropo- and -cene , coined by Paul Crutzen,
born 1933, a Nobel-winning Dutch chemist.
I recommend this book not only for a general audience, but for scientists, environmentalists,
archaeologists, planners, and developers as well as business leaders and scholars.
Fagan has attempted to appeal to both his general and scientific audience. In order to
accomplish that, the writing style has a built-in tension between scientific, academic and
personal story telling. More than one reviewer of this work lists this as a weakness. With
the same observations of style, I found the same traits kept my interest.
Fagan shows us how the global weather patterns that result from the El Niño phenomenon
reflect a long history of global weather patterns. He describes how civilizations of the past
have been destroyed by such patterns when they were unable to foresee and/or adapt to
changing conditions. Fagan does this in three parts.


Part One: The Christmas Child, which scientifically describes the phenomenon of
El Niño and what scientists know factually about it, giving the reader a working
knowledge of it. Having scientific data and tools to help evaluate climate history,
relating to human civilization, helps us to understand and adapt.



Part Two: El Niños in Antiquity, tells a story of how past civilizations and human
history have been impacted by El Niño. Of particular interest is how severe climatechange affects key aspects of society, such as how the government works and how
society behaves and interacts. Fagan points out specific, limited ways in which
society can respond or face collapse.
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Part Three: Climate Change and the Stream of Time, discusses how social and
cultural behavior today may be affected as compared to the past. Cultural and
societal vulnerabilities and key areas of attention are described -- such as population
levels, government leadership or lack thereof, and balancing limits of finite
resources.

One can see the later influence of Fagan’s book on Jared Diamond’s Collapse: How
Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (2005). Both draw clear parallels between man and
the environment; some are aspects which man may impact and some are not. Fagan’s
descriptions of relationships between populations, the carrying capacity of the earth and
how governments operate, respond and react, underscore his message of how climate
change plays a major role in cultural change. Fagan makes the case that in the ancient past,
climate change, disasters or climate catastrophes have destroyed civilizations.
His illustrative examples from early Egypt, Mesopotamia, the Moche world of north Peru,
the Anasazi of North America, Europe in the Little Ice Age, and the Mayans describe how
various cultures responded to severe climate shifts, droughts, floods, and decimation of fish
changes in water currents. Various methods were employed, such as simply moving to
another location, modifications to the land, exploring flexibility or simply vanishing.
Population levels play a large role in Fagan’s perceptions of how people can adapt to climate
change. It is easier to migrate when the population density is less than when there are many
in number. The larger the number, the less flexibility there is to meet the survival challenge.
Fagan is a proponent of population control for the future survival of civilization.
Fagan reminds us that man is interrelated with the ecosystems with which we live. He uses
scientific understandings and data of El Niño events in order to demonstrate climate changes
through history. Fagan gives a warning that “societies already strained by unwise
management of the environment” are sometimes pushed past the “breaking point” by shortterm climate patterns like El Niño. Even though our civilization might not be destroyed by
overpopulation, global warming or rapid climate change, “we remain vulnerable to the
forces of climate as never before.”
Fagan uses a number of case-studies to argue ways in which societies might respond to
climate crises: “movement or social collaboration; muddling from crisis to crisis; decisive,
centralized leadership on the part of a few individuals; or developing innovations that
increase the carrying capacity of the land” (xvi).
Some societies have avoided having their civilizations collapse by using a combination of
technology and intervention by the government. Some were doomed by rigid governmental
structure, religious ideologies, and unbalanced population densities that proved
unsustainable. Some, such as the Anasazi society, were able to adapt by leaving their urban
settlements and relocating in order to escape the conditions in which they found themselves.
Our ability to understand how the world’s environmental, and in this case climate, systems
work and how we can adapt will mean the difference between collapse and survival. “The
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ultimate equation of history balances the needs of the population and the carrying capacity
of the land.” (97) According to Fagan, our society’s ability to walk this balance will
determine our sustainability. We will either learn to adapt to the earth’s natural
environmental systems, or the environment and earth will move without us.
I recommend this book as a thoughtful contribution to an emerging body of work on global
environment and eco-civilization in the age of the Anthropocene.
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Number 72, Spring 2015
45th Annual ISCSC Gathering in Rio De Janeiro

I. CONFERENCE
The 45th Annual ISCSC Conference will be held in colorful and exciting Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil, June 11- 13, 2015. The conference venue will be the Windsor Florida Hotel.
The opening reception and the main conference will be at the Convention Center of the
Windsor Florida Hotel, located at 81 Ferreira Viana Street, Flamengo neighborhood, Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil.
The Convention Center of Windsor Florida Hotel is one of the most advanced in Rio de
Janeiro. Its main building is a historic structure that was once used as the Presidential Guard
for the Catete Palace.
II. MAIN CONTACT PERSON
Our Conference Host is: Tereza Coni Aguiar.
☎ (55 21) 2551-3153/ Phone Mobile: (55 21) 99856-8469
E-mail: terezaconiaguiar@gmail.com
III. LOCAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
 Pedro Geiger - State University of Rio de Janeiro, UERJ
☎ (55 21)2225-2449 and (55 21)2556-1724
Email: pedro.geiger@gmail.com
 Jacob Binsztok – Federal University Fluminense - UFF
☎ (55 21)25572137or (55 21)2558 5724, mobile: (55 21)99505
E-mail: jacob.binsztok@terra.com.br
 Dina Moscovici
☎ (55 21)2275-0133/ Phone Mobile (55 21)97288-2371
E-mail: dmoscovici12@hotmail.com
 Inês Freitas - State University of Rio de Janeiro, UERJ
☎ (55 21)
E-mail: freitasines@bol.com.br
 Flávio Rodrigues Nascimento – Federal University Fluminense - UFF
☎ (55 21)98287-7166
E-mail: frngeo2001@yahoo.com.br
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 Vânia Regina Jorge da Silva
☎ (55 21)985767307
E-mail: rjs.vania@yahoo.com.br
 Ulisses da Silva Fernandes
☎ (55 21)985767307 - ☎ (55 21)991872237 / ☎ (55 21)3366-5404
E-mail: u.zarza@uol.com.br

IV. GROUND TRANSPORTATION FROM AIRPORT TO HOTELS.
Special taxis do not need to be booked in advance; they are available upon request at the
counter outside the departure gate at Rio de Janeiro’s Galeão - Antônio Carlos Jobim
International Airport.
Taxi companies: Cootramo, Coopertramo, Copatur, Transcopass, Transcotur. The price
from the airport to the Windsor Flórida Hotel is approximately R$ 98,00 or U$$ 43.36.
If you desire to make a connection in São Paulo or other cities, it is possible to use Santos
Dumont Airport which is very close to the Hotel Windsor Florida, about five minutes away.
There is also an organized service of taxi transportation (with the same companies operating
out of Rio de Janeiro’s Galeão - Antônio Carlos Jobim International Airport). The price is
approximately R$ 33,00 or U$$ 14.60.
Another option is VIP TAXIS. You must book in advance by contacting Julio Batista. His
contact info is:
Email: tourguidejulio@gmail.com
☎ (55 21) 99439-4144
V. LODGING
Lodging will be available at the WINDSOR FLORIDA HOTEL, where the conference will
be held.
We have received a special group rate for the ISCSC conference:

Please note: these currency conversions are approximate, as exchange rates fluctuate. A final
reconciliation will be performed on site to adjust prices to the fluctuating currency rate.
Single: US Dollars: $161.00
Single: Brazilian Real: R$387.00

Double: US$176.64
Double: R$ 425,70

In order to receive this special rate, you must have reserved a room by March 15, 2015.
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Phone: (55 21) 2195 6800
Reservation by email:
www.windsorhoteis.com
Other Hotels close to the Convention Center:
HOTEL NOVO MUNDO - Rates are:
Single: US$ 166.46 Double: US$ 191.28
Single: R$ 376.20 - Double: R$ 432.30
☎ (55 21) 2105-7000
Reservation by E-mail: reservas@hotelnovomundo.com.br
FLAMENGO PALACE HOTEL - Rates are:
Single: US$150.88 – Double: US$175.22
Single: R$ 341.00 – Double: R$396.00
☎ (55 21) 3235-2600
Reservation by E-mail: hotelflamengopalace@hotmail.com
IMPERIAL - Rates are:
Single: US$113.83– Double: US$123.12
Single: R$257.25 – Double: R$278.25
☎ (55 21) 2112-6000
Reservation E-mail: resevas@imperialhotel.com.br
HOTEL REGINA - Rates are:
Single: US141.70 – Double: US$123.12
Single: R$320.25 – Double: R$367.50
☎ (55 21) 3289-9999
Reservation E-mail: hotelregina@hotelregina.com.br

VI. MEALS
There are many restaurants in the neighborhood. Participants also have the option of having
meals at the Windsor Flórida Hotel.
Dinner at the hotel costs R$ 65 + 10% per person.
Other Suggestions:
Carmelo
Address: 75 Correa Dutra Street – Flamengo - RJ
☎ (55 21) 2225-1890
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Carmelo Armazém (only cafeteria - sandwiches, juices and sweets)
Address: 39 Correa Dutra Street – Flamengo,
☎ (55 21) 2557-7941, open until 8 p.m.
Empório Santa Fé
Address: 2 Praia do Flamengo Street – Flamengo - RJ
☎ (55 21) 2245-6274
Estação República Churrascaria
Address: 104 Catete Street – Glória – RJ
☎ (55 21) 2225-2650
Restaurante Graça da Vila
Address: 133 Catete Street – Glória – RJ
☎ (55 21) 2225-7949
Restaurante Alcaparra
Address: 150, Praia do Flamengo – Flamengo – RJ
☎ (55 21) 2558-3937

VII. BANQUET
The banquet will be held on June 13 (we are planning on 1:30 p.m., but finalized time TBA).
Price: US$ approximately 60.00
R$ 130 + 10% per person
Locale: Porcão Ipanema
VIII. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
1. Tours in Rio
A 6 or 8 hour group tour in Rio by van with local Tour Guide Julio Batista will be also
offered to conference participants to visit famous sights in town. Another option will be by
car, using the same Tour Guide in a more private tour (up to 4 persons). Check Mr. Batista’s
website for more information: www.guidinginrio.com
The best way to learn about prices for every each tourist service will be by contacting Julio
Batista through his e-mail (tourguidejulio@gamil.com) or his website
(www.guidinginrio.com).
Julio Batista
Private Tour Guide in Rio
Cell: 55 (21) 99439-4144
Fan Page: https://www.facebook.com/tourguidejulio?fref=ts
For other tourist guide options, please inquire at the hotel reception desk.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol72/iss72/19
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Convention Center of Windsor Florida Hotel

Windsor Florida Hotel
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The International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations
In October 1961, in Salzburg, Austria, an extraordinary group of scholars gathered to
create the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations. Among the 26
founding members from Austria, Germany, France, Switzerland, The Netherlands, Spain,
Italy, England, Russia, the United States, China and Japan were luminaries such as Pitirim
Sorokin and Arnold Toynbee.
For six days, the participants debated many topics, including the definition of
“civilization,” problems in the analysis of complex cultures, civilizational encounters in the
past, the Orient versus the Occident, problems of universal history, theories of
historiography, and the role of the “human sciences” in “globalization.” The meeting was
funded by the Austrian government, in cooperation with UNESCO, and received
considerable press coverage. Sorokin was elected the Society’s first president.
After several meetings in Europe, the advancing age of its founding members and the
declining health of then president Othmar F. Anderle were important factors in the decision
to transfer the Society to the United States.
Between 1968 and 1970 Roger Williams Wescott of Drew University facilitated that
transition. In 1971, the first annual meeting of the ISCSC in the United States was held in
Philadelphia. Important participants in that meeting and in the Society’s activities during
the next years included Benjamin Nelson (the Society’s first American president), Roger
Wescott, Vytautas Kavolis, Matthew Melko, David Wilkinson, Rushton Coulborn and C.P.
Wolf. In 1974, the Salzburg branch was formally dissolved, and from that year to the present
there has been only one International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations
(ISCSC).
The presidents of the ISCSC have been, in order: in Europe, Pitirim Sorokin and Othmar
Anderle; in the United States, Benjamin Nelson, Vytautas Kavolis, Matthew Melko,
Michael Palencia-Roth, Roger Wescott, Shuntaro Ito (from Japan), Wayne Bledsoe, Lee
Daniel Snyder, Andrew Targowski, and the current president, David Rosner. To date, the
Society has held 45 meetings, most of them in the United States but also in Salzburg,
Austria; Santo Domingo, The Dominican Republic; Dublin, Ireland; Chiba, Japan;
Frenchman’s Cove, Jamaica; St. Petersburg, Russia; Paris, France; New Brunswick,
Canada; and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
More than 30 countries are represented in the Society’s membership. Its intellectual
dynamism and vibrancy over the years have been maintained and enhanced through its
annual meetings, its publications, and the participation of such scholars as Talcott Parsons,
Hayden White, Immanuel Wallerstein, Gordon Hewes, André Gunder Frank, Marshall
Sahlins, Lynn White Jr., and Jeremy Sabloff.
The Society is committed to the idea that complex civilizational problems can best be
approached through multidisciplinary analyses and debate by scholars from a variety of
fields. The Comparative Civilizations Review, which welcomes submissions from the
Society’s members as well as other scholars, has been published continually since its
inaugural issue in 1979.
Prof. Michael Palencia-Roth
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol72/iss72/19
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Membership Information
If you are not a member of the ISCSC please consider joining. For a $60 yearly membership
fee members receive a one-year subscription to this journal, are invited to attend the annual
conference, receive the ISCSC newsletter, and may participate in ongoing dialogues.
Membership is open to all interested in civilizations. Visit www.wmich.edu/ISCSC for
further information.
To Obtain Issues of This Journal
Soft cover issues of this journal may be purchased from Amazon.com, bn.com, or from
other Internet booksellers. CD and other electronic copies of this issue may be obtained
from the H.W.Wilson website at www.hwwilson.com or the ProQuest website at
www.proquest.com. Coming soon to EBSCO Electronic Journals Service.

Online Access
This issue, and previous issues, may be accessed, searched by keyword or topic, and read
by pasting the following URL into your browser:
https://ojs.lib.byu.edu/spc/index.php/CCR
We thank the Brigham Young University for providing this service worldwide to all who
are interested in the topics our journal covers.
Upcoming 2015 ISCSC Conference
The 45th Annual Meeting of the International Society for the Comparative Study of
Civilizations will take place June 10 to June 13 in Rio De Janeiro, Brazil. The major topic
this year will be: Civilizational Values at the Crossroads.
Please see conference information in this issue and on the ISCSC website:
www.wmich.edu/ISCSC
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